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 Thesis abstract  
  
This thesis aims to contribute to a personalist approach to policy. First, it covers 
representations of the social and by implication the person in third way 
approaches from New Labour to Conservative policy. To empirically 
demonstrate what views of the person exist, a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
is conducted in the area of higher education governance. The argument put 
forward is that a view of the social and person exists in higher education 
governance and this affects policy proposals and initiatives. Thus, it is viewed 
necessary to present an explicit view of the person that then informs alternative 
policy directions. For this purpose, the work of Margaret Archer is utilised but 
with some revisions proposed. The argued realist model of personhood 
presented is then adopted as the basis of a relational policy direction defined by 
a homo relatus conception of personhood.  
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1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
This thesis covers the different ways the social and by implication the person is 
represented in UK government policy, with specific focus on higher education 
governance. First views of the social and personhood will be covered, followed by 
a critique and the proposal of possible alternative policy directions. Accordingly, 
there are three broad aims to the thesis: 
 
(1) To provide an overview of governance attempts to articulate a third way vision 
between Left and Right and the manner this impacts a view of the social and 
person; 
 
(2) To conduct a textual analysis of higher education governance policies and 
practices; the aim in this analysis is to investigate ways third way policy affects an 
attempt to regulate the social and the place of the citizen in the context of public 
service provision; 
 
(3) To propose an alternative relational policy direction based on a homo relatus 
view of the person. The third aim is based on a theoretical discussion on the 
nature of personhood and the implications of these theoretical themes on 
alternative policies and practices. 
 
The organization of the thesis’s content is informed by the above stated objectives. 
The first section, tackling the first aim, consists of two chapters – the first chapter 
covers New Labour’s attempt at third way thinking in its attempt to reconcile 
antagonistic policy positions of the Left and Right. The relevance of documenting 
New Labour’s third way approach is in its precedence as a third way approach 
that proposed ideas on an enabling state (an enabling state that regulates the 
social and the conditions of provision to meet pre-given policy outcomes). 
Chapter three then overviews the Conservative ‘Big Society’ agenda in which third 
way themes were explicitly adopted. Similar to New Labour, Conservative policy 
adopted ideas on an investment in the social as a path between both the Left and 
Right. However, with similarities acknowledged, differences between New Labour 
and Conservative third way thinking will be stated. 
 
The themes discussed in the first section continue in the second section and 
inform the textual analysis. The second section consists of two chapters – 
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chapters four and five. In chapter four both the research questions and the 
methodology adopted in textual analysis will be stated. In chapter four three main 
questions will be set for analysis – (1) How does a policy vision affect social 
relations in higher education provision and thus represent the citizen as public 
service recipient? (2) How does an existing policy vision extend beyond higher 
education to other policy domains and how does this impact higher education 
practices; (3) Rhetorically what identities and views of the person are incentivised 
and articulated in higher education provision? Chapter five is the empirical 
chapter in which the set research questions are investigated in a Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA) of “Higher Education: Students at the Heart of the 
System”.   
 
Chapters six and seven, the final section, consist of the theoretical work and 
alternative policy directions. Chapter six presents a realist view of the person and 
aims to give a justification of Archer’s approach to personhood, while proposing 
some revisions through social domain theory and a developmental re-thinking of 
reflexivity. Chapter seven then adopts the theoretical questions discussed in 
chapter six and presents a case for a realist turn in higher education practice. The 
realist turn adopts a homo relatus view of personhood and aims to extend the ideas 
discussed in the previous chapter to critique both a homo economicus and homo 
sociologicus view of the person prevalent in hegemonic policy agendas. Finally, 
contextual applications will be proposed based on this alternative view of the 
person in a developmental approach to the curriculum and assessment practice.   
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2 
New Labour, the Third Way  
& Making the Social Work 
 
 
 
The first section covers the policy side of the thesis. It specifically covers the 
question on how the social is conceived as a corrective mechanism, in the logic of 
policy triangulation1, to remedy past failures. The objective of this chapter is to 
identify how New Labour’s third way vision emanates from certain 
representations of the social that pre-supposes new ideological directions and 
policy initiatives. The relevance of New Labour’s model of the third way is in its 
antecedence as a hegemonic policy trend that is then adopted in the ‘Big Society’ 
agenda. Thus, the overview presented also provides continuity and context in a 
trajectory from New Labour to further attempts at triangulation in the ‘Big 
Society’ agenda.  
 
The predominance of the social, as a corrective measure, means that in 
establishing a governance agenda through social spaces, there is, by implication, 
an attempt to define roles and their occupants in terms of a centralised vision of 
the person in relation to others. Consequently, attempts at triangulation are 
presupposed by a framing of the social that supposedly necessitate these policy 
triangulations – these are normative representations that point to an ideological 
                                               
1  For New Labour policy triangulation represented a renewal in social democracy. 
In a changing world that demands adaptation both the past social democratic statist 
approaches of old Labour and the excesses of Thatcherite neo-liberal individualism, 
represent inadequate paths to meet the needs of a competitive global economy and a 
social justice agenda. Instead, New Labour, in its policy triangulation, as will be covered 
in this chapter, sought ways to reconcile what were perceived as contradictory goals – 
social justice and economic efficiency (Alderwick 2012). Chapter three extends the theme 
of policy triangulation to Conservative policy and covers similarities and differences 
between New Labour’s third way and the ‘Big Society’ agenda. While there are similarities 
between New Labour’s third way and the Big Society agenda, the ‘Big Society’ model takes 
a different direction in its focus on reconciling antagonistic themes through initiatives 
that first emphasise a normative societal breakdown and the need to remedy this 
breakdown through collective civic measures (the social). Further, an emphasis on the 
civic represents a space between statist welfare dependency and problems with 
excessive individualism.      
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positioning justifying certain positions (McAnulla 2010). Furthermore, it is the 
logic of third way politics, continued in later Conservative policy, that a dominant 
theme emerges of remaking the social as a corrective measure to the excesses of 
markets and its individualism. Both cases represent the social as something to be 
engineered to bring about more relevant policy initiatives and a space that can 
transcend the faults of previous political philosophies.  
 
2.1 Re-defining the state and adapting to change  
 
While re-defining the state’s role in forms of welfare co-production is something 
that the ‘Big Society’ approach emphasises and further develops, it was New 
Labour that first advocated a fundamental re-thinking of what the state does, 
against what was viewed as the faults of a centralised welfare state. The state, 
through its different agents and ethos of provision, led to a dependency culture 
that valued rights over responsibilities. Re-thinking the state similarly entailed a 
different view of the citizen and subsequently how both the state and the 
community were articulated. Here three main presuppositions were present, per 
Morrison, that necessitated a change in direction: 
 
These are the presupposition, firstly, of a neo-liberal narrative of a 
changing world that demands adaptation; secondly, of a consensual 
society that can agree shared values and work in partnership; and, finally, 
of the failure of both Old Left and the New Right, characterised 
respectively as the first and second ways, hence the required Third Way. 
(Morrison 2004: 176) 
 
According to Tony Blair, the necessity of a consensual society is in its role defining 
a new relationship between citizen and community for the ‘modern world’ (cited 
in Morrison 2004: 171). The ‘modern world’, a salient New Labour policy theme, 
was synonymised with represented social processes – the reification of these 
processes then implicated a given required adaptation. Broader macro-economic 
changes are rhetorically equated with the language of ‘modernising’ and a 
‘modern world’ that imposes an irreversible and necessary context to adapt to and 
the necessity of competing and maintaining markets. 
 
New Labour’s 2003 ‘The Future of Higher Education’ White Paper document, for 
example, viewed higher education as a global business responsive to skills 
required for a knowledge based economy and a competitive market: 
 
Our competitors see – as we should – that the developing knowledge 
economy means the need for more, better trained people in the 
workforce. And higher education is becoming a global business. Our 
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competitors are looking to sell higher education overseas, into the 
markets we have traditionally seen as ours. (DfES 2003: 13) 
 
The changing world requires an enabling state that acknowledges global market 
forces but sets-out to facilitate and address, in the words of Tony Blair, for “supply 
side weakness” (cited in Bevir 2005: 108). Addressing these weaknesses was 
understood in terms of a broader policy synergism that brings together 
public/private partnerships, social networks and communities to produce the 
right supply-side conditions. Making this synergism work, enabled and co-
ordinated by the state (a long-term strategy), was set-out in an inclusive 
discourse of social solidarity. Here Social solidarity is understood as an 
investment in human capital that, simultaneously, provides pathways for 
opportunities and succeeding in global markets. It is the skills and ability of the 
workforce, in the words of Gordon Brown, which “define the ability of a national 
economy to compete” (Cited in Bevir 2005: 113). The language of opportunity and 
skills were coupled with that of responsibility, in individuals succeeding and 
claiming a stake in society—skills and training were viewed as an entry into what 
was termed as a normal life by providing the tools of self-reliance and hence 
breaking cycles of welfare dependence. 
 
There is a strong functionalist bias in the above noted approach, as it assumes a 
systemic integration is possible if the right conditions are generated (consensual 
society). As system integration needs to be developed then instilled in the citizen 
is an inculcation of responsibility and the affirmation of the structures of group 
life (a focus on pre-given system needs de-focuses from the more problematic 
issues of a lived social integration). The citizen not only obtains the right skills for 
a more competitive economy but also identifies with a positive solidarity to a 
shared cultural system and its concomitant role expectations. Tony Blair, for 
example, emphasised the socialising role of the family and the community, in 
developing this individuated sense of stake in society: 
 
The breakdown of family and community bonds is intimately linked to the 
breakdown of law and order. Both family and community rely on notions 
of mutual respect and duty. It is in the family that we first learn to 
negotiate the boundaries of acceptable conduct and to recognise that we 
owe responsibilities to others as well as ourselves. We then build out from 
that family base to the community and beyond that to society as a whole 
[…] we do not show our children respect or act responsibly to them if we 
fail to provide them with the opportunities they need, with a stake in the 
society in which they live. Equally, we demand that respect and 
responsibility from them in return. (cited in Fairclough 2000: 42-43) 
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A re-definition of the citizen, with an emphasis on collective duties, affects the 
development of policy initiatives tackling social exclusion. For example, instead of 
poverty being framed as a question of social integration, regarding sectional 
antagonisms, it is instead represented as a condition of the individual being cut-
off from networks and life chances, starting from a breakdown in family and 
community bonds. Thus, Peter Mandelson describes the problem of social 
exclusion as “more than poverty and unemployment. It is about being cut off from 
what the rest of us regard as normal life” (cited in Fairclough 2000: 52). 
 
A condition of being cut-off emerges when excluded from broader networks. 
Tackling this, New Labour sought to enable citizens but also networks to work 
better to bring communities out of the margins and into ‘normal life’. In this way, 
social problems are interlinked and welfare dependency is not merely an 
individual problem but a networked problem. Providing opportunity for the 
citizen is not only the job of the state but part of a broader national project of 
renewal. Workfare policies are central in generating the right (motivated) citizen 
subject. Here the idea is that work not only breaks cycles of dependency, with a 
change in attitudes, but also connects citizens with the right social networks2. 
This way the system works better, as not only is it more aligned to a better 
economic performance, in investing in previously untapped human capital, but 
also achieves the purpose of social justice in citizens gaining a stake and place in 
society.   
 
Considering this focus, it is consistent that New Labour focused their welfare 
policies on ideas of social inclusion and understood social exclusion in terms of 
multiple deprivation and its manifestation. Thus, in being focused on better 
                                               
2  An emphasis on being cut-off from social networks may be identified in New 
Labour’s approach to social exclusion. First acknowledged, in continuity with the theme 
of policy triangulation, are supply side factors such as lack of opportunities, 
discriminatory practice and the importance of re-distributive measures. However, at the 
same time, there is an attempt to re-reconcile this social integrationist discourse on 
exclusion with a moral under-class one. Thus, we also have an emphasis on tackling social 
exclusion through changes in a life-outlook, with the importance of engaging those on 
the margins through raising economic activity and participation in labour markets. The 
onus, therefore, is on those marginalised to adopt behavioural changes, when provided 
with the right opportunities. The inculcation of an aspirational and self-improvement 
ethos, for those excluded, improves employability chances (Levitas 2005: 206 – 209). The 
final section demonstrates, in the case of Education Action Zones (EAZ), the tensions that 
exist in this attempt to reconcile both an integrationist and moral-underclass approach 
to social exclusion.    
<10> 
system integration and how system goals are achieved and maintained, then 
processes of social exclusion are replaced with initiatives on what are described 
as conditions of exclusion. We are informed social exclusion is a condition of 
multiple deprivation, that includes social problems such as unemployment, high 
crime, substandard education performance, limited aspiration and so on.  
 
Means are sought to change citizen outlooks but this is tied with breaking cycles 
of deprivation and behavioural habits. This way, per Fairclough (2000), there is an 
attempt to bring together an integrationist discourse with a previously noted New 
Right language on social exclusion that is predicated on cultural attitudes: 
 
The three discourses are a redistributionist discourse, which focuses on 
poverty and attempts to reduce poverty by redistributing wealth; a social 
integrationist discourse, which sees exclusion as primarily due to 
unemployment and inclusion as getting people into paid work; and a 
moral underclass discourse, which attributes exclusion to deficiencies in 
the culture of the excluded and inclusion as entailing cultural change … 
The New Labour discourse of social exclusion is a combination of the 
social integrationist discourse (the focus on shifting people from welfare 
to work) and moral underclass discourse. (Fairclough 2000: 57) 
 
A synergy view of policy also implicates a modern notion of citizenship that comes 
with a strong normative undertone aiming to change attitudes (the moral 
underclass discourse) and cultivate an identification with shared values. Here the 
citizen subject actively participates and is part of strong communities and 
institutions. 
 
Following from this discourse on strong communities and a consensual society in 
New Labour’s third way, social antagonisms may be avoided, due to there being 
no necessary trade-off between the economy working better and a fairness 
agenda. The latter fairness agenda is one in which citizens are provided with the 
right skills and thus a pathway for them to claim their stake. As markets, cannot 
be left to function on their own, mutuality is at the centre of involving citizens 
with the right tools and a way back into the right forms of social capital. Just as 
individuals are with a mutual responsibility, the same applies to businesses and 
other service providers. Tony Blair, for example, stated in a speech to the 
Confederation of British Industry: 
 
The choice is: to let change overwhelm us, to resist it or equip ourselves 
to survive and prosper in it. The first leads to a fragmented society. The 
second is pointless and futile, trying to keep the clock from turning. The 
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only way is surely to analyse the challenge of change and to meet it. When 
I talk of a third way – between the old-style intervention of the old left 
and the laissez-faire of the new right – I do not mean a soggy compromise 
in the middle. I mean avowing there is a role for government, for 
teamwork and partnership. But it must be a role for today’s world. Not 
about picking winners, state subsidies, heavy regulation; but about 
education, infrastructure, promoting investment, helping small business 
and entrepreneurs and fairness. To make Britain more competitive, better 
at generating wealth, but do it on a basis that serves the needs of the 
whole nation – one nation. This is a policy that is unashamedly long-
termist. Competing on quality can’t be done by Government alone. The 
whole nation must put its shoulder to the wheel. (Cited in Fairclough 
2000: 26) 
 
The “whole nation” language of mutual responsibility and community is both an 
integrationist and normative discourse. There is a narrative of the social in this 
that consequently diagnoses and sets out initiatives to resolve what are posited 
as policy failures from both the Left and Right. What we have is a commitment to 
neoliberal politics but one that also claims a commitment to social justice and so 
acknowledges the need for markets to work for everyone (the “whole nation”). 
Ultimately, for the economy to work better and for everyone, New Labour 
acknowledges the role of governance in the mediation of a shared social and 
discursive context. Investing in the social is an attempt to make it work better but 
without the heavy regulation of the past. Consequently, what policy agenda is 
pursued is thus articulated from an understanding of the social.        
 
2.2 Objective institutional arrangements meeting policy outcomes 
 
As stated, a functionalist reading of the social was an analytical prism for policy 
initiatives and defined the intended relation between social and system 
integration. This functionalist reading implicated a strong normative reading of 
system integration imperatives and a circular view on the nature of necessary 
policy interventions. A circularity may be identified with pre-given system 
perquisites that provide guidance on how social integration is then engineered. 
Further, against welfare service fragmentation – a policy feature of previous 
Conservative governments – an investment in the social is one of legitimation that 
better articulates the relation of co-dependence and symbiosis between system 
imperatives and social integration initiatives (a project of ‘national renewal’). The 
nature of this social investment, in its circularity, brings together both 
behavioural outcomes – in regard to the citizen and their actions – and a top-
down regulation of objective arrangements that makes the social work to meet 
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stated pre-requisites (Bevir 2005). Thus, top-down objective institutional 
arrangements are regulated to generate the right behavioural changes and 
outcomes. Here two approaches to social inclusion, noted above, are brought 
together – first, is an integrationist view in arrangements assisting those on the 
margins to access the right know-how to then claim their stake (a social 
integrationist discourse). Second, simultaneously, these arrangements seek to 
bring about behavioural changes and outcomes that resolve problems in the 
culture of those excluded (a moral underclass discourse). 
 
Objectified institutional arrangements (Bevir 2005: 31), therefore, play an 
important mediatory role in the management of contingencies of a global social 
order. The stated circularity is observed in the making of the social to meet pre-
given policy outcomes. Hence, this leads to the important role of institutional 
arrangements as transmission belts between social pressures and envisaged 
policy outcomes. This implies that “the social pressures, the institutions, and the 
policy outcomes are given as natural facts, so that the only story to tell is that 
which relates to these facts” (Bevir 2005: 52). Thus, the notion of a ‘knowledge 
economy’ relates to the contingencies of a global social order and supply side 
investments in human capital, with the simultaneous objective of achieving 
behavioural changes, require an environment of flexible institutional 
arrangements that mediate between social pressures and policy outcomes. The 
flexibility and creativity in these networks are regulated in the manner they relate 
to pre-given outcomes. Provision of public services, therefore, may include state, 
private, third sector or a synergy of the three. In mediating social pressures, the 
importance of the idea of social capital, based on networks established on trust, 
is an important feature of joint up governance that builds necessary social 
networks and partnerships.  
 
In sustaining policy outcomes, the management of flexible networks becomes an 
important feature in the management of social pressures. Here disciplinary 
techniques (stated as reforms) utilise accountability measures that include target 
based provision to ensure required outcomes. In the case of those tasked with 
provision, a discourse of contractual obligation was utilised (Fairclough 2000). For 
example, in exchange for pay increase, teachers and nurses, in the words of Tony 
Blair, were expected in return to “be prepared to embrace fundamental reform in 
the way they work” (Cited in Fairclough 2000: 39). The intended reforms aimed to 
generate behavioural outcomes in not only recipients but also those active in 
provision. A theme adopted in the ‘Big Society’ agenda, as will be covered in the 
next chapter, is a cyclical and self-sustaining provision that utilised behavioural 
changes to generate the right conditions for a culture of civic entrepreneurism 
that creatively adapts to reforms to better mediate social pressures (Bevir 2005). 
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An enabling state that invests in objective arrangements for pre-given policy 
outcomes, aims to utilise these outcomes to remedy system function failures. The 
idea of provision of opportunity, for example, focuses on whether a structure 
adequately performs its task and provides effective means to access legitimate 
cultural goods. Consequently, in effective access to sanctioned goods, possible 
strains in system integration are tackled. Further, functional prerequisites, 
considering system needs, applies to business and industry in the nature of their 
institutional policies and if they are conducive to the noted legitimated pathways 
for everyone to claim a stake in society (as was seen in the above cited speech by 
Tony Blair to the Confederation of British Industry). Role expectations that 
simultaneously sustain functional perquisites in the form of policy outcomes, are 
defined in a society based on a mutual rights and responsibilities. Tony Blair stated 
his vision as “something for something” i.e. claiming a stake through participating 
in a consensual society: 
 
A society based on a notion of mutual rights and responsibilities, on what 
is actually a modern notion of social justice - ‘something for something’. 
We accept our duty as a society to give each person a stake in its future. 
And in return each person accepts responsibility to respond, to work to 
improve themselves (Cited in Morrison 2004: 114) 
 
Here there is an affinity with Merton’s functionalism in an analysis that starts from 
a set of culturally prescribed set of aspirations. Thus, any dissociation in accessing 
goods is largely understood in relation to an objective institutional arrangement 
that enables the citizen to access these goods. Strong social integration is possible 
in institutional settings that are compatible with what Merton stated as winning 
under the rules of the game (Merton 1968). The rules of the game should not be 
skewed to allow forms of winning, that does not, at the same time, consider 
broader social integration. It is in this spirit that New Labour presented a third 
way that claimed to remedy policy mistakes of both Left and Right. Accordingly, 
in the words of Tony Blair, what were seen as antagonistic in the past may be 
reconciled: 
 
My vision for the 21st century is of a popular politics reconciling themes 
which in the past have wrongly been regarded as antagonistic - patriotism 
and internationalism; rights and responsibilities; the promotion of 
enterprise and the attack on poverty and discrimination (Cited in 
Fairclough 2000: 41). 
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However, in contrast to Merton3, the functionalism of New Labour makes no clear 
distinction between functional prerequisites and specific institutional 
arrangements. Hence, while accepting the idea of possible structural strains in 
meeting system needs, there is, at the same time, a normative understanding of 
what sanctioned goods are necessary for system adaptation and integration. 
Dysfunctions that may exist – for example in the form of social exclusion – may 
be identified in the absence of adequate pathways to sanctioned goods; in a 
circular sense, these same goods are legitimated as important for positive 
integration. This approach to system integration can be observed in a stated 
‘shared values’ that underpin a ‘One Nation’ vision and what is concomitant to 
positive integration. Consequently, the issue of integration is narrowly defined in 
whatever institutional form generates adequate practices that sustain pre-given 
outcomes and advance positive social solidarity.     
 
In New Labour’s discourse on social exclusion there is a view that issues of 
inclusion/exclusion are understood in what Parsons terms as a system of 
culturally structured and shared symbols – a synchronic bias in analysis that 
figures in functionalist approaches. However, when dysfunctions do exist, they 
manifest themselves as networked problems. Thus, this draws New Labour closer 
to mid-range functionalist theories, as policy is viewed more effective when 
pursued in partnerships between different agencies closer to the point of delivery. 
As in Merton’s mid-range functionalism, there exists structured pathways that 
lead to dysfunctions such as networked problems of deprivation. Here the social 
– in the form of objective institutional arrangements – require an adaptation and 
management so that the contingencies of integration are under less strain. 
 
2.3 Global policy field & education systems as training systems 
 
As stated, a discourse of change in a ‘modern world’ is an understanding that 
contingencies are now the given state of affairs. Thus, there is always a need to 
rework the social in ways that bring together pre-given system imperatives and a 
consensual society, should systemic goals falter in the context of a changing 
world. The central question in this section is on the nature of functional pre-
                                               
3  Merton does distinguish (Merton 1968: 88-99) between functional prerequisites 
and specific social forms set in meeting these prerequisites. Thus, there is no view that 
specific social forms have any necessary functional purpose, only that a structural strain 
is possible in systems with disparity between the achievement of legitimated cultural 
goals and structural means of reaching these goals. In making this distinction between 
functional prerequisites and specific social forms the aim was to overcome problems with 
teleological explanation in unitary functionalist analysis. (Merton’s focus was in better 
methods to apply a functional analysis). 
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requisites that require interventions to meet pre-given policy outcomes – if the 
social is to be re-worked, it requires broader objectives to promote and maintain. 
Here we return to the presence of a discourse of inevitable and irreversible ‘global’ 
forces that impacts the nature of education (Ozga & Lingard 2007). At the level of 
transnational networks of governance there are powerful actors promoting 
certain aims that articulate configurations of networks and their relations at other 
levels of provision (Moutsios 2009: 474). Transnational networks of governance – 
a global education policy field ((Ozga & Lingard 2007) – present a logic of 
competitive advantage in which there is a framing of national education systems 
as training systems that invest in human capital and overcome skills deficits.  
 
The global policy discourse of a ‘knowledge economy’, for example, sets out how 
individuals may relate and identify within a ‘learning society’, including what is 
necessary to acclimatise provision to the demands of such an economy. If an 
enabling state is to succeed in mediating networks to meet the demands of socio-
economic forces, then it should invest in the acquisition of relevant work-force 
skills and ensure the productivity of these skills. National education systems, in 
this context, in the words of Ozga & Lingard (2007), seek “to ensure competitive 
advantage through the commercial exploitation and application of knowledge. 
Knowledge production is brought into close relationship with economic policy; 
what matters is what works for the economy” (Ozga & Lingard 2007: 77-78).       
 
Policies of organisations such as the World Bank, OECD, UNESCO and WTO are 
part of a process that extends beyond education and mediates the nature 
education relates to other policy fields. Thus, the education field is structured in 
ways that may not necessarily relate to immediate educational practices and be 
defined by an overriding logic of what may be described as an emergent global 
policy. Here the education policy field has moved, in the words of Lingard et al., 
“towards the more heteronomous end of field relations (Maton 2005), being 
subsumed in many instances as part of the field of economic policy, which seeks 
to mediate national the global economic field” (Lingard et al. 2005: 3). This move 
towards the heteronomous end of field relations transforms our understanding of 
education practice to something that is significantly defined from without.  
 
What follows is a policy strategy that seeks to make commensurable the efficacy 
of education systems as training systems for the goal of a competitive national 
economy. For example, the discourse of ‘policy as numbers’ is articulated at a 
globalised level by transnational actors, in which performance is compared and 
measured in its success as a human capital investment. Thus, competent 
education systems are measured, in their efficacy, through indicators set to 
demonstrate the overall productive impact of an innovative education system. 
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Here we have a link between skills training and work-force flexibility in the 
context of knowledge economies: 
 
Productivity is also boosted by higher skill levels in the labour force and 
by qualitative improvements that enable workers to use new technology. 
Increased workforce ﬂexibility, resulting from the acquisition of general 
skills that facilitate adaptation, is increasingly seen as a crucial factor in 
economic development in the context of knowledge economies. 
Sustainable transformation and growth throughout the economy are not 
possible without the contributions of an innovative tertiary education 
system, which helps build the absorptive capacity needed if private sector 
investment and donor resources are to have a lasting productive impact. 
(World Bank 2002: 76 – 77) 
 
Policy as numbers is an attempt to measure the contribution of innovative 
education systems to what is described as sustainable transformation and growth. 
Intended policy outcomes are regulated relying on technologies of governance 
that centrally set a means of measuring through international education 
indicators (part of an emergent global education policy field): 
 
This is policy as numbers through international education indicators, 
such as the OECD’s programme for international Student Assessment 
(PISA) and the Trends in International Mathematics and Science (TIMSS), 
which taken together with similar national level developments constitute 
a central aspect of the new technologies of governance and which globally 
contribute to the emergent global education policy field (Ozga & Lingard 
2007: 68) 
 
Furthermore, beyond the measurement of policy outcomes in codified and 
quantifiable means, there is the previously noted institutional arrangements that 
are sought for this end. Here there is an encompassing regime of governance – 
first, the path encompasses policies that seek to develop consistent paths of de-
regulation and the introduction of the private sector in the delivery of public 
services; second, in the methods of delivery, as part of partnerships that mediate 
public service provision, there is an attempt to cultivate compatible organisational 
identities (Ball 2009). These identities encompass a broader notion of identities-
in-relation and includes both those providing service and their recipients (Ball 
2009: 96). An encompassing and multi-faceted regime is explicitly observed, for 
example, in policies advocated by transnational organizations such as the OECD 
and World Bank, which set-out to contextualise social policy, in general, in terms 
of a market society oriented towards economic growth: 
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The enhancement of human capital through education system, according 
to the OECD’s recent initiatives, should be accompanied by the 
reinforcement of ‘social capital’ and ‘social cohesion’. What is conceived 
with this set of terms is an aggregate of individuals networked with 
shared norms and values that facilitate co-operation in a well-functioning 
market society oriented towards growth (OECD, cited in Moutsios 2009: 
478) 
   
This encompassing approach, in the words of Stephen Ball (2007), is a meta-policy 
status that “subsumes almost every aspect of public services under its rubric” 
(2007: 93). Thus, idealised social relations are represented in policy questions and 
the manner educational problems are posed. Local fields of public service practice 
overlap and relate to geographic and spatial policy fields, in which there is an 
important policy space above the nation as a global policy field or what is a 
‘travelling policy’ (Lingard et al. 2005). 
 
At the local level – national, regional or local – there is the mediation of this 
‘travelling policy’ in an ‘embedded policy’ (Ozga & Lingard 2007). Due to the 
heteronomous effect of a global policy field and the regulation of education 
provision in the context of externalist agendas, global policy spaces become an 
important aspect of cross-field analysis in the manner social fields, at different 
levels of scale, are related. At the same time, policy is not reduced to this global 
policy space and is itself mediated at the national and more local level – an 
‘embedded policy’ (Ozga & Lingard 2007). Consequently, we have a non-linear 
view of policy text production and its related practices in an irreducible dialectical 
relation between different actors and levels in the process of text production. 
Here we return to New Labour’s attempt at policy triangulation as an important 
mediation at the national, regional and local level. 
 
It is possible to find multiple and often contradictory themes in New Labour’s 
policy. Thus, while policy initiatives draw upon a global policy field, it is important 
to acknowledge the reliance on different traditions, including the Labour party’s 
social democratic tradition. Newman states this as when “old and emergent 
reg.imes interact, with different elements of the new and old being packaged and 
repackaged, producing tensions and dis-junctures as different sets of norms and 
assumptions are overlaid on each other” (Newman 2001: 26). In a non-linear 
understanding of policy text production there are different assumptions and 
expectations that may coexist in a governance approach (Newman 2001: 30). 
Accordingly, it is possible to identify different and sometimes contradictory 
themes of governance within New Labour’s policy initiatives. These themes may 
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co-exist in tension, whether they are ideas such as self-governance and open 
systems models, encouraging open flows and devolution of power to citizens and 
communities, or a centralised governance that sets policy directives from above 
in an output based model of managerialism. 
 
2.4 Social capital & the social investment state  
 
As stated, New Labour’s third way emphasised the importance of objective 
institutional arrangements to generate policy objectives and outcomes. In this 
approach there is an emphasis on synergistic arrangements in a reflexive re-
working of the social to balance the needs of a global economic field with a 
fairness agenda. The notion of a social investment state is firmly placed within this 
approach and informs the manner policy problems are then constructed. 
Regulating the social, as stated, brought with it the adoption of centralised 
controls and the utilisation of performative technologies to achieve policy 
outcomes. The management of social pressures – with its tensions – 
contextualises a proposed devolution of public services to communities and the 
civic.  
 
The management of flexible networks aimed to kick-start a self-sustaining 
provision in which actors – whether recipients or providers – self-identified with 
pre-given social reforms. Regulated subjectivities are then in the position to 
reflexively monitor their behaviour in accordance to system needs and its 
complementary outcomes. Thus, human capital investment provides the recipient 
with the necessary tools to meet employer needs and the necessary subjectivity 
to self-reflexively re-invest in their skills when needed (Edwards 2002: 357). Here 
the devolution of service also means a devolution of responsibility to self-manage 
and enhance employment relevant skills. The introduction of disciplinary 
strategies – for example, governance through numbers – is an attempt to ensure 
a relevant institutional context exists to ensure an ethos in provision to meet the 
required outcomes that extends to cultivating normalised identities-in-relation. 
A virtuous cycle is identified, by the Department for Education and Employment 
(DfEE), in a social investment state that ties public provision of work-based 
opportunity with many social benefits, while simultaneously meeting the needs of 
business and improved economic productivity: 
 
All adults need the opportunity to continue to learn throughout their 
working life, to bring their qualifications up to date and, where necessary, 
to train for a different job. Now and in the future employability is and will 
be the best guarantee of employment. Learning also brings broader 
benefits. It encourages and supports active citizenship, helps 
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communities help themselves, and opens up new opportunities such as 
the chance to explore art, music and literature. It helps strengthen 
families and encourages independence. That means that everyone must 
have access to high quality, relevant learning at a time and pace, and in 
places that suit them. Not only do individuals, families and communities 
benefit, learning throughout life also delivers tangible results for 
business—improved productivity and competitiveness. (DfEE 1999: 56)  
 
An investment in employability meets a social justice goal and manages the 
contingencies of a competitive global economy in meeting a potential skills-gap.  
With supply-side interventions focused on the provision of opportunity – e.g. life-
long learning – the goal is to generate alternative “organisational ecologies and 
identities” (Ball 2009: 86) and a cultural re-focusing of schooling (Thrupp & 
Willmott 2003:31).  
 
In an investment in alternative organisational ecologies and identities, New 
Labour’s third way drew upon two key themes – communitarianism and social 
capital theory. Both these dimensions are aspects of a social investment guided 
by the state and part of a devolvement of power and responsibility, to ‘empower’ 
individuals and communities. Enriching social capital is central to third way 
thinking as an antidote, in the words of Gewirtz et al. (2005), to rampant neo-
liberalism and the dependency culture of welfarist collectivism: 
 
Within third way discourses, social capital is presented as an antidote to 
both socially destructive nature of rampant neoliberalism and the 
‘dependency culture’ produced by excessive collectivism (Gewirtz et al. 
2005: 653) 
 
Investment in the social (a corrective measure), highlighted in social capital 
theory and communitarian themes, tackles a possible moral anomie and social 
fragmentation that may arise due to unfettered markets (Driver & Martell 1997). 
Reliance on mid-level social networks, inclusive of communities, aims to 
transform the behaviour of corporate actors and social practices to correspond 
to re-worked institutional arrangements (Franklin 2007). Here, in a synergistic 
view of social capital, an affinity may be identified with Putnam’s view of social 
capital as a self-sustaining virtuous cycle – networks of families and communities 
lubricated by sources of social capital (features of social organisation). Sources of 
social capital include “networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate action and 
cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, cited in Portes 1998: 18). Societies rich 
in the right sources of social capital (networks, norms and trust) are better 
equipped to cultivate desired forms of behaviour that, cyclically, enrich the stock 
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of social capital.  
 
Societies rich in the right sources of social capital, therefore, are better equipped 
to overcome possible structural strains and generate policy outcomes that 
advance economic performance and system wide integration. As noted 
previously, reliance on the right sources of social capital was part of New Labour’s 
view of the social world as a consensual and ordered space, in which policy adopts 
a pre-given normative understanding on what makes for an ordered and 
consensual space. In features of social capital, such as trust, there is an attempt 
to bring in those on the margins into ‘normal life’ in an identification with shared 
norms and values. Thus, an investment in the sources of social capital, in an 
integrationist approach, leads to a knock-on effect in bridging social capital. 
Bridging social capital refers to the existence of effective means to access 
strategic opportunities in given objective arrangements lubricated with the right 
forms of bonding social capital. Hence, sources of social capital, represented in a 
normative sense, were viewed as unproblematic in regard to what makes for 
positive system integration and as a resource for the dual-purposes of an ordered 
social space and as an economic resource (Franklin 2007).  
 
Making the social work, for New Labour, was an attempt to create cohesive and 
reciprocal societies. Trust is important – part of stated virtuous cycles – and is 
there to generate a self-sustaining social order and provide a legitimation and 
predictability to the governance of complex social processes. Thus, it is a link 
between the personality, social and cultural sub-systems, in mid-level networks, 
and broader system needs4. New Labour’s communitarianism is part of a broader 
objective to enrich social capital and its sources, with specific reference to a 
normative organisation of social spaces. Here we return to the idea of deficits in 
sociality and a networked poverty that results in a dependency culture with its 
wrong behavioural attitudes and types of social capital. To encourage social 
inclusion, the aim is to generate the active and responsible citizen in the context 
of shared forms of bonding social capital. 
 
Thus, structural strains occur when individuals are not able to access certain 
opportunities. This lack of access to a ‘normal life’ is a networked problem and it 
is for communities – an important source of social capital – to provide possible 
                                               
4  This returns to the affinity, argued previously, between Parson’s functionalism 
and New Labour’s third way. Here the point is in incentivising motivational elements 
(personality system) to meet defined roles. This way system needs are met, in the 
normative regulation of social spaces, to generate the right conditions for given relations 
in the social system through individuals being motivated and committed to social roles 
(including how to navigate the requirements of these roles) and through this maintaining 
a given systemic order. 
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pathways to enable the right behavioural changes in re-calibrated networks that 
enable strategic forms of bridging social capital. Community, this way, according 
to New Labour, represented a contingent achievement of people acting ethically 
in fulfilling their duties to others (Bevir 2005: 77). What we have is a 
communitarian thinking, according to Driver & Martell (1997), that places the 
individual, as moral and responsible citizen, within virtuous cycle that generate 
social cohesion and contributing to the creation of a more viable market economy: 
 
In Labour’s communitarian thinking three themes – economic efficiency, 
social cohesion and morality – are interwoven. Economic success – 
particularly more jobs – will bring greater social cohesion, which is 
further strengthened by a more dutiful and responsible citizenry, and 
more social cohesion will in turn help create a more viable market 
economy (Driver & Martell 1997: 34) 
 
New Labour’s commitment to communitarian themes is a key component of a 
networked society, a bedrock of ties and relationships of trust, values, beliefs and 
norms which are all core components of social capital. Communities, potentially 
through the right forms of bonding and bridging social capital, contribute to the 
making of an ethical and ordered citizen. It is the citizen that then fulfils their 
responsibilities, makes the most of what opportunities are provided for by the 
state and wider social structures. In claiming their stake, the citizen thus 
internalises values that inhere within their community and wider society. As 
noted, in a knock-on effect, there is a renewal of civic life in the fulfilment of 
responsibilities to others (reciprocated social relations).   
 
In regard to concrete examples, the deployment of social capital strategies in 
policy was a feature of Education Action Zones (EAZ). In this initiative, a vision 
existed to implement a joint-up policy in connecting schools to their local 
communities and resources. Here the objective was to include communities in the 
improvement of education performance. Consequently, in a virtuous cycle, 
communities will be connected to types of social capital that then establish 
communities as a bedrock for the regeneration of social capital sources. Linked 
communities entail, simultaneously, the pursuit of shared objectives. Thus, Tony 
Blair stated that “such interconnected communities have lower crime, better 
education results, better care of the vulnerable” (cited in Gewirtz et al. 2005: 654).  
 
Education Action Zones (EAZ) consisted of “about 20 schools, usually two 
secondary schools with their feeder primary schools, working with a variety of 
public, private, community and voluntary sector interests” (Dickinson & Power 
2001: 138). Along with EAZs, Education Action Forums (EAF) were set-up to link 
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communities to rich networks and their resources, empowering both 
communities and individuals towards better education attainment. EAZs were 
given the initial responsibility of developing local action plans and the day to day 
running of local institutions. At the same time, further development, 
implementation and monitoring of the plan and the setting of targets were given 
to EAFs (Halpin 2000). The initiative was set in the language of partnerships that 
sought to generate an active citizenship and include parents, the private sector 
and local community groups in the education process. For example, interventions 
to enhance social capital included “family learning classes, home-school liaison 
workers and training for parents to work in schools as classroom assistants” 
(Gewirtz et al. 2005: 652). 
 
The initiative demonstrated a tension, per Gewirtz et al., between central 
government and local policy documents, with the existence of both a deficit 
moralist tone for causes of failure but also a supportive and empowering role in 
the access of needed resources for self-betterment: 
 
The discourses in the policy documentation produced at central and local 
levels therefore present a mixed and contradictory picture, with 
community, home-school and intra-family dimensions of social capital, 
discourses of support and blame, constructions of parents as deficit and 
dysfunctional and a language of voice and empowerment combined often 
in the same documents. (Gewirtz et al. 2005: 658) 
 
The existence of contradictory themes – with a focus on behavioural changes –
corresponds to a broader tension existing in New Labour’s approach to social 
exclusion between a moral underclass and integrationist discourse. To remedy 
behavioural problems there is a pre-supposing integrationist discourse that, as 
stated earlier, sought to re-calibrate institutional arrangement to meet 
behavioural outcomes. Consequently, pre-given outcomes, including a 
representation of possible problems in their attainment, abstract from lived social 
capital to an ideological and circular understanding of its working as a policy idea. 
For example, those targeted by EAZs valued education attainment and while 
relatively rich in bonding social capital, lacked access to a bridging social capital 
to the ‘right’ networks. Gewirtz et al. state this as a lack of “appropriate cultural 
capital, in particular knowing how to effectively mount a case and exert pressure 
on the schools and/or local community … the forms of cultural capital needed to 
work the system” (Gewirtz et al. 2005: 665). Thus, there is a cut-off, in how action 
plans were relevant to the experiences of parents and students.   
 
The problem is in New Labour’s adoption of social capital as a collectivist remedy 
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to represented behavioural problems. Rhetorically there was an emphasis on a 
devolution of power to the local level but central policy adopted a pre-given 
agenda on the nature of reforms and what arrangements are necessary to achieve 
behavioural changes. Instead of social capital theory being an explanatory tool on 
the nature of lived social capital – both bonding and bridging – it became a policy 
tool in an integrationist measure in a moralising discourse on behavioural 
problems and how to legitimate system needs considering sought behavioural 
changes. Thus, bridging social capital, to remedy behavioural problems, became 
the site of initiatives to transform the properties and features of bonding social 
capital (shared norms, values and trust). It is, in the words Franklin (2007), an 
attempt to govern through communities in a normative organisation that 
manufactures “conformity out of feelings of obligation and shared standards” 
(Bevir 2005: 91). As the lived nature of social capital was de-emphasised then 
differentiated forms of social capital and with it persistent inequalities were 
neglected.  
 
In an abstraction from lived social capital, New Labour connected education to 
expected standards and its manifested outcomes, rather than socio-economic 
backgrounds as an explanation of educational under-achievement (Power 2001: 
15). Further, devolving responsibility, in the form of active and enterprising 
subjects, established a view of individuals and communities in punitive terms. It is 
more authoritarian in that it utilises the state to mediate and achieve certain 
outcomes (Calder 2004). Thus, it can be said New Labour’s adoption of 
communitarian themes were significantly prescriptive, moralising and ascribed 
importance to the individual over the corporate in its construction of individuals 
and communities in deficit terms (Driver & Martell 1997). This theme of a 
triangulation between a moral underclass and integrationist discourse extends to 
Conservative policy, as will be demonstrated, though with differences in emphasis 
and a greater focus on behavioural deficits. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
For New Labour the social became a consensual space to be normatively 
organised for the dual purposes of economic performance and social cohesion (a 
policy model that focuses on system-wide integration). Based on this, New 
Labour’s third way set itself the target to mediate social forces, so that the right 
supply side conditions exist for a competitive economic productivity but also for 
the provision of opportunities for individuals to claim their stake. Social exclusion 
was viewed as a deficit problem – individuals and community’s cut-off from 
‘normal life’, with the state responsible to generate better integration of those 
viewed as excluded. It was for this purpose that mid-level networks were guided 
<24> 
for the dual purposes of social integration and an economy that operates 
inclusively. Further, in a circular manner, New Labour’s policy model, due to its 
functionalist bias, first sets out with a normative representation of the social in 
consensual terms that leads to interventions, often contradictory, to bring about 
certain outcomes. Certain cultural goods, institutional arrangements and 
concomitant subjectivities all simultaneously exist for given functional 
prerequisites.  
 
While there exists a transnational global policy field, it is mediated at the national 
and local level.  In its mediation, New Labour drew on the importance of 
consensual spaces that are identified in communitarian terms (the community 
often identified with the nation). The re-making of social capital, in a synergy view 
between bonding and bridging social capital, played a role in transforming 
concrete practice through an engineering of institutional arrangements and 
organisational ecologies. Further, this attempt to transform practices aimed to 
sustain behavioural changes in the inculcation of certain subjectivities and the 
identification of these subjectivities with feelings of obligation and shared 
standards e.g. a self-dependent and responsible citizenry. Here the citizen makes 
the most of the opportunities provided and is then in a position – in a virtuous 
cycle – to contribute to richer and effective forms of social capital.  
 
The existence of an audit culture – policy as numbers – was part of a governance 
attempt to regulate the re-making of the social and maintain an ethos and cultural 
re-focusing of educational culture. Supply side interventions, in making the social 
work, utilised an audit culture and accountability measures to ensure reforms 
were being met and policy outcomes achieved. Further, this audit culture 
represented a strong centralised agenda in the regulation of the social through a 
prescriptive understanding of what makes for best practice (termed as ‘reforms’). 
A tension may be identified due to this strong centralised agenda between the 
language of devolution of power and the regulation of devolved networks to meet 
pre-given policy objectives. Returning to the theme of policy triangulation, it is 
possible to trace this tension in the problematic attempt to bring together an 
integrationist and moral underclass discourse on the problems of social exclusion. 
 
What is absent, in New Labour’s definition of system needs, is a differentiated 
understanding of social capital. To be more specific, how a differentiated view of 
social capital and the problem of social integration may then affect policy 
initiatives. For example, in the case of Education Action Zones (EAZs), 
responsibility is devolved but the actual running of zones and the model utilised 
focused on a deficit approach. When a language of empowerment was utilised, it 
was unrelated to a lived differentiation in the access of social capital networks; 
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thus, in viewing institutional arrangements in neutral terms, these same 
arrangements were viewed, unproblematically, to generate expected outcomes. 
Again, the qualitative aspects of bridging and bonding social capital are somehow 
unproblematic, as are the sources that facilitate types of social capital. Bypassing 
this qualitative dimension, despite the rhetoric, there was no serious concern with 
lived practice in policy initiatives.    
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3 
The 'Big Society' Agenda  
& Rethinking Sociality 
 
 
 
This chapter is in continuity with the first aim of the thesis, focusing on the policy 
triangulation of the ‘Big Society’ agenda. Like New Labour’s third way, the ‘Big Society’ 
agenda argues for a rolling forward of the social, as an important measure to 
transcend past policy failures. In the Conservative approach, the focus is on a 
localism, to enable a more responsive state that empowers individuals and works to 
generate the conditions of self-dependency. Also, similar to New Labour’s third way, 
there is a view of the citizen in the context of a representation of their sociality; it is 
from these normative representations that policy initiatives are developed that seek 
to establish a distinct diagnosis of what went wrong and what may be done to remedy 
these mistakes (similar to New Labour’s own attempt at triangulation).  
 
The objective, in this chapter, is to focus on the ‘Big Society’ as a governance agenda 
i.e. how it seeks to shape relations of power and with it the shaping of social relations, 
with their practices, between the state and citizen as welfare recipient. Further, the 
textual analysis that follows in the next section, considering intertextuality, brings in 
the ‘Big Society’ agenda as an important policy context that affects and informs the 
texturing of higher education governance. Consequently, the trajectory of 
triangulating policy models, from New Labour to the ‘Big Society’ agenda, shapes the 
outlines of higher education governance. 
 
3.1 Big Society, broken Britain & breaking cycles of dependency 
 
David Cameron’s broken Britain thesis draws on the idea of normative social practices 
mediating inter-generational structures. The focus is not in making the economy 
work better for those socially excluded, as is the case with New Labour, but a view of 
a moral crisis and fragmented normative landscape. Due to this fragmented landscape 
certain dispositions are cultivated, giving to antithetical life choices. In polemical 
tone, Cameron emphasises the welfare state as a harbinger of a dependency culture, 
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eroding responsibility and encouraging dispositions that entrap individuals in cycles 
of poverty. Thus, dependence on the local, in the form of community, and more 
importantly the family, has been eroded by what is viewed as the nationalisation of 
social problems by an overbearing big government; any notion of responsibility and 
reciprocity is eroded by a welfare system institutionalised to not reward responsibility 
or voice to citizens in their use of public services. 
 
While this is a return to a New Right discourse on poverty, contemporary 
Conservatives are willing to state "the non-financial aspects of poverty" but utilise it 
for very specific ideological ends. Consequently, unemployment becomes “structural” 
but the shift in discourse renders this structural problem in terms of a “perpetual 
jobseeker”, “benefits trap”, “way of life” and in altering the conditions that rewards the 
work-shy to one that “the payment of unemployment benefit by the state is an 
entitlement which is earned, not owed” (Conservative Party 2009: 12). Countering this 
structural problem, with its “culture of worklessness and structural unemployment”, 
is a posited policy holism that tackles the inter-connected key paths to poverty i.e. 
"family breakdown, serious personal debt, drug and alcohol addiction, failed 
education, worklessness and dependency" (Social Justice Policy Group 2007: 5). 
However, this is not just a policy of blame with an imperative of individual self-
improvement (though this exists), instead it is a position that while acknowledging the 
necessity of Thatcherite ‘modernisation’, concedes to problems generated from these 
reforms from hyper-individualism and an over-reliance on the centralised power of 
the state to push ahead with economic reforms (McAnulla 2010: 290). 
 
Likewise, in the spirit of policy triangulation, the state – specifically the welfare state 
– erodes responsibility and entraps individuals into cycles of disadvantage and 
poverty. Thus, as with New Labour’s third way, David Cameron offers the idea of the 
‘Big Society’ in the manner it transcends what are represented as Left/Right 
dichotomies: 
 
The Left in politics talk too much about the state. And the Right sometimes 
talks too much about the individual. But what really matters is what is in 
between – society (Cameron 2009a).  
 
The Conservative Party think-tank ‘The Centre for Social Justice’ emphasises this 
political triangulation in their publication ‘From Breakdown Britain to Breakthrough 
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Britain’:  
 
The traditional ‘laissez-faire’ approach understands poverty simply as a 
product of wrong personal choices about family, drugs, crime and schooling. 
That view says that poverty is always the fault of the person who makes the 
wrong choices. On the other side of the political divide, the elimination of 
poverty is seen principally as the job of government – thus if a person is in 
poverty it must be the government’s fault and it must be the government that 
develops a top down solution to the problem. (Social Justice Policy Group 
2007: 7) 
 
In place of the maligned welfare state are proposals for public service provision in 
terms of a welfare beyond the state. ‘Big Society’ in the form of the locale and 
community, between both state and individual, is viewed as the site of welfare 
provision and simultaneously given the role of creating “avenues through which 
responsibility and opportunity can develop” (Cameron 2009b). Eroding inter-
generational structural disadvantage (subjectively inculcated) is thus identified with 
both an empowerment and a “radical decentralisation” (Cameron 2009c) of power. 
Rolling back the state will serve to roll forward society and so break cycles of 
dependency and selfish individualism (Cameron 2009b).  
 
In the process of rolling forward society, the government is viewed as a guide, partner 
and instrument in engineering changes to remedy behavioural pathologies and 
remake society; in the words of David Cameron - “But I see a powerful role for 
government in helping to engineer that shift. Let me put it more plainly: we must use 
the state to remake society.” (Cameron 2009b). The ‘Big Society’ agenda seeks to 
strengthen and encourage social entrepreneurship within local institutions, 
embedded in local communities, generating solidarity and making welfare provision 
more personal—strong local institutions enable people to come together and work on 
a responsive provision (Cameron 2009b). Right choices are made by individuals by 
cultivating this more personal service, through the devolution of provision. In the 
devolution of provision there is an intended knock-on effect in shared responsibility 
in the social welfare of others, so that it is a shared burden and not solely the job of 
the government. 
 
Nudging citizens towards positive choices, whether through devolving powers to 
communities or introducing tax credits and benefits for families, empowers both 
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communities and families with purpose. New conditions are envisaged to break a 
cycle of poverty, especially early on in a child’s development (Social Justice Policy 
Group 2007: 8-9), encouraging behavioural changes and aspiration with new found 
opportunity. Thus, we have the importance of breaking initial subjective experiences 
of a social positionality (intergenerational worklessness), with its subsequent "state of 
mind". In achieving this objective, what is required is the breaking of a "cycle of 
disadvantage in the early years of a child's life" by rolling "forward the frontiers of 
society by extending the parameters of social responsibility" (Social Justice Policy 
Group 2007: 7).  
 
A consistent theme emerges in ‘From Breakdown Britain to Breakthrough Britain’ – 
individuals make wrong choices but it is inadequate to reduce policy initiatives to the 
individual. Thus, wrong choices should be viewed as systemically mediated and this 
directs policy initiatives to a conducive objectivity in creating the right structures and 
environment: 
 
On the contrary, what we should be doing as politicians is, wherever possible, 
creating the right structures and environment for individuals and 
communities to help themselves. (Cameron & Herbert 2008: 123) 
 
‘From Breakdown Britain to Breakthrough Britain’ further describes New Labour's 
state interventions as piecemeal, in contrast to a Conservative holistic and structural 
approach. Nevertheless, there exists significant convergence between contemporary 
Conservative and New Labour policy. Both identify a fairness agenda in terms of 
access to pre-supposed goods i.e. a fairness agenda that defines deficits in the ‘right’ 
sociality and a focus on social inclusion and belonging to shared values (however, as 
will be clarified, there are differences in focus on the nature and reasons for this 
deficit). The mutualism of ‘Big Society’ offers avenues of opportunity – corrective 
behavioural measures – through a network of empowered local institutions meeting 
the needs of citizens. Membership of these organisations fosters responsibility and a 
more accountable and responsive welfare provision.  
 
As covered in the previous chapter, despite differences, there remains similarities 
with New Labour’s view of a joint up governance that enables citizens and the 
importance of shared responsibility to projects of reform. As a stakeholder in these 
services, the citizen takes some responsibility in its delivery, offering a balance to the 
rights of citizen as a consumer of these services. Citizens acknowledge their shared 
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responsibility, are incentivised by government to own local services and take up 
opportunities when offered and to also hold services accountable. The key difference 
between New Labour and Conservative policy is in the former focusing on 
empowering the citizen through state provision of opportunity. Here New Labour’s 
emphasises is not only devolving service – to be more responsive – but also ensuring 
better quality in provision to tackle problems of social exclusion. It is this focus on 
quality in provision that highlights a key difference between New Labour and 
Conservative policy – the problem of social exclusion, according to New Labour, was 
highlighted as a networked poverty and something tackled with the re-working of 
these networks (social capital) to connect citizens to resources of self-improvement. 
While social exclusion was partly explained as a dependency subjectivity (in similar 
terms to Conservative policy), there was no similar diagnosis of a systemic normative 
breakdown. Instead of engineering new social structures that treat a moral malaise, 
the focus was on workfare pathways and provision of opportunity – responsibility was 
hence tied to a quality of provision (better standards) but with no intrinsic normative 
assumptions on disadvantaged individuals to make correct choices (New Labour’s 
mantra was “standards and not structures” (BBC News 2007)).  
 
Conservative policy, on the other hand, focuses on an erosion of responsibility, 
inculcated by a paternalistic state, and encourages citizens to adopt a “collective 
culture of responsibility” and an “ethos of self-betterment” (Cameron 2011). 
Consequently, a collective mutualism is assumed in not only facilitating a more 
responsive devolved public service (better provision) but in a holistic delivery of these 
same services, including early life interventions and paternalistic nudges (guiding 
choice strategies), thus sustaining and complementing the enabling role of the state. 
It is this assumption of a holistic approach to welfare provision that leads the 
Conservative approach to accuse New Labour’s policies of being both piecemeal and 
insufficient in tackling the problems of social exclusion. 
 
3.2 Welfare co-production & re-defining state provision 
 
If poverty is viewed as structured and the locale (a site beyond the state) as providing 
avenues for developing an ethos of responsibility and self-improvement, then this 
raises questions on the role of community development and the means for achieving 
this development. The ‘Big Society’ agenda, as set-out by the Community 
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Development Foundation1, defines the role of community development as 
“empowering communities, opening up public services and promoting social action” 
and all three mentioned components “will require greater cooperation and unity 
among local people, and between local people and the authorities that serve them” 
(Community Development Foundation 2010: 2). 
 
All three components are intertwined—empowering communities opens up public 
services and promotes social action (active citizenship). The third role of the ‘Big 
Society’ agenda (community/social action) provides “social value and complements or 
fills gaps in public services” (Community Development Foundation 2010b: 3). Thus, 
these three components fulfil two overarching and related objectives – “localism and 
redefining the role of the state.” (Community Development Foundation 2010b: 3). The 
redefined role of the state is understood as both an enabler for welfare co-
production, in partnership with local people, and in being responsive to citizens, 
altering its provision to meet the needs of local people. 
 
Two overarching themes may be identified with the above policy of welfare co-
production:  
 
1. A process view of service provision indicates a change in the nature of public 
service delivery — here a responsive and open state is engaged in both the 
environment of service delivery and the transformation it generates through its 
delivery. Consequently, there is a shift from the delivery of service as targets or 
outputs defined as “top-down regulations and targets” to “bottom-up 
accountability – individual choice, competition, direct elections and 
transparency” (Cameron & Clegg 2010);  
2. Changing citizen behaviour and outlook by giving communities full 
responsibility over their lives. A responsive state encourages community action 
and devolves power to the locale and as a knock-on on effect, implicates a 
change in both the citizen’s habitus and the efficacy of the state in meeting the 
needs of citizens. 
 
The first objective – a process view of public service provision – is envisaged to 
                                                 
1   The Community Development Foundation was chosen, by the Coalition Government, 
to deliver a £80m programme to help strengthen communities between 2010 - 2015. (Cabinet 
Office 2011).  
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respond to the lived expectations of consumers, in both delivery and outcome. This is 
a view of service provision in which “there is no separation between production and 
consumption of a service; they happen simultaneously” (Klein 2010: 3). Thus, objective 
outputs and subjective outcomes are inseparable, as citizens are envisaged to be 
transformed as they take responsibility for service provision in their own 
communities. In other words, as previously noted, a subjective transformation (a 
dispositionality) necessitates creating “the right structures and environment for 
individuals and communities to help themselves” (Cameron & Herbert 2008: 123). 
Whitaker describes this ‘co-production’ view as follows: 
 
In "delivering" services the agent helps the person being served to make the 
desired sorts of changes. Whether it is learning new ideas or new skills, 
acquiring healthier habits, or changing one's outlook on family or society, only 
the individual served can accomplish the change. He or she is a vital "co-
producer" of any personal transformation that occur. The agent can supply 
encouragements, suggest options, illustrate techniques, and provide guidance 
and advice, but the agency alone cannot bring about the change. Rather than 
an agent presenting a "finished product" to the citizen, agent and citizen 
together produce the desired transformation. (Whitaker 1980: 240) 
 
Specifically, the first objective of service provision as process requires “the right 
structures and environment for individuals and communities to help themselves”. For 
this objective, policy instruments are set-out, including the training of community 
organisers, to assist in the operation and organisation of self-help groups. Both the 
institutional framework and situational factors (choice context) are viewed as 
important interventions in generating the right conditions through which 
“government can harness the power and potential of self-help to meet the converging 
ambitions of localism and the Big Society” (Archer & Vanderhoven 2010: 5). 
 
Institutionally policy initiatives are utilised to facilitate for devolved powers to the 
micro level. In terms of actual policy initiatives, the Conservative Party seeks to 
redefine public service as responsive through the following measures: 
 
1. Reduced bureaucratic and red-tape burden on local community organisations 
and businesses; 
2. Neighbourhood grants and start-up funds for community groups to generate 
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social capital in the poorest areas; 
3. Supporting self-help groups e.g. co-ops, mutuals, charities and social 
enterprises (Conservative Party 2010a & 2010b), as front-line providers of a 
double devolution of public services, as set-out in the proposed Localism Bill 
(Community Development Foundation 2011); 
4. Setting up a national citizen service as “a two-month summer programme for 
16-year olds”, with the aim of facilitating community engagement and sowing 
the seeds of ‘Big Society, for it to thrive - “This is about sowing the seeds of the 
Big Society – and seeing them thrive in the years to come.” (Conservative Party 
2010b: 2); 
5. Designating a ‘Big Society Day’ that aims “to celebrate the work of 
neighbourhood groups and encourage more people to take part in social action 
projects” (Conservative Party 2010a: 2); 
6. Training community organisers – with national centres established for this 
purpose – with the necessary skills and know-how to assist self-help groups in 
providing localised public services. Community organisers, while not paid, will 
“help communities to establish and operate neighbourhood groups, and help 
neighbourhood groups to tackle difficult social challenges” (Conservative Party 
2010a: 6). Also, intermediary bodies are viewed as a bridge between self-help 
groups and the successful provision of services that requires expertise, skills 
and successful mediation between the state and the locale. For this purpose, 
the Conservative Party envisages an intermediary role from civil servants and 
trained community organisers, fulfilling the key functions of intermediary 
groups (Archer & Vanderhoven 2010). Regarding civil servants, the Conservative 
Party seeks to “transform the civil service into a national ‘civic service’”. The 
change into a ‘civic service’ is an ethos change that is sought “by making regular 
community service, particularly in the most deprived areas, a key element in 
staff appraisals” (Conservative Party 2010a: 7). 
 
The proposal of a more responsive state (as demonstrated in a number of policy 
initiatives) is made part of the same process that seeks the subjective transformation 
of the citizen. Thus, the responsive state works to generate an altered terrain that is 
conducive to a different and responsible outlook.  
 
Further, welfare co-production is argued to entail more than individualised workfare 
welfare policy (the idea of individual rights preceded by a responsibility to seek out 
and take up opportunities). While an individualised dimension exists within 
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Conservative policy, there is, however, a greater emphasis on a collective welfare co-
production that is preceded, as noted, by a conducive structure and environment. As 
a processual approach does not aim to merely produce set service outputs, the 
collective assets of the locale are sought to generate outcomes that feed into a 
virtuous cycle of welfare co-production. 
 
To maintain a culture of self-reliance, breaking intergenerational cultures of 
dependence, subjective transformation is intertwined with environmental changes. 
The broader strategy of ‘Big Society’ seeks subjective outcomes but this cannot occur 
without a prior commitment to sustainable community groups. Similarly, Whitaker 
(1980) identifies three types of citizen co-production; these types identify an 
inseparability between the citizen and a responsive institutional environment: 
 
(1) Citizens requesting assistance from public agents; (2) citizens providing 
assistance to public agents; and (3) citizens and agents interacting to adjust 
each other's service expectations and actions (Whitaker 1980: 242) 
 
All three facets exist in Conservative policy (cf. Cabinet Office: Behavioural Insights 
Team 2010 & 2011), ranging from open communication on local needs between service 
providers and citizens, cooperation in the delivery of services (e.g. recycling waste) 
and finally in self-help groups as service providers, with the government as an enabler 
in this process. 
 
3.3 Nudging community action & changing the decision context  
 
Libertarian paternalism is envisaged to complement the ‘Big Society’ agenda and gives 
continuity to its policy vision. If re-structuring the choice context (the objective 
conditions viewed to cultivate particular subjectivities) and generating different social 
practices are sought, then nudge theory offers a means for this goal. Considering a 
focus on developing a choice architecture for both self-help groups and individuals, a 
more apt description of nudges, in Conservative policy, would be a combination of 
Libertarian Paternalism (Thaler and Sunstein 2003) and Libertarian Welfarism 
(Korobkin 2009). Here the consequences of individual choices are more than a case of 
a maximisation of individual utility and is inclusive of collective welfare. As sustainable 
communities lie at the heart of the ‘Big Society’ vision, then its policies seek to go 
beyond individual behavioural change. Consequently, self-help is primarily viewed as 
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collective and changes in individual behaviour would be organically inseparable from 
this collective dimension. 
 
Nudge theory itself (Libertarian Paternalism) adopts a negative view of human 
decision making. Often individuals, it is argued, make decisions that are detrimental to 
both themselves and the greater public good. This negative view is contrasted with a 
homo economicus view of human nature that posits “unbounded rationality, 
unbounded willpower, and unbounded selfishness” (Mullainathan & Thaler 2000). 
Instead, Thaler and Sunstein adopt the term homer economicus to denote that “people 
have self-control problem” (Thaler & Sunstein 2003: 176). Self-control problems 
(bounded willpower and rationality) can be identified with a judgemental bias, status-
quo bias2, context-dependent preferences (the situational factors of decision making 
(Korobkin 2009)) and social influences e.g. herding (Thaler & Sunstein 2009; Thaler & 
Sunstein 2003).    
 
To alter the decision making process, Thaler & Sunstein recommend an array of 
possible avenues or a toolbox that can nudge the citizen in directions to counter a 
bounded rationality and willpower. However, for it to qualify as a Libertarian 
Paternalism, coercion should be carefully circumvented and people’s welfare 
promoted to render it unobjectionable: 
 
But since no one is forced to do anything, we think this steering should be 
considered unobjectionable to libertarians. (Thaler & Sunstein 2003: 177) 
 
For example, overcoming a status quo bias or an inertia can be through introducing an 
automatic enrolment for pension schemes that does not coerce the citizen, as it offers 
a possible opt-out. Other than setting defaults, something viewed as unavoidable, 
other nudges exist due to an expectation of errors in decision making. For example, to 
remedy possible errors, providing feedback advice is envisaged to nudge users to alter 
their behaviour. Examples in providing advice includes mapping choices to welfare 
provision and explaining public service choices and what they entail; structuring 
complex choices due to possible confusion, with service providers providing 
structured information that enables the user to learn about possible choices to then 
                                                 
2  The status-quo bias being “for reasons of laziness, fear, and distraction, many people will 
take whatever option requires least effort, or path of least resistance” (Thaler, Sunstein & Balz 
2010: 4) 
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reach an informed choice; and providing incentives for certain choices by making 
salient the outcomes of these choices (Thaler, Sunstein & Balz 2010). 
 
In terms of Conservative policy, nudge theory is viewed as a useful means in 
cultivating a citizen behavioural adjustment. Importantly, it is part of a broader ‘Big 
Society’ vision; thus it can be described, in the context of this vision, as a Libertarian 
welfarism that follows from a stated bounded selfishness. Interventions or nudges, in 
this case, are viewed in terms of a greater well-being and so move beyond personal 
benefit. Nudges do exist in policies that target individual choices e.g. organ donation, 
smoking, diet and weight problems and the dissemination of information, so citizens 
can make more informed choices. Nevertheless, the ‘Big Society’ agenda primarily 
envisages nudges in what is termed as “the power of the crowd”; this power is both 
collective and collaborative where consumers work “together for a better deal”, that 
includes “introducing a range of new initiatives that will support the development of 
collective purchasing and collaborative consumption” (Cabinet Office: Behavioural 
Insight Team 2011: 6-7). Here there is a joint government initiative based on a view of 
government-business-community partnerships based around the allocation of 
budgets to the locale, as point of delivery. 
 
Hence, the ‘Big Society’ agenda extends Thaler and Sunstein’s recommendations for a 
nudge choice architecture to collective enterprises and collaborative efforts. For 
example, community organisers work with intermediaries (civil service as a ‘civic 
service’) to nudge self-help groups to take responsibility in public service provision. 
Nudges, in this sense, could be through the dissemination of information, via 
intermediaries, and the structuring of choice mechanisms. Also, incentivising nudges 
are sought in generating an intrinsic motivation when devolving power and with it a 
sense of self-determination and belonging for local services (Klein 2010) – an 
envisaged ‘Big Society Day’ is one nudge in that direction. Other incentives include 
monetary funding, through the funding of local self-help groups via a proposed Big 
Society Bank (Archer & Vanderhoven 2010). 
 
Further, as the transformation of citizen behaviour is tied to a broader holism in 
public service, Conservative policy sets-out a policy outline to achieve a more holistic 
model in “facilitating the design and delivery of other services with diverse sector 
partners” (Cabinet Office: Behavioural Insight Team 2011: 4). This partnership, in the 
delivery of services, is envisaged within a three level ecosystem conception of ‘Big 
Society’. Each level has its designated roles; from the government (both central and 
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local), to government partnerships with both private and social sectors and finally to 
the locale as point of delivery in both citizens and self-help groups (Cabinet Office: 
Behavioural Insight Team 2011). The overall policy objective thus trickles down and 
nudges occur at all levels of this ‘Big Society’ vision. While David Cameron views the 
state as reconfiguring the social, with paternalistic nudges as a means, the 
Conservative Party states this as a collective and collaborative effort and not a matter 
for the state alone. 
 
Nevertheless, Conservative policy contextualises nudges within a strong normative 
reading of the social; that is a normative reading of inequality and disadvantage, as a 
state of mind, leads to a problematic adoption of a libertarian paternalistic nudge. Any 
framing of the social will affect the formulation of policy and thereafter the 
subsequent formulation of nudges steering individuals in certain directions. Further, a 
stronger collectivism or a Libertarian welfarism that informs Conservative policy, 
comes with a normative justification of certain nudges that ideologically reify 
subjective experience. It is this reification that can generate an authoritarian design of 
a choice architecture, incentivising not voice but centralised and ideological agendas. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
As covered, an ideological representation of the social, including the place of citizens 
in this representation, shapes policy nudges at every level of a conceptualised social 
eco-system. In the case of Conservative policy, due to a certain reading, the locale is 
in a relation of a-symmetry with the state; the state, as largest source of funding, is 
influential in re-configuring both the contextual resources and institutional 
framework of service co-production. The mere positing of a dependency culture in 
contrast to an envisaged responsibility culture, emerging in co-production, is a 
diagnosis from a framed reading of a supposed societal and moral breakdown; the 
problem here is defined in terms of an intergenerational worklessness (an inherited 
state of mind) that is pervasive in disadvantaged communities (Mooney and Hancock 
2010). For example, ‘From Breakdown Britain to Breakthrough Britain’ states there is 
“a mentality of entrapment, where aspiration and hope are for other people, who live 
in another place” (Social Justice Policy Group 2007: 5). 
 
Here an inconsistency may be identified - in official terms, Conservative policy seeks 
to assist self-help groups in taking-up responsibility to meet local needs but the 
terrain of preferences or the “choice of choice mechanism” (Colander & Qi Lin Chong 
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2010: 3) for nudges are defined centrally. The collective form of policy initiatives in a 
stated Libertarian welfarism – defining the terrain of preferences - sets itself against 
what was viewed as the piecemeal approach of previous Labour policies in tackling 
social exclusion. Instead, the focus is more than just a provision of opportunities in 
the form of skills and training provision and posited a larger societal breakdown. 
However, this does not entail the absence of a provision of opportunities such as 
vocational training, as a pathway out of poverty, but places the focus on initiatives 
that tackle social and cultural aspects of disadvantage, including early years support 
and strengthening both families and communities. Nudges are means to alter the 
structure of social fields, generating an exposure to differing conditions and thus a 
qualitative change in the subjective capital appropriated (a new state of mind). As with 
New Labour, Conservative policy positions its ‘Big Society’ agenda as post-ideological 
and a new third way. In this case, attempts at policy triangulation leads to a 
positioning that represents itself as neither the hyper-individualism of the New Right 
(unbounded rationality) or the statism of Labour. Nevertheless, despite claims made, 
there is a strong ideological framing of the social itself and this implicates the 
formulation and design of a choice architecture for citizens. 
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4 
Methodological Questions on 
Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
Chapter four covers the set research questions, a complementary methodology 
and finally strategies adopted in textual analysis. Accordingly, chapter four 
consists of three sections:  
1. First, the chapter consists of the research questions being asked and how 
these relate to the broader objectives of the thesis. 
2. Second is a justification of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as a 
complementary methodology, considering the stated research questions. 
Further, the relevance of social domain theory will be noted, including 
ways this theory complements CDA.  
3. The final section covers strategies adopted in answering the research 
questions. 
4.1 What questions are being asked? 
Before turning to CDA and its use, an account will be provided on the questions 
set for textual analysis1. The questions are informed by the broad aims of the 
thesis – as stated in the introduction – in which the goal is to demonstrate ways 
hegemonic policy models adopt a view of personhood and the effect of this view 
on the nature of public service provision. The set questions aim to investigate 
the manner the citizen is represented, including their broader social settings 
(institutionalised through government policy) that inform these representations. 
The analysis in the next chapter is focused on the durable aspects of orders of 
discourse and not their enactment as concrete practice. As will be discussed, in 
                                               
1  Fairclough (1992) defines text in an inclusive sense as the semiotic dimension of 
social events. Thus, texts are “the semiotic dimension of (networks of) social practices 
that constitute social fields, institutions, organizations etc. is orders of discourse 
(Fairclough 1992); the semiotic dimension of events is texts” (Fairclough 2012: 11). Texts, 
this way, are not only written artefacts but also include other dimensions of semiosis 
such as conversations, interviews and the mixing of language with visual images.  
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regard to social domain analysis (see 4.2), the focus is on the systemic end of 
social ontology (institutional settings and contextual resources) and its intended 
effect on social relations and their practices. Based on this focus on higher 
education policy, as a system element, three broad questions, for analysis, are 
identified:  
First, identifying a policy vision – as covered in previous chapters – that 
contextualises higher education policy. As a policy vision is a macro mediation 
(institutionalised features of society) then explored is its causal impact as a 
system element (rules and systems of formation) within broader discursive 
processes. In the case of this analysis it is the study of orders of discourse 
relating to representations of the person and a conception of the person in 
relation to his sociality. Thus, what is explored is the mediation of “relations of 
ruling”2 in which a government policy blueprint sets out to affect the structural 
relation between government and citizen, in the context of public service 
provider/recipient. Here the objective is to explore how a governance policy 
document – informed by an asymmetry in power relations – seeks to govern a 
clustering of contingent social relations. To regulate these relations, it first 
represents social relations in idealised forms – ways of acting and the 
inculcation of certain identities congruent with these ways of acting.   
 
Second, in what way does a policy vision relate discursive orders3 across policy 
fields (education and beyond) so there is a consistent strategy applied to 
different policy domains? As a result, the issue is the salience of a broad policy 
agenda (as covered in chapters two and three) and its manifestation inter-
                                               
2  The notion of ‘relations of ruling’ is taken from Layder’s identification of these 
relations to system elements of social ontology. As shall be covered later, system 
elements reference “the reproduced, institutionalized feature of society such as 
economic markets and bureaucratic organizations that mediate relations of power and 
“relations of ruling” (Layder 1997: 56 – 57) 
3  Social orders of discourse are defined by Fairclough as the discourse/semiotic 
aspect of a social order. It consists of three elements – genres, discourses and styles. 
Genres are ways of acting and interacting in social events. Styles are modes of being – 
they relate to an identification/inculcation of modes of activity. Discourses are modes 
of representation of others and their ways acting and interacting. Further, discourses 
include “representations of how things are and have been, as well as imaginaries – 
representations of how things might or could or should be” (Fairclough 2003: 207). The 
relation between these three elements is a dialectic process. Finally, the networking of 
orders of discourse, at the level of social events, translates into concrete ways of acting, 
identifying and representing.    
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textually4. In taking this inter-textual angle we consider the referencing of 
external texts in its articulation of discourse orders in a represented diagnosis of 
past policy failures and alternative types of practices that are then envisaged. 
Here the focus is on the state as owner of significant ‘meta-capital’ and how it is 
then used to organize social order. Attempts at policy triangulation are thus part 
of an attempt to organize and regulate social relations from representations of 
the social and the place of the citizen in relation to a social order.  
 
Third, considering a focus on personhood, the question is in what ways these 
classifactory schemes are utilised to encourage a certain identity for the citizen 
(personhood) within the social order. Investigated here will be the manner the 
person is viewed to interact in a network of discursive events. This follows from 
the place of the citizen in a network of higher education relations and the 
normative representations of these relations.  
4.2 Why Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)? 
As this chapter is pragmatically oriented then the goal is to demonstrate the 
relevance of CDA considering the noted research questions (chapter six, on the 
other hand, seeks to provide a theoretical justification for many of the themes 
stated in this chapter). CDA moves beyond the text and its internal constitution, 
as a discursive artefact, to an explanatory account of its properties as a 
generative mechanism. Thus, it is not just an account of a text’s effect, in its 
practical usage, and how a text says what it does in an interactional analysis. The 
internal constitution of a text is considered but it is only a dimension, among 
others, in textual analysis. Hence, CDA includes the linguistic dimensions of the 
text but also goes beyond this dimension and seeks to contextualise linguistic 
elements, in the words of Fairclough, in reference to social orders of discourse:  
 
So, text analysis is an essential part of discourse analysis, but discourse 
analysis is not merely the linguistic analysis of texts. I see discourse 
analysis as ‘oscillating’ between a focus on specific texts and a focus on 
what I call the ‘order of discourse’, the relatively durable social 
                                               
4  Intertextuality is the manner a text selectively draws from other texts to 
articulate certain articulations of orders of discourse. What texts are referenced points 
to the voices in a document and thus points to difference and dialogicity i.e. are the 
texts referenced acknowledging heterogeneous voices or is consensus being articulated 
through select voices. 
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structuring of language which is itself one element of the relatively 
durable structuring and networking of social practices. Critical 
discourse analysis is concerned with continuity and change at this more 
abstract, more structural, level, as well as with what happens in 
particular texts. The link between these two concerns is made through 
the way in which texts are analysed in critical discourse analysis. 
(Fairclough 2003: 3) 
 
A consideration of the linguistic dimensions of a text, in the context of the 
structuring and networking of social practice5, informs CDA’s three-dimensional 
framework6. The three-dimensional framework is consistent with a de-
compacted and stratified view of social ontology. In a three-dimensional 
framework there is an interdependence between communicative interaction 
(textually oriented), interdiscursive analysis (pertaining to the selective uptake of 
contextual resources) and finally the importance of the systemic settings of 
interaction: 
 
(a) Analysis of communicative interaction, incorporating (i) interactional 
analysis, and (ii) linguistic and semiotic analysis (both (i) and (ii) being 
textually oriented analyses), (b) interdiscursive analysis which identifies 
the discursive resources (genres, discourses) that are drawn upon in the 
                                               
5  Social practice is defined as mediating articulations of abstract structures, 
configuring multiple mechanisms into “relative permanences” or “habitual ways of 
acting”. They are closer to social events and are drawn upon in concrete events – “… 
they constitute a point of connection between abstract structures and their 
mechanisms, and concrete events – between ‘society’ and people living their lives” 
(Chouliaraki & Fairclough 2001: 21). As they are emergent from a two-way dialectic of 
abstract structures and concrete events, they are organizations of the “diverse 
elements of social life and therefore diverse mechanisms”. In this sense a text, as a 
dimension of semiosis, is part of broader social practice but in a dialectic relation to its 
diverse elements. Texts are thus overdetermined by this dialectic and in an 
interdependent relation to other elements of social life (Fairclough et al. 2002).    
6  Fairclough’s (1992) three-dimensional framework for CDA sets a three-way 
analytical distinction between texts, discourse practice and social practice. First, it is a 
view of the text as an element of discursive events (the formal linguistic dimensions of a 
text). Second, it is the relation of the text to relatively enduring aspects of discourse 
practice i.e. the dialectic between texts as elements of discursive events and the uptake 
of certain articulations of texts into relatively permanent orders of discourse. Third, 
discourse practice is the semiotic dimension of social practice. The dialectic between 
social practice and discourse practice provides an explanatory link to the social settings 
of discursive events. 
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interaction and maps them onto social orders of discourse, (c) 
sociologically informed analysis of the social structures and socio-
cultural practices which the interaction is a facet of (Chouliaraki and 
Fairclough 2001: 138) 
 
Due to its multi-dimensional framework, CDA complements the textual analysis 
conducted in the next chapter, as it encompasses the social structuring of 
language in the context of a networking of social practices. The focus on the 
relatively durable social structuring of language, in textual analysis, is in an 
attempt to identify an interplay between the linguistic elements of a policy 
document and its role as a contextual resource and facet of discursive practice 
(see below for social domain theory). Hence, analysis turns to the “institutional 
and organisational circumstances of the discursive event and how that shapes 
the nature of the discursive practice” (Fairclough 1992: 4).  
 
As stated, in shaping the settings of interaction, government policy aims to 
regulate social practice as part of a mediation of relations of power. At the 
macro level, when we turn to the analysed text – as a generative mechanism – 
we start from the third dimension of CDA. It is through the third dimension of 
CDA that the other two dimensions are represented, from a distance, through a 
proposed normalised view of social relations and practices. In seeking to bring 
about a certain state of affairs, there is a governance attempt to regulate and 
define the dynamics of situated activity and the discursive resources adopted by 
actors in the process of interaction. The social action and interaction of citizens, 
in social events, maps onto proposed social orders of discourse – discourses, 
genres and styles. In turn, these orders of discourse translate into the manner 
actors name reality, ways they act and roles they identify with at the point of 
interaction. Policy interventions (policy documents and mission statements are 
key in the process of intervention) aim to sustain enduring configurations in the 
point of interplay between different domains of a social ontology. In these 
governance interventions we identify representations of personhood in ways of 
naming, acting and identifying in reference to defined social roles. The 
properties of social roles are predefined from an understanding of what 
constitutes flourishing and accordingly what needs to be done to incentivise a 
conception of the person based on this understanding.  
 
Finally, CDA can be utilized to demonstrate the existence of pre-given 
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conceptions of the person that informs a governance regulation of ways of 
acting, identifying and representing.  Thus, as a methodology in textual analysis, 
CDA is utilised to make the ‘invisible’ visible in demonstrating to the reader the 
existence of an understanding of personhood that defines the normative texture 
of relations and the roles ascribed to the occupants of these relations. This 
‘meta-critique’ is often neglected, in which policy critique is framed within 
accepted hegemonic models of the person and its related pre-sanctioned goods. 
For example, as covered in chapter two, proposals are deemed practical when 
they relate to implementations that may enhance social mobility or access to 
strategic forms of social capital (the distribution and access of pre-sanctioned 
goods).  
4.2.1 The relevance of social domain theory 
 
Figure one: The social domains (Layder 1997: 56) 
First, a brief account will be provided of social domain theory (also theoretically 
relevant to chapter six). Second, following this account, noted will be the ways 
the theory complements CDA and further its relevance to the textual analysis 
featured in chapter five. It will be argued that social domain theory 
complements CDA, in mapping its three-dimensional framework to different 
properties of a differentiated social ontology. Informing the mapping of these 
dimensions is a de-compacted and stratified view of social ontology; this de-
compacted view of social ontology corresponds to the emergence of discursive 
practice in a duality between the durable and pre-existing dimensions of social 
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practice and its mediation in situated activity. Thus, there is a multi-
dimensionality of four inter-connected domains that contextualise abstract 
structures, concrete events and their lubrication in social relations and their 
practices: 
Domain theory suggests that instead of a simple dualism (of agency 
and structure) we should think of the social universe as 
multidimensional – as four interconnected domains (Layder 2006: 273) 
The four inter-connected domains pertain to lifeworld and system elements of 
the social. First, in lifeworld elements there are the personal and intersubjective 
dimensions, represented by the domains of psychobiography and situated 
activity. Second are system elements identified in the domains of social settings 
and contextual resources. The domain of psychobiography is the basis of what 
makes us singularities. It consists of a unique subjective trajectory of lived 
experiences; the basis of this unique trajectory is an interaction between 
irreducible personal emergent properties and external circumstances. What 
results from this interaction is an individuated subjective configuration of 
experiences – emergent from our relations with our environment – and 
grounded in the vantage point of the self and individual characteristics. Thus, we 
confront the social with unique backgrounds that are irreducible to the objective 
dimensions of social forces (chapter six theoretically develops the centrality of 
the domain of psychobiography in the development of a personal identity).  
The domain of situated activity consists of the intersubjective dimensions of 
social life. The previously noted domain of psychobiography – with its subjective 
powers – comes into contact with others in encounters that form the basis of 
situated activity. The trajectory of an encounter is defined in terms of the nature 
and time period of the exchange. It is here, at the point of contact, that the 
properties and influences of subjective/objective dimensions of social life 
interplay. In interpersonal exchanges we may identify the emergence of 
meaning and the trajectory of morphogenesis (see chapter six). As the domain of 
situated activity is the point of mutual reinforcement – in an interaction of 
subjective/objective mechanisms – then meaning is emergent from activity and 
activity “must be understood as an amalgam of subjective, external and situated 
influences” (Layder 2006: 278).  
It is in the domain of social settings – a system element – that we identify the 
structural influence of the above noted interplay. This domain consists of “local 
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aggregations of reproduced social relations, positions and practices” (Layder 
2006: 280). Present activity falls under the influence of a past aggregation of 
reproduced social relations but subjective powers – free-form elements – 
mediate these reproduced relations (the dual nature of social relations). As the 
settings of situated activity are trans-situational then they apply and are 
autonomous to lifeworld elements of social life.  
Finally, the second system domain is the domain of contextual resources. The 
domain of contextual resources is with two dimensions – first, is the 
distributional aspect of material resources based on structural differentiation 
e.g. class, gender and status. Further, there is the historical accumulation of 
cultural resources of a propositional register such as shared norms, fashion and 
popular culture (also covered in chapter six). What we have is a cultural system 
that is autonomous of individuals and groups but whose resources are drawn 
upon in the context of situated activity. Both social system and contextual 
resources, together, provide the objective context to the subjective and 
intersubjective dimensions (lifeworld elements) of a shared social universe.  
Based on an interplay between the subjective and objective dimensions, in the 
context of situated activity, contextual resources complete the circuit of power 
relations as it gives definition to social systems, in the manner it connects 
system elements to intersubjective exchanges. In providing this connection we 
refer to resources, whether distributional or as a cultural repository, in the form 
of social relations, roles and related social practices: 
The notion of contextual resources completes the circuit of power 
relations involved here by drawing into the discussion the wider 
structures of power that give definition to specific social systems. It 
completes the circuit in the sense that the notion of power is connected 
via social system features such as resources and settings through to 
situated practices and the transformative capacities of individuals. In this 
sense the individual-collective dimensions and properties of power are 
expressed through, and carried in, the dual nature of social relations and 
practices. (Layder 1997: 83) 
The dual nature of social relations and practices here refers to the tension 
between enablement and constraint. The reproduced forms of social relations, 
positions and practices are represented in contextual resources that bring wider 
structures of power to bear on the subject and his intersubjective interaction. At 
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the same time, the powers of enablement provide the possibility for subjects to 
engage and confront social forces. Socially defined characteristics, represented 
in contextual resources, are sanctioned aspects of reproduced social relations 
and practices: 
The duality of social relations refers to the tension between their ‘free-
form’ and ‘reproduced’ aspects or between their ‘personally’ and 
‘socially’ defined characteristics … The influence of either reproduced 
or free-form elements may be minimized in different settings and 
circumstances but can never be driven out entirely. There are always 
residual elements of both in all situated activity and individual 
behaviour. (Layder 2006: 282) 
The intertwining of both these elements establish the intersubjective as 
mediatory link between ‘reproduced’ and ‘free-form’ elements. As reproduced 
relations are enacted via situated activity then implicated is a tri-partite split in 
social ontology (subjective, intersubjective and objective – see figure two). First, 
the institutional settings of interaction (socially defined characteristics) – 
defined by distributive patterns and a pre-existing cultural repository – impinge 
on interaction. Second, the exercising of objective generative mechanisms is 
explained in a selective uptake of these mechanisms in accordance to the 
dynamics of exchange and individual predispositions. Thus, in this multi-
dimensional model – subjective, intersubjective and objective – we have the 
tripartite modalities of social ontology. 
 
Figure two: Tripartite modalities of social ontology (Source: Layder 1997: 89) 
 
In regard to the relevance of social domain theory, it was adopted as a 
theoretical framework, in textual analysis, to map the set research questions to 
different dimensions of the social. Thus, the three questions pertain to different 
dimensions and modalities of the social – first, the third research question 
pertains to the representation of an idealised citizen role i.e. styles (the domain 
of pyschobiography). The representation of an idealised identity-in-relation is 
explained in the context of a regulation of social practices and here analysis 
takes the perspective of system elements. Thus, a governance perspective acts 
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on relations and seeks to set the template and direction of situated activity, in 
shaping the contextual resources and settings of interaction. Here a tripartite 
split in social ontology captures the different dimensions of CDA (textual, 
interactional and structural). Enduring social orders of discourse (contextual 
resources) complete the circuit of power relations and figure in interactions in 
the way roles are defined. 
 
4.3 Adopted strategy for textual analysis 
 
The final section covers both the strategy adopted and methods used in textual 
analysis, to answer the set questions. This section, therefore, is split in two 
parts: first, a short justification will be provided on the choice of higher 
education governance as a case example for analysis; second, a general outline 
will be provided on how the text was approached and features analysed. In 
regard to the first part, higher education governance was selected due to 
education being viewed, in the logic of policy triangulation, as an important 
corrective measure to existing social problems. In third way thinking, higher 
education is an important site of intervention as it is viewed as an important 
facet of a fairness agenda, in the provision of opportunity. At the same, it is the 
site of intervention, in a human capital investment, to meet the wider needs of 
the economy, considering the contingencies of globalised social order.  
 
The document selected for analysis was ‘Higher Education: Students at the 
Heart of the System’ (June 2011)7; the document detailed, at the time, coalition 
higher education policy. Further, it relates specifically to the research questions 
in that it sets guidelines on how government policy defines its relation to the 
citizen, as part of enduring networks of social practices and social roles. Its 
textual features provide an entry into structural analysis and the envisaged 
relations proposed between different social domains.  
 
In regard to the strategy and methods adopted, the document was approached 
considering the three dimensions of discourse – (1) structural analysis; (2) 
interactional analysis; (3) linguistic and semiotic analysis. In the case of 
structural analysis – the foundational point of analysis – the objective was to 
analyse the textual features of the document to identify representations of the 
                                               
7  At the time of writing the sole document relating to higher education 
governance. 
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institutionalised features of society and how they are envisaged to regulate 
networks of social practice and their relations. It is an attempt to understand 
ways orders of discourse are networked and related to each other and any pre-
supposing representations of the social that may explain this. These are, in the 
words of Fairclough, adopted strategies (enunciative modalities8) that define 
relationships between subject positions within the discursive space (Fairclough 
1992). 
 
Interactional analysis consisted of a text’s referencing of other texts 
(intertextuality) or “how texts draw upon, incorporate, re-contextualise and 
dialogue with other texts” (Fairclough 2003: 16). Here texts draw on each other 
with purpose and meaning; the purpose or meaning of this process is identified 
in a configuration and reconfiguration of orders of discourse into different 
articulations of meaning. To discern these articulations is significant in 
explaining how texts can be laced with presuppositions/assumptions. In 
interactional analysis there is an attempt to show in what ways certain texts are 
selected and how their discourses are utilised from given assumptions and 
presuppositions. In the case of this study – focused on system element 
representations – it approached interactional analysis in the manner a macro 
mediation impacts the interaction between texts and their discourses. Finally, 
linguistic analysis was utilised to discern ways the text selectively draws upon 
language to construe forms of consensus in given discoursal articulations.  
 
The dimensions of CDA were viewed, analytically, in a relational sense. Thus, 
intertextuality shows how texts selectively draw upon orders of discourse that 
mediate between social practice and texts, with the process then realised 
through linguistic systems and the linguistic features of texts. Accordingly, 
linguistic analysis “shows how texts selectively draw upon linguistic systems 
(again, in an extended sense)” and it is intertextual analysis that “shows how 
texts selectively draw upon orders of discourse – the particular configurations 
of conventionalized practices” (Fairclough 1995: 188). 
                                               
8  Enunciative modalities are defined by Fairclough as “types of discursive activity 
such as describing, forming hypotheses, formulating regulations, teaching, and so forth, 
each of which has its own associated subject positions. So, for example, teaching as a 
discursive activity positions those who take part as ‘teacher’ or ‘learner’. As in the case 
of ‘objects’, the rules of formation of enunciative modalities are constituted for a 
particular discursive formation by a complex group of relations” (Fairclough 1992: 43 – 
44) 
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As the starting point of analysis started from the intended macro effects of the 
document then the adopted strategies, similarly, viewed structural analysis as 
the point from which it then approached both the interactional and textual. This 
is the case as the objective was to analyse the properties of a system mechanism 
(higher education governance) in the manner it represents social events, the 
interaction of different actors in these events and finally the textual features 
(semantic and grammatic) of the document in rhetorically setting out a position. 
Considering the direction of textual analysis, the following strategies were 
adopted: 
 
(1) Intertextuality: The role of intertextuality was to discover the existence of 
external policy objectives – figuring in orders of discourse – that then shape 
higher education governance. Here any cited documents or ideas from external 
documents were relied upon to demonstrate the existence of a broader policy 
model informing higher education governance (for example, the salience of 
policy triangulation between a fairness agenda and the need for economic 
performance). External references cited in the document included areas such as 
social mobility and schools. The goal in covering these referenced texts was to 
show how these policy areas, in the manner texts intersect, established a 
cohesive policy model that works across different social spheres and policy 
areas. The nature of relations between texts also informed questions of 
difference and dialogicity in the document (considering the types of texts 
referenced). In the case of the document both were minimal – the interplay of 
texts re-affirmed pre-supposing assumptions e.g. reasons for failing schools and 
the type of interventions to turn these schools into ‘engines of social mobility’.   
 
(2) Interdiscursivity9: Interdiscursivity is the articulation of a mixture of genres 
and discourses in a text. In analysing the semantic and grammatical features of a 
text in different representations and ways of acting – based on normalised 
identities-in-relation – the goal was to analyse (in relation to intertextuality) the 
different combinations of orders of discourse figuring in represented social 
                                               
9  Fairclough terms interdiscursivity as a continuous shifting of relations between 
genres, between discourses and between styles and the ongoing relation between them 
in texts. Any accomplished relative permanence in their relations, as an order of 
discourse, is thus one drawing on this interdiscursivity of a text that is part of its 
intertextuality i.e. - “a question of what genre, discourses and styles it draws upon, and 
how it works them into particular articulation” (Fairclough 2012: 12)  
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events and the manner they articulate a broader representation of the citizen as 
person (an idealised personal identity).     
 
(3) Foregrounded assumptions: The text’s semantic relations were investigated 
for assumptions that act as representations of what is the case and what should 
be done based on these assumptions. Further, complementing the existence of 
foregrounded assumptions, was the use of nominalisations that rendered 
complex social processes into pre-supposed entities. Thus, nominalisations, in 
their use, erase difference in abstracting from complex processes to then state 
an idealised state of affairs.  Assumptions can be existential, propositional or 
value assumptions and set out a manner of representation i.e. in how social 
relations should be enacted and structure social events. Existential assumptions, 
in the case of the document analysed, holds sway and denotes an assumption 
“about what exists” (Fairclough 2003: 55). Propositional assumptions take a 
normative turn, blending factual statements that imply or dictate ways to adapt 
or intervene to what are realised conditions. In value assumptions, the 
normative turn is explicit and assumptions of desirability are made. Each of 
these assumptions can be triggered by linguistic features of the text, such that 
existential assumptions can be made with markers of definite reference (e.g. the, 
this, that, these, those). Propositional assumptions often rely on factive verbs 
denoting something that ought to be done, from an assumption of what is the 
case. It is in value assumptions that explicit markers of desirability are used, 
including verbs that point to positive doings (Fairclough 2003: 56).  Different 
types of assumptions are overlaid, so that their texturing is relational e.g. 
propositional assumptions emerge from and can be pre-supposed by statements 
of what exists in the form of existential assumptions.  
 
(4) Modality10 features: Modality features demonstrate a level of commitment to 
certain policy directions. Further, these commitments were identified in relation 
to foregrounded assumptions – modality features establish commitment to 
given assumptions that represent what needs to be done in social relations via 
different actors. Based on commitments to given propositions it is possible to 
identify passivated and activated actors in relations of power and whose voices, 
                                               
10  Modality is defined by Fairclough as “the question of what people commit 
themselves to when they make Statements, ask Questions, make Demands or Offers. 
The point is that there are different ways of doing each of these which make different 
commitments.” (Fairclough 2003: 165) 
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consequently, are normalised. Thus, modality features were identified as an 
aspect of structural analysis in which the objective is to analyse textual features 
for representations of articulations of orders of discourse, considering 
institutionalised features of governance and its effect on the networking of 
social practices and their relations (relations of ruling). These are, in the words 
of Fairclough, strategies (enunciative modalities11) adopted that define 
relationships between subject positions within the discursive space (Fairclough 
1992). Fairclough defines both modality and evaluation, both interrelated, as 
“seen in terms of what authors commit themselves to, with respect to what is 
true and what is necessary (modality), and with respect to what is desirable and 
undesirable, good or bad (evaluation). My assumption is that what people 
commit themselves to in texts is an important part of how they identify 
themselves, the texturing of identities” (Fairclough 2003: 165).  
 
Here, as noted, the question is in how a governance document sought to identify 
and texture identities. In the process of textual analysis, covered in the next 
chapter, this was done through highlighting passages that demonstrate 
commitments to what is true or necessary and the impact of these statements 
on the articulation of orders of discourse (discourses, genres and styles). Textual 
features that highlighted evaluative commitments included deontic modalities 
and epistemic modalities. Deontic modalities are commitments on what should 
be done (a statement of obligation) and epistemic modalities are commitments 
to propositions or assertions (statement of truth) of what is or will be the case 
(e.g. existing obstacles to social mobility). Markers of modalisation and 
evaluation were utilised to identify modalisation elements in the text. Markers of 
modalisation can be triggered in the use of modal verbs (‘must’, ‘should’, ‘will’, 
‘can’, ‘could’) but also modal adverbs (‘assuredly’, ‘certainly’, ‘always’), modal 
adjectives (‘likely’, ‘possible’, ‘probable’) and even indicators of mental process (‘I 
think’, ‘I believe’). Further, modalisation can also be triggered in the form of 
clauses to denote different scales of commitment (‘likely’, ‘possible’ and 
‘probable’). 
                                               
11  Enunciative modalities are defined by Fairclough as “types of discursive activity 
such as describing, forming hypotheses, formulating regulations, teaching, and so forth, 
each of which has its own associated subject positions. So, for example, teaching as a 
discursive activity positions those who take part as ‘teacher’ or ‘learner’. As in the case 
of ‘objects’, the rules of formation of enunciative modalities are constituted for a 
particular discursive formation by a complex group of relations” (Fairclough 1992: 43 – 
44) 
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(5) The ‘filtering’ of Genre chains: Genres are ways of acting and interacting 
(actional meanings) in social relations and practice. In the case of the document 
analysed, as a governance genre, the aim to is to act on and regulate social 
relations i.e. “action at a distance” (Fairclough 2003: 31). Thus, the document 
analysed, in the next chapter, represents ways students are expected to identify 
(student subjectivities) and this extends to the manner genres are cited and 
filtered in the document. Here, in an “action at a distance”, governance policies 
seek to stimulate social relations in given directions in the manner government 
communicates to relevant social actors: 
 
And it is noteworthy that contemporary genres for ‘action at a distance’, 
genres of governance, through which organizations communicate with 
individuals, are pervasively characterised by stimulated social relations 
which, we might argue, tend to mystify social hierarchy and social 
distance. (Fairclough 2003: 76) 
 
Genres stated in the document relate to orders of discourse and specifically how 
genres, as part of these orders, are filtered through a given regulative logic that 
privilege certain discourses over others (Fairclough 1995). Examples of genres, 
cited in the document, included surveys and student evaluations – these 
examples affirmed an exchange view of social relations. Further, what these 
examples demonstrated was the existence of a discourse of an idealised student, 
in the context of higher education relations that incentivise this given view of 
the student. Thus, in an attempt to institutionalise and regulate ways of acting 
there is both a discourse on an idealised student and broader institutional 
settings that provides context to defined social roles. This way of viewing 
genres, as an aspect of orders of discourse, and its application in social relations 
is taken from Fairclough’s definition of genres as the “discoursal aspect of ways 
of acting and interacting in the course of social events: we might say the 
(inter)acting is never just discourse, but it is often mainly discourse. So, when we 
analyse a text or interaction in terms of genre, we are asking how it figures 
within and contributes to social action and interaction in social events” 
(Fairclough 2003: 66). If the forms of action and interaction in social events are 
defined by its social practices and the ways they are networked together, then 
the application of genres, in the form of documents, pertains to how they figure 
as elements of actional meanings and specifically in their relations to other 
<54> 
 
aspects of orders of discourse (styles and discourses). The predominant genre of 
this document is one, as noted, that can be described as a governance genre and 
whose effects is sought through an action-at-a-distance in the form of 
regulating actions and interactions in social events. Thus, the document acts at a 
distance in seeking to define the types of identifications (styles) and how events 
and identifications of actors are represented in their actions and interactions 
(discourses). 
 
(6) Social events: Social events are situations of interaction. In the case of this 
analysis, considering the genre of the document, it is the selective 
representation of events, from a governance perspective, and the manner 
discursive orders and their actors are expressed in these events (in terms of 
social domain theory, concrete events would be the place in which contextual 
resources enact power relations). Questions asked, regarding the representation 
of events, included ways actors were referenced and whether certain actors 
were activated or passivated. The normalisation of certain voices established a 
reference point that then established normalised patterns of social practice. For 
example, ‘collaboration’ between different actors was a salient feature in the 
document and the issue was to identify which actors were activated and how 
this impacted power relations.  
 
(7) Further notes: The relational nature of textual analysis – pre-supposed by a 
relational understanding between social domains – entails there is no discrete 
dimension in analysis. Thus, for example, considering ways of acting implicates 
identities and manners of representation. Similarly, foregrounded assumptions – 
forms of representation – affect the manner these identities act out their roles 
in relation to other actors. Finally, the main themes of the document were 
identified inductively and acted as a procedural mechanism to organise its 
content for textual analysis. It was the set research questions that framed the 
methods used and types of questions asked when analysing the document’s 
content.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Three set questions framed the textual analysis of ‘Higher Education: Students 
at the Heart of the System’ (June 2011). The first question asked related to the 
manner an existing policy model defines the role of the citizen as recipient 
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public provision and the role of the citizen within broader relations of public 
provision. The second question related to the manner this policy vision extends 
to higher education and other policy areas. Third, is the question of identities 
incentivised, with a focus on student identities, and a view of the person that 
informs these identities and their concomitant social roles.    
 
Methodologically Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) was adopted due to its 
relevance and complementarity to the noted set questions. Here CDA goes 
beyond the linguistic dimensions of the text to include the relatively durable 
social structuring of language in relation to the relatively durable structuring 
and networking of social practices (Fairclough 2003: 3). Specifically relevant, in 
the case of this study, is the perspective of a governance agenda – as a system 
element – in regard to the regulation and shaping of orders of discourse and the 
manner actors adopt social roles in the context of networks of higher education 
practices. Further, social domain theory was utilised as a view of the social that 
informed the application of CDA; the relevance of social domain theory is in the 
way it maps the different dimensions of CDA to the different domains of a 
multidimensional social universe. For example, the manner lifeworld domains 
are mediated in relation to an institutionalised making of contextual resources 
that are highlighted and enacted in situated activity. 
 
The strategy adopted in textual analysis included – (a) the identification of cited 
texts (intertextuality); (b) grammatical and semantic features that identify 
articulations of orders of discourse; (c) identifying commitments to certain 
policy directions (modality features); (d) genre chains that discursively filter and 
highlight certain idealised social roles; (e) the manner social events and actors 
are represented. Together these methods were part of broader strategy to 
answer the set research questions and so focused on a system regulation and 
normative representation that seeks to structure the networking of social 
practices in higher education.  
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5  
Representations of the Social in  
UK Higher Education Policy 
 
 
 
This chapter aims to apply Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) - considering the 
research questions set-out in the previous chapter – to higher education 
governance. CDA will be specifically conducted on ‘Higher Education: Students 
at the Heart of the System’ (June 2011)1; at the same time, wider policy issues – 
covered in section one – will be considered. ‘Higher Education: Students at the 
Heart of the System’ details coalition higher education policy and being a 
governance document directly relates to the three research questions set out in 
the previous chapter – (1) What elements exist in the text that identify a policy 
vision and how does this vision represent the citizen in relation to a governance 
of provision. Further, how does this representation affect the regulation of 
relations between social actors in higher education; (2) How does a policy vision 
extend beyond higher education to other policy domains? Does a diagnosis of 
past policy failures – with its normative view of the social – impact higher 
education? (3) Rhetorically what identities are incentivised considering the 
noted policy vision and in what ways are the actors represented in the domain of 
higher education policy. The three noted research questions will provide a 
general research framework when approaching the text.  
 
Specifically, in regard to the third research question, the central question of 
personhood will be investigated. Chapters two and three highlighted attempts at 
policy triangulation, in which two views of the person were synthesised – the 
strategic subjectivity of homo economicus and the regulated subjectivity of homo 
sociologicus. In the former, as demonstrated in a responsibilisation discourse, 
the objective is to generate behavioural changes as a knock-on effect that 
follows from a provision of opportunities and know-how to access strategic 
goods. Here there is a virtuous cycle of self-dependence and self-betterment to 
make the right choices that leads to required behavioural changes. At the same 
time, it is assumed that an investment in consensual social spaces is necessary 
to generate strategic subjectivities. In this investment there is a homo 
                                               
1  At the time of writing the sole document relating to higher education 
governance. 
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sociologicus dimension of policy triangulation in making markets work for 
individuals. Provision is regulated, including the definition of roles in this 
provision, and this regulation – top down – aims to create pre-given policy 
outcomes. In the socially regulated subject (homo sociologicus) there is an 
attempt to engineer the citizen to value certain preferences that are the basis of 
strategic concerns and deliberations. Thus, in a responsibilisation of citizen’s 
rights, there is a contractual exchange in which the individual seeks their own 
good but with the terms of exchange defined (Mooney 2014). Accordingly, in the 
analysis below, the third research question will consider the manner these two 
views of the person are triangulated and how this relates to a broader policy 
vision. 
  
5.1 Application of CDA 
 
Four themes may be identified in ‘Students at the Heart of the System’ and each 
theme demonstrates a dimension of higher education governance. Together 
these identified themes demonstrate a consistent vision in higher education 
provision. As noted in the previous chapter these themes were identified 
inductively and act as a hermeneutic method to organise the document’s 
content. Further, in the document, external policy fields are identified (the 
second research question) and cited. These fields, together, demonstrate a 
consistent agenda that proposes a vision across different policy areas. For 
example, topics such as consumer choice, industry collaboration and social 
mobility establish ways higher education interrelates with external policy fields 
in presenting a broader policy approach in government provision. The 
interrelation of these fields – as shall be demonstrated – establishes social 
problems and initiatives that are then taken to resolve these problems.      
 
Theme one: Statement of challenge & objective of reforms 
 
The document starts with a statement of challenge and broader objectives of 
reforms: 
 
Our challenge has been to reduce public spending on higher education 
without reducing the capacity of the system and, at the same time, to 
provide more assistance for students from disadvantaged backgrounds. 
We believe our new funding model meets this challenge. It allows for 
increased investment in higher education, is more affordable for 
everyone and provides significant additional support for students from 
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less affluent backgrounds. (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 
2011: 24) 
 
The statement of challenge puts forward a problem but, at the same time, there 
is a presupposed commitment to an austerity economics. This is a commitment 
that does not compromise support for students from disadvantaged 
backgrounds. Here a prognosis of welfarist waste (“burdens of bureaucracy”) is 
contrasted with a regulated market model that tackles problems of waste: 
 
At the same time, our reforms to higher education funding will promote 
the development of a more diverse, dynamic and responsive higher 
education sector where funding follows the student and the forces of 
competition replace the burdens of bureaucracy in driving up the quality 
of the academic experience. (Department for Business, Innovation & 
Skills 2011: 24) 
 
Dialogue in the text is minimal – it is a statement of intent in a document whose 
genre can be described as governance. As a policy document, its underlying 
assumptions are part of a chain of documents that includes interviews, policy 
blueprints (for example the Big Society agenda), speeches and other areas of 
policy making. In placing the document within this broader chain, it is then 
possible to trace how – in dialogue with other texts – policy is carried through. 
While a practical genre is concerned with how things are done, a governance 
genre, on the other hand, is concerned with the way things are done (Fairclough 
2003). It is a genre whose properties seek to appropriate elements of social 
practice so that social relations are re-contextualised and regulated – to 
regulate social relations, orders of discourse are mixed in ways that privilege 
certain discourses over others. The document puts forward its plan to govern 
relations between the academy, industry and economy and generate forms of 
discourse that then filter the organisation of social relations and their different 
fields of practice. Thus, a statement of challenge and setting of objectives should 
be viewed considering this governance objective. 
 
Policy triangulation is noticeable in the excerpt – it identifies statist or welfarist 
waste (the idea of rolling back the state) with a commitment to opportunity and 
the need to provide some form of welfare freed from the burdens of 
bureaucracy. As shall be covered, the Big Society agenda and ideas of a broken 
Britain and inter-generational dependency are present in the document but 
there is also focus on guiding individuals with the right know-how to tap into 
strategic social networks. In this focus (a fairness agenda) government takes a 
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guiding role and includes collaborations and partnerships, to provide the right 
structures and environment for individuals and communities to help themselves 
(Cameron & Herbert 2008: 123). This approach is consistent with a welfare 
(process) co-production model put forward in the ‘Big Society’ agenda of rolling 
forward the social as a site of welfare provision that is also responsive to local 
needs (see chapter three). 
 
In the excerpt “assistance” is provided and the focus is on an institutional 
structure that is a “more diverse, dynamic and responsive higher education 
sector where funding follows the student and the forces of competition replace 
the burdens of bureaucracy in driving up the quality of the academic 
experience”. As the stated focus on the student consumer elicits a view of the 
student as a responsible consumer – an antidote to a dependency culture – then 
advocated is a conducive environment to deliver a service that meets the needs 
of the consumer. Government regulates a collaborative environment for a 
responsive system that champions the role of student as consumer (here a homo 
sociologicus conception may be identified in an environment that complements 
strategic subjectivities i.e. the student consumer): 
 
We will oversee a new regulatory framework with the Higher Education 
Funding Council for England (HEFCE) taking on a major new role as a 
consumer champion (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 
2).  
 
It is not just delivery of services (outcomes) that are rendered in objective terms 
but also the process, including the contents of courses chosen by students and 
how they are designed and delivered (see theme three). 
 
Assumptions in the excerpt are textured to foreground legitimation. In the 
excerpt above, a statement of an existing challenge is assumed (an existential 
assumption) and “our new funding model meets this challenge”. The use of 
“This” being a marker of definite reference that pre-supposes the existence of a 
challenge to reduce public spending. An existential assumption is itself 
presupposed by a propositional assumption that sets out “to reduce public 
spending on higher education without reducing the capacity of the system and, 
at the same time, to provide more assistance for students from disadvantaged 
backgrounds”. The factive verb utilised (“to reduce”) assumes that public 
spending requires reduction. Considering a propositional assumption, a value 
assumption is made that declares it compatible to reduce public spending but 
still achieve the dual goals of a fairer system and a responsive education system. 
<60> 
“Promote” is used in a normative sense, triggering a value assumption that a 
diverse and responsive market is something sought. 
 
Thus, the statement of challenge and objectives of reform may be identified as a 
governance paradigm. Value commitments state assumptions that, from the 
start of the document, seek to establish a hegemony of meaning. This ideological 
work – in a statement challenge – then extends to the organisation of meaning 
and mixing different discourses and their related social practices. Assumptions 
on processes of neoliberal governance are, at the same time, always negotiated. 
In attempts at triangulation there is a commitment to widen participation and 
provide support for disadvantaged students. Value assumptions are thus 
embedded to propositional ones, to elaborate how a fairness agenda may be 
possible.  
 
Theme two: Higher education as a market model - diversification and 
competition  
 
Considering the statement of challenge and objectives of higher education 
reforms, it is poignant to investigate in what ways this statement and its 
assumptions are then applied to governance policies. In what ways does a 
mixing of genre chains impact orders of discourse and networks of social 
practice. To elaborate an alternative model of neo-liberal economics – 
responsive to the needs of citizens – social relations are the point of 
intervention. Here analysis is on how a governance agenda represents events 
from a distance – in its articulation of normalised view of relations – and what 
should be the correct way of acting and interacting in these events. 
Representing events and favouring of certain genres in these events means the 
favouring of certain orders of discourse over others. Consequently, analysis 
emphasises discourses of governance and its representation of social events, 
from the perspective of pre-given discourses to genres and styles.  
 
There are different genres cited in the document, significant ones being surveys 
and student evaluations. As stated in the previous chapter, a governance genre 
denotes an ‘action at a distance’ - it represents ways students are expected to 
act in social events and the genres cited in the document point in this direction. 
Here ‘action at a distance’ regulates social relations and adopts a discourse that 
conceives discursive processes and ways of doing to be responsive to students. 
However, through a representation of social events and citation of certain 
normalised ways of acting there are presuppositions in assumptions regarding 
student subjectivities (see theme three). A governance genre stimulates social 
<61> 
relations in normalising certain discourses over others and due to this 
stimulation of social relations mystifies social hierarchy (Fairclough 2003: 76).  
 
To stimulate social relations, they are mediated through a filtering process that 
re-contextualises an articulation of discourses, as set out in the statement of 
challenge regarding reforms and their objectives. For instance, an event 
highlighted, and repeated, is the publication of data that is made available for 
students to better inform their choices: 
 
This already happens to some extent with organisations such as 
OpinionPanel, an independent market research company, which 
represents publicly available data in ways which potential students 
might find useful. Their recent publication, The Student Fact File 2011, 
includes information ranging from the socio-economic background of 
applicants to higher education institutions to how often students go 
‘clubbing’. Other examples include Push and the Student Room, which 
provide forums for informal sharing of students’ views about higher 
education. The consumer organisation ‘Which?’ is now interested in 
providing information for prospective students and their parents, and is 
exploring how it might work to deliver this with other organisations, 
including bestcourse4me, who specialise in showing the career paths 
offered by different higher education courses. (Department for Business, 
Innovation & Skills 2011: 30) 
 
Here accountability is seen in different genres including interactive websites 
(application portal), online summary reports and student surveys. These cited 
genres are filtered in a represented need to develop certain means to record and 
document data that offers a “seamless customer experience” and so may be 
responsive to choices. 
 
Difference and dialogue refer to the manner different orders of discourse are 
referenced and textured (different forms of representation, action and 
identification). Regarding difference and dialogue in this text, there is both a 
focus on solidarity and a normalization of this solidarity and consensus. This can 
be seen in an assumption of consensus as an analytical vantage point and a value 
commitment that pre-supposes interventions to make consensus workable and 
sustainable (discussed later in themes three and four). Embedded assumptions 
can be identified in a commitment that a market model allows for greater 
diversity of provision and the administering of greater choice, improving 
delivery and enhancing the experience and needs of students. Thus, when voices 
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are referenced, for example, when asking “the SLC and UCAS to develop a single 
application portal” (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 32) it is 
then normalized so that a single application portal allows for an integrated 
application process. Further, a single application portal allows for “a seamless 
customer experience where data common to both applications is entered only 
once”. Here we have not only a procedural means of efficiency - how things are 
done - but also a value assumption re-contextualising what is apparently a 
procedural means. The value assumption is in how things should relate in 
generating a seamless customer experience, with assumptions made on 
subjective identifications envisaged for students (the strategic dispositionality of 
homo economicus).  
 
Several assumptions are made, whether it is propositional or value assumptions. 
For example, “the Key Information Set will enable higher education institutions 
to illustrate the quality of the experience that they offer” (Department for 
Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 29). Here a propositional assumption is made 
in the use of the factive verb “enable” - the propositional assumption makes a 
connection between regulation techniques (KIS) and sustaining an improved 
quality of provision. Also, the relation between quality provision and teaching is 
stated in the use of anonymised information for prospective and existing 
students:  
  
A further way in which higher education institutions can demonstrate 
their recognition of the importance of teaching is to publish anonymised 
information for prospective and existing students about the teaching 
qualifications, fellowships and expertise of their teaching staff at all 
levels (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 29) 
 
The use of “can demonstrate” shows a value assumption that an anonymised 
publication of qualifications demonstrates a recognition of the importance of 
teaching and an assumption that a focus on teaching quality is at the centre of 
sustaining quality provision. These different assumptions show a predominance 
of strategic action and affects the relationship between genres in the context of 
broader purposes of reform. It is a value assumption and an ethos focused on 
getting results, and developing regulating techniques to demonstrate these 
results. Further, the relation between student, teacher and other actors in 
higher education is affected by this ethos.  
 
Semantic and grammatical relations are shaped by the document’s governance 
genre. Containing policy blueprints the document intends to guide and 
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transform social practices, social relations and the styles of their occupants 
(Fairclough states such documents to have ‘hortatory intent’ i.e. getting people 
to act in certain ways (genre) based on what is represented (discourses)). Thus, 
the document aims to legitimate and this aim is realised in the linguistic features 
of the document. Expectantly the semantic relations demonstrate, in relations 
between sentences and clauses, a focus on relations of purpose presupposed by 
a logic of legitimation. Legitimation of reforms (ways of representation) is seen 
in positing teaching quality as central in relation to the student consumer’s 
provision and in teacher-teacher relations. For that purpose, additive, 
elaborative and purposive clauses are used; additive clauses point to addition of 
different elements together (e.g. in the use of “and”), purposive clauses establish 
legitimation and elaborative clauses establish a relation through which a second 
clause then clarifies and provides information on a previous one. For example, 
“the publication and effective use of student surveys and other evaluations to be 
at the heart of a continuous process of improving teaching quality” denotes 
purpose, in that documentation and publication of performance, with its 
effective use, is to be (purposive) at heart of a process improving teaching 
quality. When additive and elaborative clauses are used, they are often 
foregrounded with strong purpose and legitimation.  
 
Returning to the ‘Big Society’ agenda there is a model of governance that 
represents its vision of the state as a responsive one (championing the consumer 
citizen) and one that devolves power to institutions and students. Service 
delivery and outcomes are envisaged to be in a relation of co-production, so that 
delivery is measurable as outcomes but these outcomes are envisaged to be 
responsive to the consumer (again, both strategic action and a strategic 
disposition are a form of identification for students to adopt). Hence, the 
consumer is championed to participate in shaping outcomes by being a part in 
its production. Further, they are championed to thereafter choose between 
services based on outputs and results (effective use of student surveys).  
 
The legitimation of this form of service is further shown in additive relations 
then elaborated and foregrounded with purpose. For example, an additive 
relation is present when “such data collected and used in an open and 
transparent way can both support informed student choice and stimulate 
competition between peers”. In the passage, there are additive relations that are 
ordered and placed in conjunction by a clause of purpose (“can”) and an 
epistemic modalisation, with prescriptive intent, so that the first chain of 
additive clauses is given purpose with the latter. The open and transparent 
collection of data then serves the purpose of both championing the student 
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consumer and ensuring a responsive environment for consumers to help 
themselves (the goal is to guide and transform social practices, social relations 
and the styles of their occupants). Legitimation is by rationalisation, which is by 
“reference to the utility of institutionalized action” (Fairclough 2003: 99). 
Institutionalised rationality takes an instrumental logic of action, in which 
effective results legitimise procedures and actions. In appearance, we have 
procedural means for better standards but underpinning the adoption of these 
means is an attempt to sustain certain frameworks that regulate both teaching 
practice and student subjectivities (shaping of roles through bureaucratic 
regulation – homo sociologicus - highlights the importance of an institutional 
framework that incentivizes strategic subjectivities in higher education 
provision).  
 
De-centralising service provision and empowering at the point of delivery 
(developing partnerships) are transformative means to a process view of 
provision. In this provision those delivering the product and the consumer are 
part of the same process. We find citizen co-production, along with nudges, in 
the encouragement of a careers service that promotes strategic styles and self-
reliance (the active and strategic self): 
 
The Government will establish a new careers service in England, built on 
the principles of independence and professionalism, by April 2012. It will 
provide comprehensive information about careers, skills and the labour 
market, and advice and guidance on all options, including vocational 
study in colleges, training through Apprenticeships, and higher 
education. There will be a single access point to national online and 
telephone services for young people and adults, and face-to-face 
careers guidance for adults. The face-to-face service will be delivered, 
as with the existing adult Next Step careers service, through a network 
of public, private and voluntary sector organisations contracted by the 
Skills Funding Agency. These organisations will continue to subcontract 
to be able to offer a service which is both trusted at local level and 
responsive to local needs. (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 
2011: 57) 
 
Grammatical relations establish relations between clauses within sentences and 
two main types are highlighted—first, paratactic relations establish symmetry to 
clauses, setting additive relations between clauses or an elaboration that 
clarifies or specifies a series of clauses used. In the excerpt above the use of 
“and” in “skills and the labour market, and advice and guidance on all options” is 
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then elaborated with “including” in “including vocational study in colleges, 
training through Apprenticeships, and higher education”. Second, hypotactic 
relations between clauses are asymmetrical i.e. one clause is subordinated to 
another and so establishes purpose. Paratactic relations can also climax into a 
hypotactic relation, with a series of additive clauses culminating into and 
foregrounded by purposive clauses. 
 
The excerpt establishes a prescriptive intent—the continuous use of ‘will’, in this 
case a deontic modalisation, demonstrates strong commitment on material 
processes that the government plans to make happen in a set of additive and 
elaborative clauses that are then given purpose (hypotactic). The ‘Next Step’ 
careers services will be delivered via “a network of public, private and voluntary 
sector organisations”. Here “and” establishes a paratactic relation between 
different organisations. Purpose is provided (‘to be’) and elaboration is then used 
(“both”) to clarify the nature of this service. The locale is a preferred point of 
delivery of service and it is partnerships that are responsive to needs - again 
informed by an engaged citizen consumer. An activated actor is identified (‘Skills 
Funding Agency’) and is the subject of the process verb “contracted”. The use of 
“contracted” in regard to the ‘Skills Funding Agency’ evokes a view of higher 
education as a corrective measure to counter any skills gaps and thus meet 
employer needs (see theme three).   
 
Institutions are also given powers to compete for students outside a core 
allocation in “from year to year, every institution will have to compete for the 
student numbers outside its core allocation and the core will reduce every year” 
(2011: 50). Disciplinary techniques that regulate a competitive institutional logic 
are part of the same model promoting the engaged consumer students (an 
attempt to triangulate between a regulated provision of opportunity (homo 
sociologicus) and the consumer student that invests in employer needed skills 
(homo economicus)). The engaged student provides feedback on the provision 
received and institutions are envisaged to regulate their provision to be 
responsive to students. In being responsive to the consumer, institutions secure 
feedback that attract future students in the provision market. The state, from 
above, devolves power in this provision but sets-out the infrastructure of 
provision to be responsive to the consumer and business needs. Importantly, 
this infrastructure aims to define systemic relations between 
students/institutions and institutions/wider economy. These relations 
culminate in students obtaining the right skills and dispositions to meet the 
wider needs of the economy (see theme three):  
 
<66> 
We have no target for the “right” size of the higher education system but 
believe it should evolve in response to demand from students and 
employers, reflecting particularly the wider needs of the economy. 
(Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 49)  
 
An elaborative clause (“but”) establishes the relation between the size of higher 
education expansion in it being responsive to the demands of students, 
employers and primarily the wider needs of the economy. Grammatically the 
relation is realised between clauses as a hypotactic one, in that the former is 
made subordinate to the latter.  
 
Theme Three: Responsive to employers and students - collaboration between 
higher education and industry to provide the required skills and knowledge 
 
As stated, the document is identified with a significant prescriptive intent - it is 
“aimed at getting people to act in certain ways on the basis of representations of 
what is” (Fairclough 2003: 96). While the document acknowledges a responsive 
higher education, there are, at the same time, specific views of the student, 
teaching provision and a broader institutional logic. Here governance seeks to 
regulate the field of higher education practice and their relations. In an 
envisaged process of collaboration how are the needs of different actors realised 
in discourse and what does this communicate in regard to the legitimation of 
policy priorities? Returning to the governance question, the question posed is in 
how relevant social actors are related in a posited collaborative provision:  
 
Around the world, the very best universities are building deeper links 
with business both to maximise innovation and promote growth, and to 
ensure students come out of universities equipped to excel in the 
workforce. Much has been done to promote better links, including 
through enhanced knowledge exchange, technology and research 
commercialisation, and curricula developments. However, in the context 
of our reforms to HE funding and student choice, we want our 
universities to look again at how they work with business, across their 
teaching and research activities, to promote better teaching, employer 
sponsorship, innovation and enterprise. (Department for Business, 
Innovation & Skills 2011: 39) 
 
In the excerpt above hyponyms and co-hyponyms are used. The utilisation of 
hyponyms (words given meaning within broader semantic fields) ascribe certain 
meanings to processes. Synonyms identify words to meaning and it is antonymy 
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that identifies represented themes to their opposites (e.g. what is social 
cohesion and what is corrosive to this cohesion). Together with nominalisations2 
it is then possible to provide certain meaning to processes that build toward 
semantic fields, their meanings and their polarizations and opposites.  
 
Deep links to business by universities, in the excerpt above, are hyponyms to 
“promote growth”, “innovation” and for students to excel in the workforce. Co-
hyponyms to promoting better links include “enhanced knowledge exchange”, 
“technology and research commercialisation” and “curricula developments”. 
From the start, the relation of universities to business is set out as a 
superordinate one and so the nature of the links between them is presupposed 
with what is better for both the institutions and the students. It is for 
universities to look at ways to work with business across teaching and business 
to “promote better teaching, employer sponsorship, innovation and enterprise”.  
 
This superordinate relation can be further discerned in an a-symmetrical 
relation between institutions and employers, with collaboration between both 
resulting in the right skills employers want from graduates: 
 
Graduates are more likely to be equipped with the skills that employers 
want if there is genuine collaboration between institutions and 
employers in the design and delivery of courses. Although around 80 per 
cent of universities say they are engaged in collaborative arrangements 
with employers, this can still be improved. (Department for Business, 
Innovation & Skills 2011: 39) 
 
Further the industry sector sets standards for course content and accreditation: 
 
There are many models, local and national. Individual employers or 
groups of employers can collaborate with their local higher education 
institution and representatives of an industry sector can set standards 
for course content or format to meet professional or recognised 
accredited standards. Sector Skills Councils can support employers and 
higher education institutions to develop such approaches and provide 
consistency where that is helpful. (Department for Business, Innovation 
& Skills 2011: 40) 
 
                                               
2  Fairclough defines nominalisations as “the conversion of a verb into a noun-like 
word, and semantically of a process into an entity” (Fairclough 2003: 143).  
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Grammatical metaphors are also an important feature, through which 
discourses are realised. These are noun like verbs that represent processes as 
entities (nominalisations) and abstract from the circumstances and 
contingencies of social events and their activities. When abstracting from social 
events and then representing these events in normalized forms of action and 
interaction it is then possible to identify the subject and object of represented 
processes. Hence, in idealised events an agenda of governance erases or even 
suppresses difference (Fairclough 2003: 144). Processes figuring in concrete 
events are made into highly abstract things that then prescribe through 
process-nouns e.g. “innovation”, “growth” and “enterprise”. Consequently, the 
processes of education, their relations, participants and events can be excluded 
by process-nouns that are given meaning in an ideological rendering of social 
practice. The texturing of entities, through nominalisations, then act on social 
events in shaping their systemic setting. There are implications to this 
abstraction when considering relations between policy fields and approaches to 
social inclusion, social mobility and widening participation (see theme four).  
 
In terms of social events (level of event representation), the document puts 
forward complex processes but with a restricted focus on specific social agents 
in these processes. Therefore, we have representations of social events – in 
higher education governance – at the level of institutionalised social practices 
and structures. Here the types of practices envisaged – at governance level – 
becomes a refraction in which the activity and identifications of social actors are 
understood. At this higher level of abstraction and its representation of social 
events, processes are then made dependent on a normalised reference of social 
practices and its articulation of orders of discourse. As an example, specific 
enterprise societies are asked to give advice to ministers on how to provide 
students with the right skills and knowledge and for societies to embed 
themselves in universities for this purpose:  
 
To support this, the QAA has convened a group to develop guidance for 
UK universities on enterprise and entrepreneurship. The chair of the 
group will be Professor Andy Penaluna, the world’s first Professor of 
Creative Entrepreneurship. This guidance will set out the skills and 
knowledge, attitude and approach that students should acquire through 
enterprise education. (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 
45) 
 
What is presented to the reader are not the views of situated actors but 
proposed events that pertain to a consultation and the collation of information. 
<69> 
The objective behind these proposed consultations is to identify what attitudes, 
approaches, skills and knowledge that students should acquire as agents of 
economic progress – here concrete actors are represented at an abstract level. 
What we have is a re-contextualisation of social events as part of broader social 
fields and networks of social practices (Fairclough 2003: 139). This re-
contextualisation means representations of events are filtered through a 
particular perspective on the workings of social practice. As noted before, 
process-nouns (nominal nouns) figure and represent complex processes in 
highly abstract ways; they signify normalized verbs or doings.  
 
Consequently, nominalisations evoked as process-nouns – e.g. “participation” 
and “collaboration” - demonstrate an absenting of social events. Here obscured 
are contingencies in the represented processes such as problems in the 
collaboration process itself. By abstracting this way, the ideological working of 
social identities and their roles, as social practice, is given in the form of an 
explanatory logic reifying situated activity. It can be said events are represented 
as part of social processes but the representation of these processes, due to an 
ideological abstraction, suppress and foreground certain actors and empower 
others. 
 
Hence, in processes of collaboration, for example, certain actors are activated, 
while others are passivated. With an ideological abstraction of specificity 
consensus is then advocated between concrete actors. Accordingly, specific 
actors identified, through the document, include student bodies (the NUS) and 
educational institutions (Loughborough University, University West of England, 
De Montfort, Sheffield Hallam, Teeside, Abertay Dundee, Glamorgan, Hull and 
West of Scotland). Similarly, governance bodies (QAA, HEFCE, HESA, HEBRG, 
ISB, OIA and SFA) and industry actors (Hewlett Packard, Unilever, Lloyds 
Banking Group and GlaxoSmithKline) are identified by name.     
 
Rhetorically students are activated in collaboration processes but in the 
identification of styles, student voice is foregrounded, as noted, to pre-
supposing representations. They are, therefore, named but passivated, even 
when personalised in noting their needs as consumers. Instead, employers, as 
actors, are not only named and personalised but also whose needs are made 
necessary and normative to what sorts of commitments that texture subjective 
styles: 
 
Graduates are more likely to be equipped with the skills that employers 
want if there is genuine collaboration between institutions and 
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employers in the design and delivery of courses. Although around 80 
percent of universities say they are engaged in collaborative 
arrangements with employers, this can still be improved. (Department 
for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 39) 
 
Commitments are realised in an epistemic modality in the use of a modal 
adjective (“likely”), indicating a median commitment. In the case of this 
commitment, the type of skills viewed as significant are made secondary to the 
type of collaboration between institutions and employers. Process noun used 
(“collaboration”) abstract the types of skills negotiated or their values. Instead, 
actors are named and the nature of relations between specific actors are 
asserted. In representing circumstances of collaboration, including identities-
in-relation and the organisation of these identities, employers are represented 
in a relation of asymmetry. An evaluative statement activates employers in the 
use of the verb “improved” as a statement of desirability, in maintaining the level 
and right skills required by graduates.   
 
There are many models, local and national. Individual employers or 
groups of employers can collaborate with their local higher education 
institution and representatives of an industry sector can set standards 
for course content or format to meet professional or recognised 
accredited standards. Sector Skills Councils can support employers and 
higher education institutions to develop such approaches and provide 
consistency where that is helpful. (Department for Business, Innovation 
& Skills 2011: 40) 
 
Again standards, course content and the circumstances of their negotiation are 
abstracted and instead the process is merely stated and a commitment is made 
that favours and legitimises industry representatives. Explicit modal verbs are 
used (“can”) and predominating are epistemic modalities or assertions of local 
and national collaboration leading to “course content or format to meet 
professional or recognised accredited standards”. Evaluative statements are 
marked in the desirability that there is consistency and for the Sector Skills 
Councils to provide this consistency; when concrete examples of collaboration 
are cited these are often selected examples to substantiate the noted 
representation from abstraction. As an example, bespoke courses are envisaged 
in terms of partnerships between employers, students and institutions: 
 
The new funding arrangements for higher education offer the chance of 
a new partnership between employer, student and institution. 
<71> 
Employers may help to meet a student’s tuition costs in return for a 
commitment from the student to work whilst studying, and a 
commitment from the institution to align course content to their 
specific needs. Below are some early examples of employers who have 
decided to go down this route and are working with higher education 
institutions in an imaginative and innovative way. Smaller firms within a 
sector or subsector may wish to work together to achieve leverage and 
economies of scale. (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 
41) 
 
Examples cited include employer sponsorship and scholarships by Unilver, 
GlaxoSmithKline, The UK Electronics Skills Foundations and Lloyds Banking 
Group. In the case of Unilever and GlaxoSmithKline the “course is designed to 
ensure graduates are equipped with the tools and techniques to rapidly make a 
positive impact in chemistry-based industries” (Department for Business, 
Innovation & Skills 2011: 41). To be responsive to student needs is to view them, 
beforehand, as potential investments in human capital; as they are viewed in this 
way then the objective is to ensure students gain the right knowledge and skills 
(the use of “will” is an explicit deontic modality i.e. a statement of obligation): 
 
We also set out how we will create the conditions to encourage greater 
collaboration between higher education institutions and employers to 
ensure that students gain the knowledge and skills they need to embark 
on rewarding careers. (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 
2011: 33) 
 
Theme Four: Relative social mobility, widening access/participation, fairness 
and the inculcation of aspiration 
 
If a broader objective exists to make higher education more responsive to the 
wider needs of the economy then how does this fit with the objective to “provide 
more assistance for students from disadvantaged backgrounds” (Department for 
Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 33)? In the process of representing social 
inclusion, what voices are brought in and how are different voices textured 
(intertextuality)? Further, considering the broader challenges set-out at the 
start, with its own assumptions, in what way does the translation of key goals 
such as widening participation and social cohesion work considering these 
assumptions? 
 
<72> 
Answering these questions, two key issues are first considered - intertextuality 
and difference. Regarding difference, foregrounded assumptions exist and point 
to an attempt to reconcile any differences arising from acknowledged problems 
at the level of social integration. Though with the possibility of difference 
acknowledged, what is proposed is first prescriptive, demonstrated largely in 
deontic modalities. It is through strong commitments and sometimes 
nominalisations that difference is made resolvable and language is rendered un-
dialogized. Social actors are cited (OFFA [Office for Fair Access], HEFCE [Higher 
Education Funding Council for England], Aimhigher, Careers Profession Task 
Force, the Russel Group and National Scholarship Programme) but they are part 
of pre-given commitments and are cited to affirm a foregrounded legitimation 
(value assumption). Consequently, it is the relation of cited actors to pre-given 
commitments and value assumptions which then identifies their role as 
passivated or activated actors. For example, OFFA and HEFCE work in 
partnership on access agreements and assessments to advance the 
government’s goal of widening participation.  
 
Consistent with a broader nominalisation of events, student voice is absent and 
instead there is a re-affirmation of a self-reflexive student identification that 
works out their route through guidance and information provided: 
 
Potential students need high quality advice and guidance to make 
informed decisions about whether higher education is the right option 
for them and, if so, which route to take and what subjects to study to 
prepare them for their desired course. (Department for Business, 
Innovation & Skills 2011: 56) 
 
The modal verb (“need”) demonstrates a commitment to offering this advice 
through a government established careers service (‘Next Step’) and a “network of 
public, private and voluntary sector organisations contracted by the Skills 
Funding Agency” (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 57). There is 
a value assumption relating to “high quality advice” – the self-reflexive student is 
strategically aware but in relation to pre-sanctioned goods. An “informed” 
choice implies the desirability of seeking government provided advice. The 
activated actor in this partnership (careers advice) is identified with the ‘Skills 
Funding Agency’ – an agency of the ‘Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills’. Again, we have here a triangulation between the homo sociologicus of an 
enabling state and a homo economicus of a strategic student subjectivity that is 
provided with the right know-how to then dedicate to certain preferences. 
 
<73> 
Concerning intertextuality, there is an indirect reporting3 of what the ‘Russell 
Group’ considers worthy of retention in schools. The ‘Russel Group’ is cited as 
an activated actor and in an authoritative sense: 
 
We are reforming performance tables so that schools are no longer 
rewarded for encouraging young people to pursue courses and 
qualifications that are not recognised by universities and employers. 
Instead, we believe all pupils should have a broad education with a 
sound grasp of the basics. The subjects covered by the English 
Baccalaureate match closely those which the Russell Group of 
universities indicated recently would be sensible choices for young 
people wishing to keep their higher education options as open as 
possible. (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 57)  
 
Again, the modal verb (“would”) shows commitment to the English Baccalaureate 
as a sensible choice due to an evaluation being ascribed to the ‘Russell Group’ of 
universities. A subjective commitment (“we believe”) frames, beforehand, the 
recognised courses and qualifications by both universities and employers. The 
follow-on, with specific mention of the ‘Russell Group’, along with a vaguer 
reference to “employers”, becomes an arbiter on what should be considered as a 
sensible choice. There is also an implied view, in a negative clause (“schools are 
no longer rewarded”), that attributes to schools the rewarding of students with 
irrelevant qualifications. 
 
Schools, as an interlocutor in this process, are cited but there is an abstraction 
of their role. Consequently, their voice is largely absented and the circumstances 
of the event (e.g. feedback from schools regarding the circumstances and 
contingencies of preparing their pupils) are depicted from given representations 
of social practice. Instead, the styles or roles adopted in these presupposed 
assumptions relate to both an understanding of welfare, as noted, but also as a 
type of identification that coheres with the purposes of economic efficiency:  
 
For the first time, we will introduce a measure of how well pupils do 
when they leave school, including information on how many progress to 
higher education. This ‘destinations measure’ will act as a strong 
incentive for schools to make sure that they are preparing young people 
for success in higher education or employment and are helping them to 
                                               
3  Indirect reporting is defined as a summary of what was said or written; this in 
contrast, to direct reporting, where direct quotations are used (Fairclough 2003: 49).  
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make choices that are right for them. (Department for Business, 
Innovation & Skills 2011: 57) 
 
Thus, the document utilises nominalisations (“aspirations” and “progression”) 
but the subject of these processes (young people) are passivated: 
 
Making sure that young people have access to high quality, aspirational 
information, advice and guidance is an important part of what schools 
can do to raise aspirations and support progression. Schools will, subject 
to the passage of the current Education Bill, be under a new legal duty 
to secure independent, impartial careers guidance for their pupils in 
Years 9-11. (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 58)  
 
The aspiring student is to be guided with the right information and this is the 
work of different agencies working in partnership and collaboration. In the 
above extract, value assumptions are triggered in the use of “raise” and it is 
aspirational information that will raise aspiration and support progression. A 
commitment to this value assumption is triggered in the use of the modal verb 
“we will” (deontic and subjective modalisation), indicating the duty of schools to 
offer “aspirational information” as part of careers guidance.  
In terms of intertextuality, there is reference to external voices that provide 
some clarification on the types of styles and their relevant discourses of 
aspiration and progression that are legitimised. Maintained, in the referencing of 
external voices, is an explanatory logic that establishes an argument from 
assumption (dialogicity is minimal). The genre of documents cited are similarly 
governance ones and affirm this logic. Accordingly, cited are documents on 
young people’s applications to research-led universities in ‘Opening Doors, 
Breaking Barriers’ (social mobility) and ‘The Importance of Teaching (schools). A 
think-tank report by the Sutton Trust in coordination with the ‘Department for 
Business, Innovation & Skills’ on young people’s applications to research-led 
universities. Finally, a report on fair access to the professions in ‘Fair Access to 
Professional Careers: A progress report by the Independent Reviewer on Social 
Mobility and Child Poverty’. These documents are either governance documents 
or reports on findings relating to accessing professions and ‘Russell Group’ 
universities. Whatever document is cited they represent continuity, rather than 
difference, and aim to maintain the privileging of a government purpose for the 
regulation of social relations. 
 
Particularly relevant is ‘Opening Doors, Breaking Barriers’ that states the 
government agenda to improve social mobility in terms of a commitment to 
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social justice and, at the same time, in an investment in human capital. A 
triangulation between economic performance with the ethical imperative to 
improve social mobility is clearly stated: 
 
There is a strong ethical imperative to improve social mobility. But there 
is an economic dimension too. In our increasingly globalised economy, 
new opportunities for wealth and income are emerging. A fair society 
ensures that those opportunities are open to everyone. (HM 
Government 2011: 11) 
 
 The challenge is further defined in terms of an austerity policy: 
 
We cannot get away from the intense fiscal pressures we face as a 
country. Failing to reduce the deficit would saddle future generations 
with enduring public debt and slower growth, threatening social 
mobility. That creates challenges. We must do more with less. Above all, 
we must do more to promote a fairer society. (HM Government 2011: 12) 
 
Also, there is a commitment to welfare-to-work and self-dependency policies as 
an approach to social mobility that enables behavioural changes and the 
breaking of patterns of welfare dependency: 
 
Our work to increase social mobility complements the Government’s 
ambitious agenda for social justice. We have a group of people in our 
society who have become detached, unable to play a productive role in 
the workplace, in their families or in their communities. They are often 
trapped by addiction, debt, educational failure, family breakdown or 
welfare dependency. Our social mobility strategy is about enabling 
people to move up the ladder of life. Our strategy for social justice is 
about helping these people get their foot onto the first rung. The two 
are inseparable components in our fight against poverty and 
disadvantage. (HM Government 2011: 11) 
 
Similarly, in ‘The importance of Teaching’ the problem of low aspiration is 
directly related to a “culture of failure” (Department for Education 2010: 51). 
However, previously failing schools have now become “engines of social 
mobility” (Department for Education 2010: 51). The ‘Sutton Trust’ report also 
focuses on the manner choices and decisions are made and the type of 
information available to students from different institutions. This also includes 
the type of information and guidance that can be used to better inform 
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decision-making and raise aspirations for students from disadvantaged schools. 
The final report of the panel on fair access to the professions states social 
mobility as fairer access to the professions and more fairly spread opportunities. 
It affirms a work-to-welfare ethos in defining social mobility as better jobs and 
fairer chances, with consequences for social cohesion, economic flourishing and 
advancement through social responsibility and individual endeavour. 
Subsequently, other texts (intertextuality) and genre chains, in the document, 
demonstrate a strong re-contextualisation from a broader government policy 
model. This model consistently applies to higher education, schools, a specific 
understanding of social mobility and more broadly the formulation of the role of 
state and society.  
 
Returning to the theme of social mobility, the document sets itself the objective 
to propose a view of social mobility that considers both economic performance 
and social cohesion. Fairer chances lead to better social cohesion but also better 
economic performance. The document identifies social mobility as “a measure of 
how possible it is for people to improve their position in society” (HM 
Government 2011: 15). A distinction between relative and absolute social mobility 
is made, with both acknowledged. However, focus is placed on relative social 
mobility which “refers to the comparative chances of people with different 
backgrounds ending up in certain social or income groups” (HM Government 
2011: 15). Absolute social mobility, on the other hand, refers to the “extent to 
which all people are able to do better than their parents” (HM Government 2011: 
15). The workfare welfare model, noted above, complements the government’s 
approach to social justice. In this approach, it is an understanding that for 
people to improve their position they require the right guidance and skills for 
the right job. This can be seen in a commitment (“should” as deontic modal verb) 
to relative social mobility in which, regardless of background, an individual’s 
acquiring of the right skills should mean they then have a fair chance: 
 
Our focus is on relative social mobility. For any given level of skill and 
ambition, regardless of an individual’s background, everyone should 
have a fair chance of getting the job they want or reaching a higher 
income bracket. (HM Government 2011: 15)  
 
In focusing on relative social mobility there is a reliance, for example, on careers 
advice. This advice provides a means to nudge citizens with valuable information 
to make the right decisions but always relative to the labour market. There is a 
commitment to provide advice (deontic modal verb “will”) and an elaboration 
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(“including”) on the type of education information provided as vocational study 
and training through to apprenticeships, other than higher education: 
 
It will provide comprehensive information about careers, skills and the 
labour market, and advice and guidance on all options, including 
vocational study in colleges, training through Apprenticeships, and 
higher education. (HM Government 2011: 57) 
 
As stated before, semantic fields associate meaning to nominalisations. For 
example, nominalisations such as ‘collaboration’ and ‘partnership’ are given 
meaning considering the words they are in mutual relation to. Thus, focus on 
relative social mobility is fairness but also an engine of self-dependence and 
informed choice. Engines of social mobility include providers of services – in 
partnerships and collaboration – and recipients are envisaged as participants. 
Hyponyms are evoked to give meaning to nominalisations and policy positioning 
an ideological potency. These partnerships offer pathways coordinating wider 
economic needs with a responsiveness to local needs. Together economic need 
may be met and collaborations become drivers of social cohesion, by enhancing 
social mobility.  
 
The previously noted ‘Opening Doors: Breaking Barriers’, for example, is 
identified as an authorial text on the nature of barriers facing young people from 
the most disadvantaged backgrounds. Similarly, it is a governance document 
covering obstacles to aspiration. While ‘Higher Education: Students at the Heart 
of the System’ sets out workable policies to overcome obstacles, these obstacles 
are identified in ‘Opening Doors: Breaking Barriers’. First, it is the latter 
document that covers obstacles to social mobility in assumptions regarding 
behavioural paths to poverty and an erosion of responsibility (consistent with 
the ‘Big Society’ agenda). Second, are interventions, complemented by life cycle 
interventions, that incentivise the right choices and changes. It is a focus on 
inculcating the right “skills and aspirations that strongly influence their success 
in further or higher education, and ultimately in the labour market” (HM 
Government 2011: 6). Further, it is the education system that “should challenge 
low aspirations and expectations, dispelling the myth that those from poorer 
backgrounds cannot aim for top universities and professional careers” (HM 
Government 2011: 6). Regarding assumptions made on behavioural changes, 
nominalisations such as “expectations” and “aspirations” contextualise semantic 
fields and act as hypernyms for “informed choices” about jobs and careers. 
Similarly, from this context, normative commitments are made on supporting a 
“culture where the key aspects of good parenting are widely understood and 
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where all parents can benefit from advice and support” (HM Government 2011: 6) 
- “can” being a modal verb showing commitment to a value statement (“advice” 
and “support” implying the positive value of this change in culture).  
 
Job markets are to be fair all the way to the top and the synonym of this fairness 
is set as “success should be based on what you do, not who you know” (HM 
Government 2011: 7) – an evidence of positive social mobility. At the same time, 
the antonymy of fair job markets – incongruent with positive social mobility – is 
one that “a large number of the professions remain dominated by a small section 
of society” (HM Government 2011: 7). While advocating a fairer job market and 
positive social mobility – including an acknowledgement of forms of social 
capital that are not conducive with a fairer job market – there is a return to an 
assumption that current welfare arrangement fail to sufficiently incentivise 
work: 
 
Getting on in work should be about merit not background. Too many 
struggles to get on in the labour market, held back by low qualifications 
or a welfare system that does not sufficiently incentivise work. Too 
many do not get the vital second chances they deserve. (HM 
Government 2011: 7) 
 
The above excerpts bring together an existential assumption and a modality 
commitment. There is a statement of ‘what is’ (existential assumption) in the 
struggles to get on in the labour market (“that” as marker of definite reference). 
There is also a deontic modality in what should be the case in interactions and 
social relations i.e. progress through merit and not background (triggered in 
‘should’ as modal verb).  
 
Forms of collaboration and partnership, responsive to the self-dependent, 
informed and aspiring learner (behavioural changes), acquiring and re-acquiring 
new skills, becomes an engine that then drives both positive social mobility and 
economic performance. As a policy model informs a policy triangulation then 
this model adopts a normative vision that abstracts from the concrete but 
simultaneously intends to regulate social events through a normative 
representation. From a pre-given perspective, the nature of obstacles then 
informs workable policies to overcome both a represented problem and a 
diagnosis of its outcomes.  
 
Compared to New Labour (see chapter two) there are similarities with initiatives 
focusing on changes that may instigate different patterns of behavioural 
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outcomes. However, the approach identified above – in the stated obstacles to 
positive social mobility – is consistent with the ‘Big Society’ agenda; here the 
idea is to cultivate the right subjectivities (the moral underclass discourse of 
social integration). Thus, the main issue is not only in generating the right 
conditions for aspiration and advancement – something more salient with New 
Labour – but also to cultivate the right subjectivity that values sanctioned goods. 
The citizen needs to be nudged and informed to make the right choices or to 
value how to make the right choices. Nevertheless, obstacles are acknowledged 
at the level of integration (integrationist discourse of social cohesion) with 
interventions proposed in widening participation, fairer access and opening 
access to professions all key to this. What is consistent through the document is 
that collaboration and partnerships are engines of social mobility, including the 
inculcation of the right subjectivities in maintaining a certain vision of welfare 
co-production. 
 
Thus, the role of schools and improving career guidance become, as stated, part 
of a trajectory of life cycle interventions that affect social mobility, in providing 
the right information for students to then make choices and value a certain 
dispositionality. An existential assumption on the nature of obstacles – what is 
the case – is a form of perspective taking that then filters the process of 
intervention and consequently the texturing of student identifications, actions 
and social relations. Both the importance of partnerships with external service 
providers and the activation of certain actors within these partnerships are 
stated. For example, to return to an earlier extract on careers service, the 
representation of career guidance (as a social event), utilises verbs that ascribe 
processes to government and identified external providers (activated actors): 
 
The Government will establish a new careers service in England, built on 
the principles of independence and professionalism, by April 2012. It will 
provide comprehensive information about careers, skills and the labour 
market, and advice and guidance on all options, including vocational 
study in colleges, training through apprenticeships, and higher 
education. There will be a single access point to national online and 
telephone services for young people and adults, and face-to-face 
careers guidance for adults. The face-to-face service will be delivered, 
as with the existing adult Next Step careers service, through a network 
of public, private and voluntary sector organisations contracted by the 
Skills Funding Agency. These organisations will continue to subcontract 
to be able to offer a service which is both trusted at local level and 
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responsive to local needs. (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 
2011: 57) 
 
Activated actors include the government (‘Skills Funding Agency’) that 
establishes career services and provides information by outsourcing through a 
“network of public, private and voluntary sector organisations contracted by the 
Skills Funding Agency”. Potential students are passivated actors and are object of 
guidance and information. As noted above, guidance includes “comprehensive 
information about careers, skills and the labour market, and advice and guidance 
on different options, including vocational study in colleges, training through 
Apprenticeships, and higher education”. The contracting of services, via 
networks, is given to the ‘Skills Funding Agency’ and thus maintaining, at the 
level of social practice, a re-contextualisation of practices to the needs of the 
labour market. 
 
Underlying this is an assumption that legitimises career guidance as an 
important guide to an idealised student role (“need” as an epistemic 
modalisation). A commitment to provide guidance is then given purpose 
(semantic relation between sentence and clause) in “to make informed 
decisions”:  
 
Potential students need high quality advice and guidance to make 
informed decisions about whether higher education is the right option 
for them and, if so, which route to take and what subjects to study to 
prepare them for their desired course. (Department for Business, 
Innovation & Skills 2011: 56) 
 
Student identification is elaborated from an epistemic modalisation so that the 
excerpt above establishes an assumption that not only should student’s 
identifications be set with self-dependence, aspiration and expectation but also 
that the “high quality advice” given to students will make them better informed 
in acting out set roles. To put it another way, that they are guided to value the 
right “high quality advice” to then “make informed decisions”.  
 
Schools are similarly part of the broader process of collaboration and life cycles 
intervention, as engines of social mobility. They are further sites where students, 
early on, are offered aspirational information, advice and guidance.  
 
Improving children’s attainment at every stage as they progress through 
school is the most important thing we can do to increase their chances 
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of accessing higher education, particularly those from disadvantaged 
backgrounds. We will do this through a relentless focus on improving 
teacher quality and establishing a strong, autonomous school system 
that is accountable to parents, pupils and communities. (Department for 
Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 57) 
 
In the excerpt above, nominalisations in “attainment” and “progress” and their 
hyponyms are in the “improving of teacher quality” and in an autonomous school 
system that is also made accountable. There is also the theme of responsiveness 
to the locale as the point of delivery—an integrationist discourse that articulates 
the role of schools, as engines of social mobility, to be accomplished in 
collaboration and partnership with parents, pupils and communities.  
 
The policy of changing perceptions and behaviour extends to a bridging social 
capital through the right know-how and in valuing resources then accessed 
from this know-how. Thus, certain forms of identification are part of and 
maintain sources of social capital that then regulate the right types of social 
capital (bridging and bonding). Problems are identified with disadvantaged 
students being less likely to apply to selective universities, even with the right 
level of qualification. The problem is diagnosed with a lack of sound information 
that results in a lack of aspiration. To counter this problem a case study example 
is provided as an intervention that can raise aspirations:  
 
Realising Opportunities is a unique collaboration of 12 leading 
universities, working together to promote fair access for, and social 
mobility of, students from under-represented groups. (Department for 
Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 59) 
 
The circumstances of student support – for students from underrepresented 
groups – is stated in abstract terms and without clear guidelines. Again, what 
this demonstrates, in the semantic relations of the text, is a passivated role for 
students: 
 
Students are supported through a coherent programme of activities 
designed to raise their aspirations to go to research-intensive 
universities. Successful completion of the programme leads to 
recognition at the point of application to one of the 12 universities, 
where students can receive an alternative offer through UCAS … The 
scheme is in its early stages, but a robust evaluation framework has 
been put in place that will help the 12 partners understand the impact of 
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Realising Opportunities on student perceptions and behaviour. 
(Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 59 – 60) 
 
Rhetorically verbs used (“supported” and “designed”) show the processes 
identified as activating the subject position of the student. However, the 
designated programme of activities is designed to raise “their aspirations”. Thus, 
despite this rhetorical acknowledgement of the student subject position, the 
impact of the scheme is measured in how it changes student perceptions and 
behaviours and so acts on students to change them.  
 
Further, when students value the right forms of social capital, institutions and 
institutional arrangements can hinder access to higher education and 
professions. There are different provisions proposed to overcome this, such as 
more generous financial support for part-time and low income students, further 
flexible routes “for progression from further to higher education, including 
work-based options” (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 62) and 
access agreements to attract students from disadvantaged groups via ‘The 
National Scholarship Programme’. Yet problems in social capital networks 
excluding outsiders (negative forms of bonding social capital) are acknowledged: 
 
Professional bodies offer progression routes into a range of careers such 
as accountancy, engineering and law which often combine work and 
study. Those from less privileged backgrounds face a number of barriers 
to accessing the professions including: lack of knowledge about 
professional careers; lack of family connections with the professions and 
aspiration to enter them; and the high entry requirements, length and 
cost of professional courses. Other barriers stem from the structure and 
practices of the professions themselves. (Department for Business, 
Innovation & Skills 2011: 63) 
This acknowledgement shifts back to an integrationist discourse—problems may 
still exist even when the right dispositions are cultivated. These problems are in 
certain arrangements being prohibitive of “outsiders” accessing sanctioned 
goods. The semantic relations of the above excerpt utilise an elaboration 
(“which”) in stating that the professional bodies of careers such as accountancy, 
engineering and law offer progression routes into careers and combine work 
and study. This elaboration then culminates into a series of additive relations - 
as professions offer this route then any barriers in entering these professions 
are noted, including the structure and practice of professions. The objective 
then becomes to make networks work better by being more inclusive for the 
purposes of system adaptation and integration. As any life cycle intervention 
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enhancing social mobility, a commitment (subjective modality) is made to what is 
deemed necessary to widen access to professional careers and for bodies 
representing professions to alter their practices and relations: 
 
We are working with the Gateways to the Professions Collaborative 
Forum, chaired by the Minister for Universities and Science, to 
encourage the professions to widen access to professional careers, 
including through the development of non-university routes. 
(Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 63) 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The analysed document covered four main areas – it sets out a statement of 
challenge, with objectives of reforms (informing assumptions in the document); 
a view of higher education as a market offering services; a higher education 
model that is responsive to both students and employers; and finally, social 
mobility as a driver for an agenda of social justice. The statement of challenge – 
directly related to the first research question – brings together an austerity 
policy but with commitment to a fairer system. Further, the statement pertains 
to the first research question in establishing a broader policy vision, with policy 
triangulation explicit and with ‘Big Society’ themes referenced. The policy ideas 
identified in theme one then informs what follows in the document. First, there 
is a commitment to reduce public spending in higher education, with waste 
following from an excessive bureaucratism, but without affecting strategic 
investment in higher education and disadvantaged students. From these 
assumptions reforms are then conceived—a more diverse and competitive 
provision of higher education that is also responsive to the needs of students 
and employers. It is these assumptions, in the form of a necessary austerity 
policy and reforms leading to more efficient public service, that then filter and 
shape, from re-contextualising principles, the relations between different fields 
and practices. This then becomes the basis for a vision of public service 
provision—a market ethos intertwining and complemented with a rolling 
forward of ‘society’, by providing an environment enabling sectional interests to 
cooperate and be part of what is a co-production model of public service 
provision. The existence of the ‘Big Society’ agenda is resorted to in the 
texturing of the document, as an element of intertextuality.  
 
The identified governance approach demonstrates a prescriptive texturing in 
relations between universities, businesses and student needs (third research 
question). The student consumer is provided with information on institutions 
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and their performance (the quality of experience offered), to then inform 
decisions made. Improving teaching is part of a strategy that affirms students at 
the heart of reforms by specifically relating teaching to an education system that 
offers a stated high standard learning experience. If a market model and its 
infrastructure is sought for higher education (the system dimension of social 
domains), then there is similarly a regulation of student styles and an 
institutional habitus through different techniques (a triangulation between a 
homo sociologicus and homo economicus view of the person). These techniques 
include information sets that offer a service comparison (with focus on teaching 
quality) but also broader institutional roles in relation to students. Consequently, 
we have interventions at the level of system domains (domains of social settings 
and contextual resources) and these interventions are part of a cycle that 
invests in an institutional setting that then sustains certain behaviours and 
actions (complementing a pre-supposing governance agenda). Adherence to a 
governance logic and its concomitant orders of discourse becomes part of a 
virtuous cycle. In a virtuous cycle, students provide feedback and use surveys to 
improve teaching quality. Simultaneously, an engaged student contributes to 
standards in a competitive market; quality assurance measures then seek to self-
regulate institutions so that they offer an even better student experience to 
differentiate themselves from competing institutions. Governance guides but 
also maintains and sustains given social practices within relations in a higher 
education field.  
 
Further, there is a guiding role envisaged for higher education institutions, 
enabling better life decisions. This guidance role extends to how social mobility 
and an agenda of fairness is then conceived. The establishment of a careers 
service – offering information about careers, skills and the labour market – seeks 
to regulate attitudes and motivations in ways that are intended to better life 
decisions through centralised nudges and guidance (part of a fairness agenda). 
As certain needs are to be valued by students and catered for by universities 
(third theme covered in the document) then there is a regulation of relations in 
which provision is defined by a foregrounded legitimation.  
 
Universities are put in a relation of superordination to business – it is a relation 
that primarily promotes economic growth, innovation and an effective 
investment in students as a form of human capital. Social events are presented 
in abstract terms and in place of the contingency of situated activity there are 
representations of events in the use of process-nouns. These process-nouns are 
nominalisations that prescribe, in abstraction, the needs and dispositionality of 
students and the services offered by higher education institutions. Normative 
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commitments in these prescriptions assert the nature of collaboration between 
actors in a regulated provision. The nature of a normative regulation of provision 
is seen in the passivation and activation of certain actors. Student needs are 
rhetorically acknowledged but as an identity-in-relation they are passivated as 
recipients of skills employers want. Further, students are expected to value the 
needs of employability as they embark on rewarding careers and should 
continue to invest in this process. It is also for education institutions to arrange 
collaborative arrangement so that course deliveries are responsive to the type of 
skills that employers want, reflecting the needs of the wider economy. 
 
The final theme covers an attempt to synthesise the possibility of a higher 
education system responsive to the wider needs of the economy and employers, 
with a fairer system that allows those disadvantaged to access sanctioned goods 
and the acquisition of skills (opportunities); the acquisition of skills through 
opportunities provided then allows individuals to participate and improve their 
life chances and break patterns of dependency. A fairer distribution of 
opportunities merits a system that rewards hard work and the right aptitude. 
For this purpose, forms of nudging and guidance become important factors and 
engines of social mobility—networks of public, private and voluntary sector 
organisations providing services as part of life cycles interventions that 
contribute to behavioural changes. A moral underclass discourse on social 
inclusion (providing the right advice to bring about shifts in assumed cultures 
and outlooks) is also complemented by an integrationist discourse 
acknowledging the negative forms of bonding social capital that are prohibitive 
of outsiders entering professions. In the case of negative forms of bonding social 
capital there is a cut-off between a sanctioned normative dispositionality and 
access of strategic networks. Thus, even with the right guidance, sound 
information and valuing the right social goods, there may be necessary 
interventions to allow networks to work better for outsiders to access 
resources.   
 
Finally, as a governance document, representations of social practice and its 
structures are normative abstractions of social events. Nominalisations utilised 
represent complex processes into things and it is these things that are given 
meaning in the texturing of semantic fields. Semantic fields emerge from a 
certain perspective taking and these fields then underpin referents to noun-like 
entities that denote desirability e.g. ‘progress’ and ‘attainment’. Assumptions 
from a given perspective demonstrates a continuum with New Labour i.e. an 
emphasis on consensual discursive spaces and, with this emphasis, a regulation 
of social integration in a manner that is viewed to cohere with pre-supposing 
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assumptions on what makes system integration work. Further, in continuity with 
New Labour, there is a commitment to reinforce social capital and social 
cohesion as part of an understanding of aggregated individuals networked with 
shared norms and values - it is a networking of individuals with shared norms 
and values that facilitate co-operation (welfare co-production).  
 
Yet with coalition policy and specifically, in this case, higher education 
governance, there is greater emphasis on a moral underclass approach to social 
inclusion with attempts to guide and nudge. While social capital theory and 
investment in calibrated networks and communitarian themes are present, they 
are there to guide individuals and break cycles of welfare dependency. Hence, 
we have engines of social mobility and life cycle interventions facilitating the 
breaking of a dependency culture, rather than an enabling state initiating 
integrationist reforms to further social inclusion (the predominant New Labour 
approach). With a focus on behavioural aspects of exclusion over integrationist 
policies – the former often represented as a prerequisite of the latter – 
initiatives proposed to overcome obstacles to social mobility focus on the 
cultivation of the right dispositionality for positive social mobility.  
  
With a social justice agenda focused on behavioural changes then the student, in 
this approach, is conceived through the prism of self-dependence and self-
initiative (homo economicus). University education becomes part of life cycle 
interventions that aim to generate behavioural changes and offer different 
opportunities to enhance relative social mobility (related to the second research 
question). Thus, there is an aim to diversify higher education provision to meet 
the needs of the student consumer. Here there is an incentive for universities to 
compete and offer the best student experience and pathways to employability. 
An emphasis on self-help and self-dependency is represented in employability 
and higher earnings. For the generation of behavioural outcomes, students are 
motivated to self-invest in gaining the right education and skills to better their 
chances for better employability and to meet wider economic needs.  
 
As stated, students are encouraged, in this approach, to expect the best possible 
service in their attempt to self-invest in the enhancement of their personal 
skills. Consequently, in this context, the public good of higher education 
becomes an individuated service with the student consumer part of a broader 
social setting that contextualises service provision with expected standards. 
Thus, students, instead of engaging with bodies of knowledge, are offered a 
structured learning experience (service), with clear expectations on what is 
required for progression (Williams 2013). Regulating bodies target institutions 
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and their capacity to deliver a consumer responsive service. Institutions, in their 
own role, are centrally guided and encouraged to compete for students. Also, 
the role of the student is defined – an idealised subjectivity – in taking an 
instrumental approach to their education (for example, the introduction of the 
KIS dataset encourages comparison and greater choice for students by 
systematizing the student consumer experience before they embark on their 
higher education learning). As Williams observes, this constructs the student 
consumer before arriving at university: 
 
The provision of this quantifiable information commodifies education 
into a tangible service, and the direct link between education and 
employment presented in such information further encourages 
prospective students adopt an instrumental approach to their 
education, constructing students as consumers before they arrive at 
university. (Williams 2013: 76) 
 
Positive social mobility and widening participation (an agenda for fairness) is 
about informed life decisions and the state regulates a devolved market offering 
services that guide students on different possible courses, training and other life 
chances. Life chances translates into transferable workplace skills that underpin 
learning. Consequently, disciplinary knowledge becomes secondary to learning 
that is judged as a pathway to employability. While differences were noted, 
between coalition and New Labour policy, in the focus and role of the state in 
provision, higher education is consistently viewed in the words of Peter 
Mandelson, as a ‘ticket’:  
 
A university education remains the gateway to the professions and a 
ticket to higher lifetime earnings on average (cited in Williams 2013: 70)  
 
The difference, between New Labour and coalition triangulation, is not in the 
instrumentalism but only in the interventions. In both approaches to policy 
triangulation, education remains the site of both social and economic agendas 
and is viewed as a ticket or means to all sorts of sanctioned goods. Expectantly, 
de-focused is an engagement with subject knowledge, including a criticality 
towards what constitutes systemic equilibrium. Considering this view of 
education, provision is held to be a corrective measure and a means to social 
inclusion, fairness and economic performativity.   
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6 
Towards an Alternative  
Ontology of Personhood 
 
 
 
Previous policy chapters focused on representations of the social and citizen as 
person. Behind stated practical and problem-driven approaches to policy there 
are implicit representations that abstract from complex processes, to then state 
a policy of what works best. It is in these implicit conceptions, as argued before, 
that we have an understanding of the person in terms of a triangulation between 
a homo sociologicus and homo economicus view of the person. This chapter 
presents a theoretical basis for an alternative homo relatus view of personhood. 
The argument presented in this chapter informs a relational approach to policy 
advocated in chapter seven.  
 
In making the case for this alternative view of personhood certain necessary 
questions need to be considered. These questions are implicitly or explicitly 
considered in all theoretical models and structure the content of this chapter. 
The argument starts from the necessity of a transcendental reasoning on what 
makes an object an intelligible point of reference and how this then leads to a 
transcendental realism based on a referential detachment. Once the necessity of 
a transcendental realism is established, it will then pre-suppose further 
questions covered.  
 
The proposed realist understanding of personhood is based on Archer’s model of 
personhood and this chapter aims to provide a justification and defence of this 
approach. However, a revision will be proposed to Archer’s morphogenetic 
account, in a way that understands the emergence of a reflexive capacity as a 
mediatory mechanism in a multi-dimensional social universe. In reviewing the 
process of morphogenesis and re-thinking the developmental dimensions of the 
domain of psychobiography, there is a return to Layder’s social domain theory. 
The enactment of reflexivity, it will be argued, is understood in reference to the 
properties of social domains and the environment of their interaction. In 
investigating the properties of the domain of psychobiography there is a reliance 
on wider literature in the area of developmental psychology and specifically 
cited are the works of Zahavi on the development of a self-concept presupposed 
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by a pre-reflexive self-consciousness. Further, the idea of a cognitive continuum 
will be cited and draws on the work of Crespi and Badcock; the idea of a 
cognitive continuum provides an empirical case application – in a continuum 
between mechanistic and mentalistic cognition – on the importance of a 
developmental distinction between a self-regulated pre-reflective self-
consciousness and the development of a reflexive capacity.   
 
Importantly, the revisions proposed do not imply that Archer ignores subjective 
biographies and the situated dimensions of the social. Rather, the revisions are 
directed at the way these dimensions are articulated when considering the 
interplay between personal and social morphogenesis. In Archer’s model the 
anchor in the process of social morphogenesis is ascribed to emergent 
subjective biographies and the enactment of reflexive capacities. This approach 
is understood to be necessary to maintain a clear subjective/objective 
distinction (Archer 2009: 9). The proposed revisions aim to maintain this clear 
realist distinction, while understanding the enactment of a personal reflexivity in 
developmental terms, in which the efficacy of a capacity to deliberate and then 
dedicate on a course of action to be enacted through public language (a 
semantic capacity).  
 
Finally, the ideas and themes proposed in this chapter inform alternative policy 
ideas and educational practices presented in chapter seven. In chapter seven the 
role of collective reflexivity is highlighted in an organic link between a meta-
reflexive mode of reflexivity and transformative corporate action. These 
transformative practices are directed at educational practices and their efficacy, 
in indexical interactions, to enhance non-self-referential personal ends. For 
example, the idea of a cognitive continuum, discussed in the final section, refers 
to the properties of the domain of psychobiography and the need to renew 
practices in referential detachment to this domain. Chapter seven extends this 
theme to higher education practice and its focus on a developmental model of 
the curriculum. As will be covered in the final chapter, the extrinsic nature of 
subject knowledge – an independent propositional realm – is planned in relation 
to the intrinsic properties of differentiated learners. 
 
6.1 The necessity of a transcendental realist argument 
 
In chapter seven there will be an argument for fallibist educational practices, 
directed at personal ends, that are pre-supposed by a transcendental realist 
underlabourer. Thus, it is first necessary to set–out a philosophical ontology (a 
realist underlabourer) that acknowledges the ontological properties of the object 
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of reference as the basis of educational practices. The transcendental argument 
starts from the position that all meta–theories must engage, in some way, with 
ontological questions. Based on this understanding, ontological questions inform 
the conditions of emergence of a personal identity and its relation to selfhood. 
Here the role of a philosophical ontology is to extrapolate from these conditions 
(the broader relational orders that give meaning to this emergence) to arrive at 
an explanatory ‘must’, if personhood is to be intelligible (Collier 1994). Thus, this 
means, as shall be explicated, a logical necessity for some form of referential 
detachment (ontological commitments) and the development of a conceptual 
underlabourer, based on these commitments. We arrive at an a priori from the 
noted objective conditions that render personal identity possible. To focus, first, 
on the objective conditions of emergence means an affirmation that it is the 
nature of the relatum that determines the nature of the terms of reference.  
 
If an ontology of personhood implicates a homo relatus conception of the human 
person then a justification should be provided for its conceptual underlabourer 
and underpinning philosophical ontology (transcendental argument). 
Accordingly, this section takes the following structure: 
 
1. Documenting the objections of those opposing a transcendental 
argument. The positions cited are predominantly what may be stated as 
mid–level forms of realism.  
2. A response to these views, with an affirmation that a transcendental 
reasoning is both universal and a logical necessity. 
3. As a transcendental reasoning is a logical necessity, in regard to 
ontological commitments, then an argument will be provided on how this 
argument is made and the conclusions that may be drawn. 
 
6.1.1 Opposing a transcendental realism 
 
Before presenting an argument for the necessity of a transcendental argument, 
some objections against a transcendental realism will be noted. Documenting 
the views of those opposed to a transcendental realism will provide both a 
theoretical background to the key relevant questions and demonstrate a 
justification for the necessity of a transcendental realist underlabourer. First 
stated will be realist views that adopt a judgemental rationality – acknowledging 
a distinction between meaning and reference – but view an attempt at 
transcendental reasoning to be internally incoherent due to the claims 
underpinning this ontology. Second, is a claim that any distinction between 
meaning and reference to be implausible, as it philosophises sociology and by 
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this mistakenly holds that human knowledge can be distinct from 
operationalising frames of reference. Following this, there will be a response 
that argues for the indispensability of some form of transcendental reasoning 
that pre–supposes operational practice.   
 
In the first category – those affirming a meaning/reference distinction – 
Cruickshank argues that the epistemological primacy of reason, as embedded 
explanatory paradigms, locates all frames of reference as models constituted in 
the transitive domain. Thus, as frames of reference are located and constituted 
in the transitive domain, then what is needed is an epistemological vigilance 
(Cruickshank 2004; 2010). Here there are consequences for any ontological 
claims regarding the social; hence ontological claims should always be pre–
supposed by fallible interpretations. Due to this, argues Cruickshank, there can 
be no master–definition of what social reality may be and this implicates 
conceptual consequences for transcendental realism’s two main aspects – its 
propaedeutic and prescriptive functions1.  
 
Cruickshank critiques the possibility of there being a possible fit between the 
propaedeutic and prescriptive functions, due to an over–extension of the 
epistemic fallacy to include transcendental claims:  
 
The problem though is that in defining the epistemic fallacy as the 
transposing of questions about being into questions about knowing, 
Bhaskar has defined the said fallacy so broadly that any reference to 
what we know of reality (which may well be knowledge claims with a 
                                               
1  The propaedeutic function has two aspects – first, philosophy provides 
conceptual clarity in its role as an underlabourer and conceptual mid–wife. Here the 
ontological frame of reference assists scientists to avoid conceptual confusion about 
the reality of scientific practice. Consequently, in avoiding this conceptual confusion, in 
an adherence to a realist philosophical underlabourer, science will be in a better 
position to make progress in operational practices. The second aspect posits that in 
understanding practice, in realist terms, operational practice guards itself against 
epistemic closure – this is due to the point of reference being the intransitive realm, 
thus affirming the fallibist nature of scientific claims. The prescriptive function follows 
from the existence of an intransitive realm and sets out to separate scientific from non–
scientific practice. However, this separation is not in a pre–given justification of certain 
forms of operational practice as ‘scientific’ but in first returning to the ontological 
underpinnings of practice. In first starting from the ontological underpinnings of 
practice, acknowledging the existence of an intransitive realm, there is then a 
possibility of a philosophical criticism of scientific practice in its given frames of 
reference (Cruickshank 2004: 570 – 571; Bhaskar 1997).    
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high degree veracity) must commit this putative fallacy. (Cruickshank 
2004: 572) 
  
The over–extension of the epistemic fallacy results in ontological conceptions to 
be a question of knowing and so part of the transitive. Here there is an internal 
incoherence and this puts into question the possibility of an ontological 
conceptual clarity that defines the nature of progressive operational practices.   
Cruickshank identifies the argument for a transcendental realism as a 
philosophical one, rather than an argument relating directly to operational 
practice or scientific knowledge in the transitive domain. Citing Bhaskar, it is a 
philosophical reasoning that is “developed by reflection upon what must be the 
case for science to be possible; and this is independent of any actual scientific 
knowledge” (Cruickshank 2004: 573). Due to the argument being a philosophical 
one then the distinction between a substantive and philosophical ontology does 
not hold. Fallible representations, framed as philosophical ontologies, are still 
located within the transitive domain of human knowledge and so are necessarily 
a posteriori and emergent; there is no “Archimedean point or God’s eye view, 
from which one could know the essential features of reality beyond knowledge” 
(Cruickshank: 2004: 568).  
 
The argument noted above is extended to a transcendental realist view of 
sociological practice. A transcendental realist understanding is qualified, in the 
case of sociological practice, but with the important qualification that social 
structures, contra natural structures, do not exist completely independent of 
social actors. At the same time, social structures endure in their effects – as 
emergent properties – and remain efficacious even when not triggered in 
specific interactions and situations (hence the intransitive dimension of social 
structures). Similarly, Cruickshank views, in this case, that we have a 
philosophical ontology in the form of a sociological intransitive dimension that 
stands outside practice and sets to define the parameters of what constitutes 
the substantive features of social reality. It is “to explain the condition of 
possibility of social science as well as natural science: the argument about 
existential intransitivity is taken to be the a priori condition of any scientific 
study” (Cruickshank 2004: 576).  
 
Despite this critique, Cruickshank argues that it is still possible to commit to 
ontological claims but these are not transcendental. They are, instead, emergent 
from a critical dialogue with opposing theories and this is to recognise that 
“ontological claims and presuppositions were constructed and revised 
intersubjectively, given that ontology pertained to an interpretation of reality” 
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(Cruickshank 2004: 580).  Accordingly, the distinction between philosophical and 
substantive ontologies does not hold and to adopt this distinction leads to an 
irresolvable antinomy. The irresolvable antinomy comes from an irresolvable 
understanding of an interpretative framework of social ontology that, at the 
same time, affirms a dogmatic metaphysical claim that denies the grounds of its 
emergence. Yet, for Cruickshank, this does not mean a rejection of critical realist 
ontological claims. What it does mean is that these claims need to be 
acknowledged as part of an ongoing critical dialogue and that the immanent 
critique vouched for by critical realists needs to be applied to critical realism 
itself. The theoretical rigour advocated by critical realism remains workable and 
will frame, de facto, social research but this framework, while presupposing the 
selection of practical methods, is nevertheless contingent on current 
understandings prevailing in the transitive domain: 
 
Rather, ontological presuppositions may be recognised as being situated 
within the transitive domain, and that the task of social scientists is to 
draw upon the most useful ontological definitions that currently prevail 
in the transitive domain. (Cruickshank 2004: 582) 
 
Instead, theory is intrinsic to practice (situated in the transitive domain) and 
mediates our interaction to both natural and discursive worlds. This approach 
can be described as mid–level; it repudiates both intransitive ontological 
presuppositions but also the feasibility of research pragmatics with little 
theoretical insight or rigour – the idea of theory as emergent a posteriori from 
data collected. However, while repudiating a monological immanent critique 
there remains a commitment to the idea of ‘internal coherence’ or that some 
models are progressively efficacious in producing useful ontological definitions. 
It is this commitment that situates Cruickshank’s approach as a mid–point 
between philosophical starting points and the primacy of research outcomes. In 
this approach the propaedeutic function is made possible and the theoretical, 
qua critical dialogue, is in the feasibility of an ‘internal coherence’ but one 
detached from a philosophical ontology.  
 
The question extends to the possibility of deriving the universal features of the 
social that are isolated in a transcendental inquiry. Cruickshank critiques both 
Bhaskar and Archer for isolating these features in viewing them to be derived 
from the lay knowledge of agents, in a view of the social as a stratified open 
system. Social structures, in this ontological framing, are emergent properties in 
a contingent naturalism, in which structures are mediated in the present tense 
but whose properties are emergent over time. Over time there is a continuous 
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interaction of morphogenetic and morphostatic causal properties – a diachronic 
emergence – that is contingently mediated in the present tense (Cruickshank 
2010). The irreducibility of structure entails there is no reduction in the relation 
between structures – in their constraints and enablements – and agents. 
Consequently, there is no assumption regarding the falsity or truth of agency’s 
conception of social structures, due to the irreducibility of these structures to 
agent activity. Consistent in his critique, Cruickshank states this approach as a 
form of begging the question, in that it does not establish itself in a dialogical 
critique with other approaches. Instead, it justifies a model of the social – based 
on a transcendental inquiry – and from a given starting point then critiques 
other models. Thus, it first stands back to apply a justification for its approach 
based on a metaphysical justification, in contrast to a fallibilism focusing on 
knowledge growth.  
 
As an alternative approach, Cruickshank cites Popper’s justification of 
knowledge growth in the form of problems that are located in a theory “that had 
previously solved problems in a precursor theory and, when a solution to the 
newly located problem is developed, it too will be subject to criticism and, in due 
course, it will be replaced by an alternative theory” (Cruickshank 2010: 600). 
Adopting this approach, Cruickshank re-formulates the epistemic fallacy so that 
it is substantively constituted as a fallibilist epistemology. This way the epistemic 
fallacy is avoided, as claims of the social are open to revision and never settled to 
then define social reality as it really is:  
 
This is a problem because if knowledge is held to be fallible then, rather 
than simply using this to say that one’s claims are not infallible, one 
needs to put this recognition to work, so to speak. Doing this, one would 
argue that as knowledge claims are fallible they need to be revised and 
replaced through criticism. This would be antithetical to the search for 
an answer to a transcendental question because one would not be 
seeking some fixed answer but rather holding that all forms of 
knowledge claim were open to revision and replacement. (Cruickshank 
2010: 598) 
 
Kaidesoja argues for a revision of transcendental arguments that sets to 
postulate the “general categorical structure of the world that is interpreted in a 
realistic way” (2013: 18). First, it is argued, there is a significant difference 
between Kant’s application of a transcendental argument and what he terms as 
Bhaskar’s metaphysical speculations on the general categorical structure of the 
world. Kant’s methods reject this type of metaphysical speculation on 
<95> 
transcendent things (intransitive) as “he maintains that categories of 
understanding are applicable only to the possible objects of experience” 
(Kaidesoja 2013: 84). As the categories are subject sided – the generalised 
epistemic subject – the focus is on subject sided cognition and its categories of 
understanding. Accordingly, this locates operational practices as firmly within 
the transitive or as subject–sided.  
 
Due to this subject–sided focus, operational practices are restricted to objects of 
experience, as opposed to a stratified ontology that necessitates a commitment 
to irreducible and unobservable generative mechanisms. The synthetic a priori 
starting point directs to a transcendental idealism that brings together, at the 
same time, the structures of our understanding with the objects of our 
experience (Kaidesoja 2013: 85). Consequently, the appropriation of a synthetic a 
priori viewpoint carries with it the adoption of a subjective cognitive experience 
in relation to the object of experience. Further, analogical to a Kantian 
transcendental argument, the aim, for transcendental realism, is to demonstrate 
“how certain intelligible and rational scientific practices are possible by 
establishing their necessary conditions of possibility” (Kaidesoja 2013: 87). As this 
is the case, then an attempt to establish the grounds of possibility for scientific 
practice does not hold, argues Kaidesoja, as it does not distinguish between 
“descriptions of scientific practices from the practices themselves”. This 
distinction is important for Kaidesoja as “the truth–values of descriptions of 
scientific practices cannot be known a priori, because scientific practices are 
not operations of our understanding but activities of real people in the real 
world” (Kaidesoja 2013: 88 – 89). Consequently, any evaluation of operational 
practice can only be justified a posteriori and by analysing practice empirically, 
rather than from a transcendental necessity generative from the necessary 
conditions of practice. In contrast, a transcendental realist approach views 
transcendental necessities cannot be justified from empirical knowledge but 
from a transcendental philosophy.  
 
In appropriating Kant’s transcendental argument to establish the conditions of 
operative practice it then becomes necessary, for the sake of internal coherence, 
that any subsequent argument developed, a priori, be justified epistemically 
(subjective cognition). Yet Bhaskar, for example, bases his argument for a 
transcendental necessity on the objective conditions of operative practices and 
because of this he cannot accept any epistemically located starting points 
(transcendental idealism). Again, an a posteriori justification is not possible 
utilising a Kantian transcendental. Bhaskar’s approach, it is argued, appropriates 
the Kantian position but turns the transcendental argument to an other–sided 
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model and whose transcendental, consequently, is necessarily negated by this. 
There is an internal incoherence between adopting a transcendental argument 
with a realist ontology “due to his attempt to combine two incompatible 
doctrines: Kantian transcendental arguments (which presuppose the framework 
of transcendental idealism) and the transcendental realist ontology” (Kaidesoja 
2013: 91).  
 
Despite Bhaskar viewing his transcendental argument as both fallible and open 
to revision, it is nevertheless posited as a transcendental necessity for what 
makes practice possible. Thus, the transcendental argument starts from the 
conditions of practice to then critique other models (an immanent critique) in 
how their ontological claims are incoherent in reference to given a priori 
justifications. In a Kantian sense a transcendental argument is no longer feasible, 
in this case, as it builds, fallibly, from an a posteriori conception of the object’s 
operative conditions. The Kantian view, Kaidesoja argues, is to hold 
transcendental necessities from an apodeictic necessity of the universal subject. 
Taken this way the Kantian view does not develop a priori arguments from what 
is knowable a posteriori: 
 
It is not possible to justify a posteriori any propositions about 
transcendental necessities in the Kantian sense, because knowledge a 
posteriori is always merely hypothetical and hence fallible. (Kaidesoja 
2013: 90) 
 
Kaidesoja argues, similar to Cruickshank, to select certain contingent 
conclusions and to make this, simultaneously, transcendentally necessary is to 
beg the question on why certain conceptions – with their pre–supposing 
interpretations – yield an a priori definition of what is true. There is an 
incongruence between what is an a priori interpretation and the 
aforementioned contingency of pre–supposing ontological theories. 
Consequently, acknowledging the contingency of ontological definitions 
compromises the ability to adjudicate between different positions, as each starts 
from a reasoning that sets itself apart from the practices it seeks to systemise: 
 
Practices that are referred to in the premises of these supposedly 
‘naturalised transcendental arguments’ can (in principle) always be 
interpreted from the point of view of two or more incompatible 
ontological theories and there is no a priori way to decide which 
interpretation is true. (Kaidesoja 2013: 98) 
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Arguing for this incompatibility, the argument put forward by Kaidesoja bears 
resemblance to Cruickshank’s shift away from transcendental reasoning to a 
revisionist model that develops ontological models from the transitive:  
 
I would thus say that the intelligibility and rationality of the practice X 
relate to our conceptions and judgements concerning this practice 
rather than the features of the world that make it possible in the first 
place. (Kaidesoja 2013: 87) 
 
Kaidesoja is committed to drawing on the conditions of scientific practice, qua 
substantive ontology, to then derive ontological arguments. For him a 
substantive ontology is a criterion that makes possible an identification of 
research practices that produces better practices in terms of the intrinsic 
features of good basic science. In the social sciences, agreeing with critical 
realism, we rely on the “explanatory power of theories over their predictive 
successfulness, since, as critical realists rightly emphasize, the predictive power 
of explanatory models and theories developed in social sciences is inevitably 
circumscribed and seldom used as a standard of evaluation of explanatory 
theories” (Kaidesoja 2013: 100). At the same time, consistent with naturalism, and 
contra a Kantian transcendental a priori, the standards invoked for better 
explanatory theories cannot be pre–justified but emerge according to different 
disciplines and the development of new theoretical ideas and methodologies 
(Kaidesoja 2013: 101). Problematically, as shall be covered later, Kaidesoja 
acknowledges that certain views of social reality may be identified as 
incompatible with successful social scientific practice: 
 
This requirement is needed, because the most epistemically successful 
scientific practices presuppose that different sciences study the same 
world and that the results produced in different disciplines should be 
complementary, not contradictory. I find this requirement especially 
important in the context of social ontology, since, for example, 
physically reductionist, idealist and individualist views of the nature of 
social reality are not compatible with the best theories about human 
cognition proposed in cognitive sciences, as was suggested in the 
introduction. This means that arguments in naturalised social ontology 
are not solely based on the successful social scientific practices since 
their conclusions should also be compatible with the ontological 
assumptions of the empirically confirmed theories of other sciences 
(Kaidesoja 2013: 101) 
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This approach, as stated, is not based on a transcendental reasoning (a priori) 
and nor is it transcendentally necessary. Inferences to what are successful social 
scientific practices (the development of ontological propositions) emerge from 
the “empirical analysis of the practice, not on a priori conceptual inquiries or 
immanent critiques of the other philosophies of science” (Kaidesoja 2013: 103). 
The empirical analysis of practice is rooted in an explanatory necessary 
condition, as opposed to a transcendentally necessary philosophy, and if critical 
realist propositions of an open and stratified social ontology holds then it is due 
to its explanatory power rather than any necessary a priori posit of the 
conditions of operative practices. Finally, for Kaidesoja there is no necessary 
epistemic fallacy in this approach, as any evaluation of better explanatory 
models refers to the ontological structure of the world and not current 
knowledge of the world. The problem, however, is a stronger ontological claim 
attributed to a critical realist understanding of the epistemic fallacy to include 
“all epistemic concerns in the context of ontology” and it is this claim that is 
“unacceptable as it tends to open the gates for uncritical metaphysical 
speculation” (Kaidesoja 2013: 102).    
 
From an altogether different position and against ontological reasoning, is 
Kivinen & Piiroinen’s (2006) pragmatist methodological relationism. This 
approach rejects any commitment to a “metaphysical language game of ontology 
and what might be called a “referentialist” conception of knowledge” (Kivinen & 
Piiroinen 2006: 310). Here any form of ontological reasoning is denied, including 
any dualisms (subject/object or reference/referent). What follows is the 
relationality of the object – in that the object is never distinct to the knowing 
subject – and with this the problems of epistemic and ontological fallacies are 
considered as residues of a philosophising sociology:  
 
Like Dewey ([1925] 1981, 173 – 225), we give up the whole philosophical 
subject–object dualism, which first presupposes the knowing subject as 
an entity distinct from the objects of its knowledge, and then engages in 
figuring out how the subject could form correct representations of the 
world. (Kivinen & Piiroinen 2006: 309) 
 
Methodologically fruitful debates (sociologizing philosophy) are not engaged in 
the development of a metaphysical under–labourer. Instead, they argue for an 
immanence that contextualises all inquiries as problems to be investigated from 
the “concrete troubles people face in the course of their everyday social lives” 
(Kivinen & Piiroinen 2006: 319). The object of investigation is not a description of 
what is independent, as referent, but human action and internalised habits – an 
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embodied knowing–how or practical skill – formed and underpinned by a certain 
knowing–that (shared practices). This linguistic knowing–that does not capture 
the intrinsic features of an object (the referent), as the object is already named 
and it is the relations of their naming (knowing–that) that becomes the object of 
inquiry:  
 
It is precisely because of the centrality of practice––because of the fact 
that everything is practical and can only be weighed in action––that all 
theories should be conceived of as nothing but tools for action. (Kivinen 
& Piiroinen 2006: 319) 
 
Following the Deweyan operalionalist approach, we reach a practical and 
problem–driven way of understanding the social sciences, as all human 
knowledge is related to the inquirer’s purposes and all beliefs are to be weighed 
in intentional action and its consequences. Further, social scientific 
conceptualizations used by the inquirer are tools that must be operationalizable 
in context of things to be done. Further, a sense for the rules of the game, in the 
form of problems people face in their everyday lives, is not something to be 
theorised (for example, Bourdieu’s theorising a theory of practice). Instead, what 
is advocated is a theory with a small ‘t’: 
 
From a pragmatist standpoint, we need to embrace the strict demand of 
operationalizability—understanding theories in terms of acts to be 
done—and this means, among other things, dropping the idea that the 
growing complexity of a theory and the use of peculiar doctrinal lexicon 
can be justified by the claim that they are needed in capturing the 
complexity and indefiniteness of the real world (cf. Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992, 22–23, and n. 40 and 41). Rather, we need an 
unambiguously operationalizable frame of references (i.e., a simple 
theory with a small t) that serves us as a practicable toolset for solving 
specific research problems. (Kivinen & Piiroinen 2006: 319 – 320) 
 
6.1.2 Transcendental reasoning as a logical necessity 
 
The positions of those opposed to a transcendental realist underlabourer, noted 
above, may be summarised as follows: 
 
1. An assumption that any ontological conclusion is not possible, as pre–
notions are already constituted in the transitive domain. Due to these 
pre–notions being constituted in the transitive domain there is an internal 
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incoherence in any appropriation of a Kantian transcendental reasoning. 
Within this contention, we have mid–range realist views that seek to 
maintain some distinction between referent/reference and with this the 
possibility of adjudicating between different explanatory approaches.  
2. A stronger position that opposes any ontological reasoning as a 
metaphysical language game.  
 
Regarding the first point of contention then the central issue is the possibility of 
differentiating, in the words of Cruickshank, between conceptual clarity and a 
reasoned a priori underlabourer (an underlabourer that establishes the 
transcendental necessary conditions of practice and defines how a conceptual 
clarity implicates better explanatory models). The question, therefore, is to 
demonstrate the possibility of a transcendental argument, as philosophical 
ontology, that can also act as an underlabourer, while allowing for both an 
epistemic relativism and judgemental rationality in its reasoning. Here the key 
issue is an acknowledgement of a judgemental rationality and the possibility of 
more adequate explanatory models in regard to an ontological commitment. In a 
distinction between meaning and reference we have a possible synthetic 
account between the epistemic and ontic. When both are acknowledged, we 
require some form of framework to hold both meaning (the intensional) and 
external reference (the extensional) as irreducible but also relational 
dimensions. Accordingly, we need an account on how a referent is referenced as 
an object of investigation and whose terms of reference are made meaningful in 
the process.  
 
Cruickshank, as noted, views an internal incoherence in the notion of 
ontological presuppositions that are, simultaneously, situated. However, the 
mere stipulation of a meaning/reference distinction implicates an a priori 
philosophical ontology. This follows, if we maintain a distinction between 
meaning and reference and the importance of some form of judgemental 
rationality in regard to the ontology of the relatum – a judgemental rationality 
that is mutually compatible with an epistemic relativism. As a mutual 
compatibility is informed by the necessity a judgemental rationality, grounded in 
the nature of the relatum, then we already define the permissible objects of 
reference a priori. As Tyfield argues (2007) the necessity is in the nature of the 
relatum – our ontology– that then determines the nature of the relation of 
reference: 
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As with all relations, the nature of the relatum of the permissible objects 
of reference, i.e., our ontology, necessarily determines the nature of the 
relation of reference. (Tyfield 2007: 151) 
 
Further, the mere stipulation of a relatum that determines the relation of 
reference – the basis of a judgemental rationality – is to commit to a synthetic a 
priori, inasmuch as it is an attempt to acknowledge that theory is indeed 
intrinsic to operative practice in this relation. At the same time, the version of 
the transcendental argument, put forward by Bhaskar, is not a logical or 
analytical argument and its validity is drawn from “the derivation of synthetic a 
priori truths” (Tyfield 2007: 145). Thus, it becomes necessary, de–facto, to 
understand relations between the intentional and extensional and that any 
philosophical reasoning is derived from this problematic. In the relation between 
both, we are concerned with what makes for a progressive explanatory model, 
corrigibly, considering the a priori conditions of practice. Investigating meaning 
in reference to our ontology, therefore, translates into explanatory models 
(substantive ontology).  
 
It is correct to view this question as derived from the transitive domain; 
however, even if the manner we derive a synthetic a priori is not fixed, there 
remains a transcendental argument, as the synthetic a priori prescribes a 
certain view on the conditions of practice considering the meaning and 
reference problematic. We can thus ask what makes a certain actualisation 
possible, empirically; an explanatory model will necessarily focus on this 
problem, informing the question on how an actualisation relates to meaning 
derived from practical methods utilised (the noted dialogue between a 
philosophical and substantive ontology). This question, as Archer (1998) argues, 
is a logical necessity when we consider what makes for an empirical advance in 
any concrete explanatory proposition (Archer 1998: 199). Tyfield (2007) similarly 
states this as a reasoned necessity (the basis for a synthetic a priori), derived 
from premises grounded in the question of what makes a phenomenon an 
intelligible object of investigation. It already assumes, as do Cruickshank and 
Kaidsejoa, that we can refer and so the necessary question directs to the 
conditions of intelligibility by which we articulate the relation between 
conceptual resources (explanatory model) and the object of reference (an 
indirect reference that does not pre-suppose pragmatic schema (Tyfield 2007: 
155)).  
 
At the same time, the existence of this reasoned necessity, considering the 
problem of meaning/reference, is that there needs to be a “detachment of 
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conclusions” (Bhaskar 2007: 194) when providing any ontological claim, even if 
claims are situated. To view this detachment as an impossibility, due to a 
philosophical ontology being located in the transitive realm, will, at the same 
time, render any form of judgemental rationality as part of self–referential 
networks and so negate the possibility of progress qua substantive ontology. 
Philosophical ontology, as detached knowledge, guides practice (epistemological 
premises derived from conditions of practice) on how we understand the 
internal coherence of explanatory models and it is through this that operative 
practices are then judged considering ontological questions pertaining to 
reference.  
 
As noted this is not a metaphysical justification, as Cruickshank argues, but it is 
through a procedure of detachment that premises are derived on what makes an 
object an intelligible point of reference (to examine an object’s ontological 
conditions of possibility). Hence, a synthetic a priori is in both a subjective 
investigation, though posited as necessarily detached, and the manner 
referential statements can be construed in regard to its ontological conditions of 
possibility. Here we direct, according to Bhaskar (2007), to a mutual 
compatibility between subjective investigation and the procedure of detachment 
through which we refer to our external world: 
 
This is of course perfectly consistent with the easiest argument to grasp 
for ontology: when we refer to an object what we do in that moment in 
which we refer to it is detach it from the subjectivity that investigates, 
posits, observes. This is what I call ‘referential detachment’ and it is 
what we do when we talk about the world, detaching things (including 
totalities) from their evidential and supporting context. So we have the 
motifs here of: the suspension of the natural attitude; the attitude which 
epistemalogizes or normalizes ontology; and the procedure of 
detachment. (Bhaskar 2007: 194) 
 
Accordingly, an appropriation of a Kantian transcendental argument remains 
possible, as an epistemic starting point is a reasoned necessity inherent in any 
attempt to reach ontological conclusions; this is due to the problem investigated 
(meaning/reference) being intrinsic to the very act of epistemic reasoning 
(referential detachment). Furthermore, this is a synthetic a priori as it starts 
from an attempt to bring together a subjective understanding with the object of 
experience (ontology). Thus, the philosophical ontology is posited as sui generis 
due to the premises being deduced from the conditions of practice. What we 
have is not a justification of a metaphysical speculation; it is a deduced position 
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that then forms the basis of a judgemental rationality on what may be 
progressive research practice.  
 
To bypass this reasoning and still rely on some view on what makes for better 
approximations of social reality, via a posteriori successful practice, is merely to 
transfer philosophical inquiries to the domain of situated practice. Yet in making 
this transfer, without a pre–supposing philosophical ontology (a reasoned 
framework), there would be no clear way to judge the basis of what makes for 
more adequate explanations. To merely stipulate successful and complementary 
outcomes (substantive ontology), as the basis for better theories, is to fall into 
the same problem of begging the question i.e. when we talk about the world, 
what is the nature of the object that leads to an adequate explanation? Again, if it 
is incremental progress in explanatory models that identify adequate 
explanatory models then this is to deduce, corrigibly, from the conditions of 
practice, even if this may be located as analytically mid–level. For example, if 
individualist or collectivist views of social reality are identified as erroneous, 
then best practice is what leads to this conclusion i.e. it is a referential 
detachment to the object that leads to certain conclusions.  Thus, de-facto, to 
identify certain ontological conceptions as erroneous is to adopt a similar 
position to that of a transcendental realism – it is incorrect, due to the noted 
synthetic a priori, to assume that this reasoned necessity equates ontological 
commitments relating to the nature of reality with all epistemic concerns 
regarding ontology. Consequently, referring to an object requires some form of 
view on what makes the object an intelligible point of reference to then derive 
mutually compatible epistemic premises, qua incremental progress, in a process 
that intrinsically includes a referential detachment. 
 
Kivinen & Piiroinen, on the other hand, are explicit in what can be stated as a 
meta–theoretical a priori stance, though from a stance of negation. Here the 
problem of meaning and reference is replaced with human knowledge and that 
the continuity of a knowing–that is in an indistinguishable relation of 
immanence to a knowing–how. This way it is a meta–theory, even if a closed 
one, that denies its own starting point, as it views the mere conception of 
transcendental reasoning and a mid–point realism as still committed to 
ontology; the latter being still committed to a philosophising ontology as an 
aspect of operational practice. The goal, instead, is problem–solving rather than 
progress in models of indirect reference (ontological questions). This is 
consistent with a pragmatism that holds all doings to be aspects of problem 
solving and that attempts to guide these doings is in a language game 
acknowledged from within a network of named practices.  
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It is difficult to see how merely conceiving theory as tools for action (getting 
things done) that it would then be possible to adjudicate on how it may achieve 
objectives relating to explanation. This is the case, as explanatory objectives 
would be defined by an epistemic and genetic fallacy in regard to an epistemic 
embeddedness of already existing shared practices. What we have is a rejection 
of both epistemic and ontological investigations (the meaning/reference 
problematic) and thus the researcher would commit an epistemic fallacy, not in 
conflating a knowing-how with a knowing-that, but in denying the need – at any 
level of research – of a knowing-that distinguished from a knowing–how.  
 
Sociologizing philosophy, consequently, leads to a closure, though intending the 
opposite, in setting–up a meta–theory that not only guides but draws the 
parameters of what is plausible for operative practices to consider. Thus, the 
same operative practices would be embedded in identified concrete problems 
but require the development of practices to solve further research problems. 
However, there is no way to ascertain, outside concrete concerns, why problems 
may be better solved through given practices (theories are referential to acts to 
be done and thus self–referential). Absent in this account is an objective basis for 
a dialogue on improved operative practices. In self–referential operative 
practices, we only have self–referential networks of meanings and consequently 
research doings cannot be anchored in anything distinguished from de-centered 
practices weighed in action.  
 
6.1.3 The basis of a Transcendental realist argument 
 
In the next chapter, there will be an acknowledgement of the latent dimension 
of policy practice in the form of personalist ends. This part of the chapter 
establishes the basis of a transcendental realist argument that pre–supposes and 
informs a relational turn in policy towards these personalist ends. Two points 
will be covered in establishing the basis of a transcendental realist argument: 
 
1. If a transcendental argument is a reasoned necessity, whether implicit or 
explicit, then the question arises on the manner it guides a realist 
position. 
2. What would the implications of this form of argumentation be for the 
question of personhood as relatum.  
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Regarding the first point, in defining a transcendental realist position we have 
referential detachment. As noted before, in the words of Bhaskar (2000), this is 
the procedure of detachment of the act of reference from that to which it refers: 
 
The procedure which I have called ‘referential detachment’, that is, the 
detachment of the act of reference from that to which it refers, 
establishes at once the existential separation, distinctiveness or 
‘intransitivity’ of both referential act and referent and the possibility of 
another reference to either, a condition of any intelligible discourse at 
all. (Bhaskar 2000: 24) 
 
Thus, at the centre of this referential detachment is an existential separation 
between the act of reference and the referent, with an ‘intransitivity’ 
characterised in a non–identity between them. Furthermore, closure through 
pre–given epistemic models – the epistemic fallacy – would be avoided by 
affirming the relatum as the subject matter of a transcendental argument. Due to 
this, against empiricist observational models, we turn to generative mechanisms 
as the latent model of the object – a structure that yields certain powers. While 
powers may be exercised in certain conditions, the latent dimension of the 
object – the intransitive realm – is defined by generative mechanisms that exist 
regardless of their contingent activation. Here we move beyond given events 
and point to generative mechanisms as the latent dimension of an investigated 
object. Referential detachment entails we may refer to this realm of exercised 
powers, in terms of tendential outcomes, but these mechanisms would not be 
reducibly explained in terms of a perceived sequence of events. Accordingly, a 
given concept of the object is not the same as its latent dimension (the 
intransitive):  
 
Generative mechanisms, instead, are different from (exercised) powers. 
“Generative mechanism” is a technical term that marks “something that 
is real” independently of the sequence of perceived events and which 
usually lasts longer than the events it generates. It is the sub–stantia, 
the latent model of the object. The generative mechanism is that aspect 
of the structure of an object by virtue of which it possesses some 
powers, its “way of operating”. This trait lasts and is exercised whilst 
ever the same characteristics and conditions remain. (Prandini 2011: 41) 
 
The relative autonomy of tendential powers means their exercise is explained in 
the context of an interdependent and layered emergence, rather than a given 
sequence of perceived events. Consequently, within an open interaction of 
<106> 
mechanisms – defining this emergence – the properties and powers of the 
human being, as Archer argues (2003), are emergent from our relations with our 
environment, rather than assumed or pre–defined in a given reasoned 
referential act.  
 
Second, in regard to the implications of this referential detachment, a 
transcendental realist synthetic a priori does not aim to resolve the question of 
emergence of a personal identity in a pre-given metaphysical collective logic. At 
the same time, against the empiricism of individuated learning, as the means of 
inculcation of shared practices, it remains committed to an irreducible 
propositional realm. As Collier argues (1994), the focus is on generative 
mechanisms that co–jointly generate events, in a stratified and relational view of 
natural and non–natural worlds. Here this non-reductive approach implicates an 
inter-disciplinarity, as different orders of our environment contribute to social 
agency (natural, practical and discursive).  
 
6.2 Affirming both differentiated singularities and irreducible sharedness 
 
This section applies a realist underlabourer in acknowledging the existence of an 
independent propositional realm, while also accounting for the transmission of 
this shared realm. Further, the aim is to provide a justification of Archer’s realist 
approach to personhood through discussing and setting-out important pre-
cursors that inform this approach. Archer approaches the transmission 
problematic, as will be discussed, through highlighting the importance of our 
embodied practical interactions in our natural world; these interactions, the 
basis of ontogenetic developments, distance us from our biological origins and 
prepare us for our social becoming (Archer 2009: 90). The discussion of the 
transmission problematic includes a discussion on the working of mirror 
neurons that substantiates Archer’s view empirically. Chapter seven takes the 
ideas discussed in this section further in the need to develop a relational policy 
model that considers both the ontological difference of persons and the social 
link that connects persons to their shared settings (between differentiated 
singularities and an irreducible sharedness).  
 
The argument is based on world-directed actions that facilitate our social 
becoming via a shared action ontology; it is this action ontology that enacts our 
embodied relations from which in potentia capacities then develop. This position 
is a defence of Archer’s emphasis of embodied practical relations – the bodily 
know-how – that then accounts for the transmission of propositional knowledge 
(a ‘knowing-that’) and our referential detachment to our embodied relations. 
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This justification of a realist approach to personhood, therefore, covers the 
questions of how a propositional realm is transmitted and the existence of an 
autonomous sharedness that is emergent from an interpersonal bodily 
perspective. Therefore, the section takes the following structure:  
 
(1) The transmission problematic – The first preliminary point is the problem 
of sameness i.e. the means through which unitary identities, in their 
mediation of natural, practical and discursive orders, come to collective 
objects from which an objective sharedness is possible. Once this initial 
point is discussed, the following argument will direct to questions on the 
nature of the mediation of this sameness and consequently its emergence 
over time. The argument put forward is one opposed to an attempt to 
bypass the efficacy of an active pre–reflective phenomenal self-model in 
the emergence of social actors.  
(2) Affirming irreducible sharedness – This is an argument against an 
individuated pragmatic sameness. Instead, it will be argued, while it is 
important to account for the emergence of personal identities in their 
singular individuation, it is likewise important to consider generative 
mechanisms pertaining to an irreducible discursive order. 
 
6.2.1 The transmission problematic 
 
The transmission problematic relates to the problem of sameness i.e. the means 
through which unitary identities, in their mediation of natural, practical and 
discursive orders, relate to collective objects from which an objective 
sharedness is then possible. Once this initial point is discussed, the following 
argument will direct to the possibility of sharedness as an irreducible world of 
ideas. Regarding the transmission problematic, it is, in Bourdieu’s terms, a 
genealogical enquiry into an “internalised objective structure” and how the 
transmission of this objective structure as an immanent law, a lived externality, 
is then “inscribed in bodies by identical histories, which is the condition not only 
for the coordination of practices but also for practices of co–ordination” 
(Bourdieu 1990: 59). Stephen Turner states this problematic in the following way:  
 
The problematic feature of all “collective object” conceptions was that 
they required some sort of means of getting from the collective object 
into the individual that preserved the sameness or unitary identity of the 
collective object – of what, as Bourdieu says, is taken for granted 
(Turner 2007: 353)  
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The problem is thus concerned with an account on how sameness of external 
performance can be, simultaneously, a sameness of internalised structure 
generating behaviour. In what follows there is a contrasting of positions 
between Turner and Lizardo, in regard to this problematic, in which both 
contest the plausibility of convergence of actions based on correspondence to 
given tacit conceptual presuppositions. The objective, after this review, is to 
then arrive at a solution to the noted problematic in a way demonstrating the 
importance of a transcendental realist position. The importance of this position, 
as starting point, is in its non–reductionist referential ontology. As will be 
shown, Turner rightly critiques what is termed as the mystery of collective 
objects (tacit conceptual presuppositions). However, contra Turner, the 
argument put forward is informed by a transcendental realist understanding in 
which layers of emergent strata possess their own properties and powers. In this 
approach, conceptions such as convergence of collective pre–suppositions rely 
on a mistaken viewpoint of an ontological complicity, which results in a 
bypassing of subjective authority that mediates a regulating propositional 
knowledge. At the same time, against Turner, to direct towards generative 
mechanisms means there is an acknowledgement of an irreducible propositional 
order. To empirically substantiate this realist position there will be a referencing 
of the work of Metzinger and Gallese on mirror neurons (both Turner and 
Lizardo, in different ways, cite this work to substantiate their opposing views).   
 
First, in regard to Turner’s view, sameness is explained in the social process of 
an individual-individual relation. However, this convergence is not some form of 
social metaphysics – a quasi–teleology – bypassing the process of individuation 
and without providing an account on how this is possible. The movement is then 
one in which practices are both collective and the source of individual 
dispositions:  
 
Bourdieu’s main argument has two parts: that practices are a collective, 
dispositional, and strategic source of individual habitus, which are in 
turn the source of individual dispositions and strategies. The causal 
relation is bi-directional: up from the individual through affinities of 
habituses to the practice, and down from the practice to the individual. 
(Turner 2007: 354)  
 
Here declarative sameness, such as social practice, is an embodied inculcation 
through the social process of interaction itself, rather than external facts 
imposed on individual minds. The convergence of sameness pertains to the 
inherent problem of social coordination – something different to a transcendent 
objective structure regulating the coordination of social practice (a taken for 
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granted). Instead of an unaccounted for sameness, the basis of social practice, 
we turn to the manner mirror neurons work on visual material producing a 
capacity to do something similar to what is seen: 
 
The mystery element is gone: if the neurons work on visual material, and 
produce a capacity to do something similar to what is seen, we need 
another mechanism to explain other supposed cases of transmission, or 
we need to question whether there is anything transmitted. (Turner 
2007: 366) 
 
Mirror neurons represent a mechanism facilitating inter–individual convergence 
in the social process of interaction. For Turner mirror neurons would be a 
procedural mechanism enabling convergence, citing work done on monkey’s 
premotor cortex of neurons, with evidence suggesting that humans also possess 
(2007: 366). These neurons facilitate learning through a sub-personal 
attunement between individuals and via known epistemic channels. Against a 
‘downloading’ of an assumed shared objective logic there is – phylogenetically2 – 
a substrate shared by individuals, facilitating an instrumental or pragmatic 
sameness. Consequently, there is nothing outside the minds of individuals but a 
to-and-fro individuation of learning in social interaction. The working of 
neurons point to a learning from overt behaviour – an external perspective – 
which is then translated into bodily perspective and sustained through an 
embodied off–line simulation and emulation (a repository enabling action 
sharing through a trajectory of learnt behaviour).  
 
Thus, the learning process is based on an external perspective (action 
observation) that is mirrored and through this perspective there is an 
accumulation of learnt performance – the basis of a pragmatic sameness – that 
allows for a predictive capacity to perceive similar actions in others and the 
ability to recognise self in others. Facilitating the predictive capacity – 
                                               
2  The ontogenetic development of the human is first facilitated and sustained in 
our embodied natural relations (phylogenetic developments). Here the development of 
human learning is transmitted through a shared bodily perspective that provides the 
basis and furthers ontogenetic developments. Thus, Archer states our embodied 
knowledge (know-how) is realised in our natural relations and is based on developments 
that are traced to the manner we interact and transmit learning through the doings of 
this bodily perspective - “Embodied knowledge is a know-how about nature which has 
literally become ‘second nature’. It is a ‘knowing how’ when doing, rather than a 
‘knowing that’ in thought. Because it has to be realised by each individual in their 
natural relations, it is unsurprising that our ontogenetic development recapitulates 
phylogenetic developments”. (Archer 2003: 162) 
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referenced to an off–line learnt repertoire – neurons are activated when 
identifying the actions of others, even when no action is performed by the 
subject. The action is mirrored, as if the subject performed the act, and is 
transmitted back; with this there is an ability to ‘mind read’ another person from 
the same learnt repertoire that is developed when the act is learnt. Turner states 
the process of action simulation as an “off–line process involving the same 
neurons as those involved in perceiving an action of another person as ‘minded’ 
or intentional which thus becomes the means by which we ‘mind read’” (Turner 
2007: 360). Instead of the transmission of content there is a mirroring that 
becomes the basis of emulation: 
 
Moreover, I will suggest, the right understanding fits with my points 
about emulation: the same content is not directly transmitted, as he 
imagines, but mirrored, that is to say simulated from within the mind of 
the person doing the mirroring. (Turner 2007: 359) 
  
These are retrodictions constructed through simulations applied to external 
performance (overt behaviour) and it is a learnt trajectory that then enables the 
making sense of a trajectory of observed behaviour: 
 
We construct these retrodictions with our own capacity to simulate, 
which we apply to what we observe, namely overt behaviour, which our 
simulations enable us to make sense of, or code. (Turner 2007: 361) 
 
Mirroring, contra content being directly transmitted, becomes an archimedean 
point directed to the world though bodily interactions, based on a shared mental 
substrate at the phylogenetic level. It grounds the possibility of sameness 
empirically and resolves the transmission problematic in this phylogenetic 
solution.  
 
An agent–based perspective is affirmed, starting from the mind of the person 
doing the mirroring and emphasises “the individual, who uses himself as a model 
and means of understanding other” (Turner 2007: 367). We always return to 
individuated learning perspectives, based on differentiated backgrounds, to 
arrive at a functional intersubjective understanding: 
 
‘Sameness’ in this case is sameness only at the level of functional 
intersubjective understanding – not a neural fact, much less one 
produced by common body experiences. Even less individualized 
training, such as military drill, is neurally overlaid on differentiated 
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backgrounds, such as the way recruits walked before they were 
disciplined by the drill sergeant. (Turner 2007: 366) 
 
With differentiated backgrounds we have an important distinction between 
individual variations of social interaction and pre-supposing collective objects – 
in the former we respond to others in social interaction, while the latter refers 
to an unaccounted special realm regulating the direction of response:  
 
The implications of this argument for social theory were identical to 
those of Ellwood’s social psychology a century ago. As Ellwood put it, “as 
individual psychology teaches, no two physical coordinations [a Dewey-
Mead term from the 1890s] can ever be exactly alike” (1899, 663). The 
message here is very clear. What we require through interaction with 
others is subject to the individual variation in response that occurs in 
interaction. This is a social conception without being a collective one. 
The “social”, for Ellwood, refers to the social process of interaction itself 
(1901, 741), not to a special realm of substance, such as the “water” to 
which Bourdieu refers (Turner 2007: 354) 
 
While there is the possibility of implicit tacit knowledge, without explicit 
instruction, learning history matters at the cognitive level, based on a 
developmental capacity to simulate overt behaviour (Turner 2007: 353). Further, 
even in the case of tacit knowledge and learning we still have transmission 
through the epistemic channels, rather than an assumed social realm as the 
basis of tacit pre–suppositions.  
 
This agent-based approach allows for both pragmatic sameness and skilled 
interactors whose responses can never be shaped by a given objective sense. 
Thus, we have neither an impinging group will or an anything goes anarchy: 
 
Because we can simulate other people more readily than we can 
simulate the physical world, we can thus construct, test, and assimilate 
complex feedback simulative “hypotheses” about this world 
expeditiously. The interaction between these capacities and this 
environment is not one that produces clones, or puppets of the group 
will, nor does it produce anarchy. It produces skilled interactors with 
enormous capacities to anticipate, predict, and model the people with 
whom they interact, to adjust to them, and to learn from their 
adjustments. (Turner 2007: 369) 
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In an opposing perspective, Lizardo (2007) argues empirical evidence 
substantiates Bourdieu’s theory of objective transmission of shared practices. 
Mirror neurons facilitate cognition via the transmission of shared collective 
logics through shared body experience. Neural structures support, 
simultaneously, both action representation and action comprehension. More 
than mere embodied mirroring and then an imitation of overt behaviour there is, 
parallel to mirroring, a capacity to pick-up a tacit knowing-that, which Lizardo 
argues is the dominant mode of embodied learning. The motor neuron system in 
the F5 region is identified as a substrate relating to practical capacities 
productive of action and the coding and comprehension of practical action in 
relation to others: 
 
In this sense the motor neuron system in the F5 region can be seen as 
one possible substrate of not only of the practical capacities productive 
of action (which are mainly subserved by traditional motor neurons in 
the pre-frontal region) but those which are in charge of the practical, 
representation, coding and comprehension of the practical action of self 
and others, and which may be involved in the implicit matching of the 
practical skills of others to that of other actors and vice versa; precisely 
the neurocognitive capacity that according to Turner (1994) belonged in 
the realm of high-speculation and/or logical impossibility and 
incoherence. (Lizardo 2007: 12) 
 
Importantly, there is a neural basis for a practical generalisation that is 
interpreted by Lizardo as making possible the noted representation, coding and 
comprehension of practical action. It is due to this practical generalisation that 
we have shared practices from practical capacities, including meaningful actions 
directed towards collectively situated objects. Mirror neurons enable a 
generalisation in which objects are understood in terms of their potential motor 
affordances and from these affordances a proto–conceptual generalisation that 
forms “fairly abstract representations of practical action upon objects in the 
world performed by other actors” (Lizardo 2007: 330). From a proto-conceptual 
generalisation there is an encoding of practical information about objects in 
what they are for the observer. Thus, an initial practical embodied sense, the 
basis of an implicit transmission, then becomes the basis of meaningful actions 
and their pre-supposing representation in an implicit logic.    
 
Transmission of the conceptual correlates, simultaneously, with embodied 
action simulation. Instead of an individuated learning from overt behaviour, 
resulting in an offline simulation from learnt repertoires, imitation is in a 
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relational immanence to collective objects. In this immanence collective 
transmission is in convergence to other relations and their relations to objects 
as meaningful (conceptual) representations. With mirror neurons, as a 
computational starting point, we have a capacity to transmit meaningful 
intentionality to shared objects and generate learning from given logics i.e. 
implicit certitudes, as meaningful representations, transmitted in correlation 
between action observation, simulation and execution. For Lizardo, the process 
of transmission rather than conscious and deliberate, is instead automatic, 
unconscious, and pre–reflexive. Thus, by virtue of being part of a given social 
world, humans will be exposed to countless acts of practical teaching and will be 
the subject of practical learning during the course of their everyday existence 
(Lizardo 2007: 17). Consequently, following Bourdieu, nascent forms of reflexivity 
are inseparable (an ontological complicity) from self-other interactions that 
transfer pre–conscious forms of regulated understanding in everyday spaces.  
 
The issue of transmission, through individuated learnt instruction, no longer 
figures, as we do not set out to learn from overt behaviour. Instead, we have in 
the body, neuro-physiologically shared, a sub-personal attunement that 
coordinates motor schemes “across agents, without ever resorting to conscious 
deliberation about goals and purposes” (Lizardo 2007: 19). Hence, motor 
equivalence is an embodied attunement through an inter-corperiety that 
immanently encodes bodily behaviour in action. Due to this implicit 
transmission, through a shared bodily analogue, we do not require the type of 
overt mirroring – through epistemic routes of access – which Turner argues for. 
The body is an analogical operator, a medium of transmission, and it is through 
it that social meanings and values are acted on in a variety of social settings. The 
body imbues meaning and allows the transmission of collective presuppositions 
in which learning processes are highly constrained to those practice produced 
by others: 
 
Learning processes, especially those having to do with practical activity 
in the world, are highly constrained to match those practices already 
produced by role models, and correlatively to draw implicit 
correspondences to the tacit conceptual presuppositions encoded by 
those actions. (Lizardo 2007: 26)  
 
With role models and tacit conceptual presuppositions inhering in their actions, 
embodied simulation is understood in reference to a structured social practical 
logic, as part of patterned sequences of action in a concrete context. Lizardo 
argues there is a subset of mirror neurons that play just this role in anticipating 
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the order of actions, in a concrete context, to achieve shared goal–ends. In this 
sense, the “embodied simulation mechanism thus appears not only to be able to 
reproduce the observed isolated actions of others, but also anticipate which 
actions should “logically” follow the observed one given the context of 
observation” (Lizardo 2007: 25). 
 
Considering these two opposed views and informed by a transcendental realist 
underlabourer (a stratified and non–reductionist ontology), an argument will be 
presented to empirically resolve the transmission problematic. The argument 
acknowledges Turner’s rejection of ‘transmission’ through pre–supposing 
collective objects. The problem with pre–supposing conceptual presuppositions 
is its appropriation of irreducible mechanisms pertaining to an individuated and 
differentiated inculcation, through given discursive filters. At the same time, the 
argument put forward acknowledges an irreducible sharedness, something 
rejected in Turner’s skilled interactions of individuals. However, while 
irreducible, it must refer, ontogenetically and logically, to a pragmatic sameness 
in the manner practical activity is appropriated by a first person perspective. 
 
In regard to a rejection of an appropriated irreducible mechanism (pertaining to 
individuated inculcation), via tacit conceptual presuppositions, the argument is 
substantiated by the workings of mirror neurons (cited by both Turner and 
Lizardo). Lizardo fails to differentiate between a functional proto-conceptual 
mechanism and the development of a more complex semantic mechanism 
(Gallese 2003: 1238; Metzinger & Gallese 2003). Between these two there is an 
inter-dependence between a know-that, in the functional proto-conceptual, and 
a know-how of a semantic representation. Lizardo’s understanding, as we shall 
see, takes this differentiation as given to the latter semantic representation, so 
that the proto–conceptual is there to draw implicit correspondences to tacit 
conceptual presuppositions. Consequently, the agent-based model of action 
turns to an objective mode of regulation. 
 
In contrast, the agent based model, set out by Gallese & Metzinger, first turns to 
a capacity to extend the self, in a shared action ontology and via motor action. 
This extensibility relies on a basic functional mechanism depending on 
“unconscious and automatic simulation processes” (Metzinger & Gallese 2003: 
556). What we have is a rudimentary first person perspective, in the noted 
simulation process, in an observation of an object-related action. In observation 
of action there is a coupling between observation of an object–related action 
and action execution. It is a functional mechanism that is posited to be the basis 
of an implicit form of action understanding: 
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The observation of an object-related action leads to the activation of the 
same neural network active during its actual execution. Action 
observation causes in the observer the automatic simulated re-
enactment of the same action. We proposed that this mechanism could 
be at the basis of an implicit form of action understanding. (Gallese 
2005: 32) 
 
Further, in a proto-conceptual functional mechanism, in its embodied, 
unconscious and automatic simulation of object-related action, there is also the 
capacity to understand the ‘why’ of an action in the context of its performance. 
This way acts are perceived and the intention behind it detected in observing 
the sequence of its performance in regard to its distal goal: 
 
Thus, pre-motor areas – areas active during the execution and the 
observation of an action – previously thought to be involved only in 
action recognition are actually also involved in understanding ‘why’ of 
action, that is, the intention promoting it. Detecting the intention of 
Action A is equivalent to predict its distal goal, that is, the goal of the 
subsequent Action B. (Gallese 2009: 493) 
 
In the noted extensibility, through a mind/body interplay, we establish the “core 
element of an automatic, unconscious, and pre–reflexive functional control 
mechanism whose function is the modeling of objects, events, and other agents 
to be controlled” (Metzinger & Gallese 2003: 555). In modeling objects, events, 
and other agents to be controlled there is a functional basis of social 
referencing. The role of a functional mechanism, in this agent based model, can 
be described as a sub-personal mechanism that is a mediatory capacity and 
bridge between a first person and third person perspective. The first person 
perspective is the basis of an elementary self-model, while the third person 
perspective being a high-level capacity to cognitively model social relations 
(social referencing) in a practical engagement in shared target spaces. 
 
The functional control mechanism relates to the way we relate to objects, other 
conspecifics and how we share subjective states, from a given elementary self–
model. The elementary self-model is then understood in the manner an agent–
object relationship can be phenomenally represented (Gallese & Metzinger 2003: 
561), as first person perspective. Accordingly, there is first a Phenomenal Self 
Model (PSM) that is defined as the “integrated conscious model an organism may 
have of itself as a whole”. Due to this PSM being in the world then it is an 
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intentional relationality – established through a functional control mechanism – 
from which an initial self-model phenomenally represents itself in relationality 
to its externality. Thus, the PSM’s extensibility is understood from a Phenomenal 
Model of the Intentionality Relation (PMIR), in an embodied observation and 
execution of action, in which the PMIR facilitates the modeling of objects, 
events, and other agents to be controlled. This facilitation is possible when the 
PSM is “fully immersed in its external environment through a dense network of 
causal, perceptual, cognitive, attentional, and agentive relations” (Metzinger & 
Gallese 2003: 562). 
 
In this immersion we start from the vantage point of a self-regulated practical 
engagement in the world to establish a first person character of action. In the 
activation of the PSM, in its immersion, through a PMIR, we then establish a 
non-conceptual and non-reflexive first person extensibility. Thus, a phenomenal 
representation of an integrated conscious model is not reliant on the possession 
of concepts, or necessarily involves a reflexive self–consciousness, and this 
suffices to establish the first–person character of actions: 
 
It is important to understand that all of this does not necessarily involve 
reflexive self-consciousness, the possession of concepts, or the 
mastering of a language: In animals such as monkeys an attentional and 
a volitional perspective could suffice to establish the first-person 
character of actions (Metzinger & Gallese 2003: 561).  
 
The activation of the relationality of a PSM – the phenomenal self-model being 
the point of enactment of a shared functional ontology – establishes a capacity 
to entertain the mental account of other agents (the basis of an 
intersubjectivity). The capacity of interpersonal convergence becomes 
meaningful in a shared action ontology i.e. a shared functional ontology. A 
shared action ontology, therefore, guides organisms through to intersubjectivity. 
It is an action ontology that brings together different organisms through a 
shared functional overlap and what follows in mapping the behaviour and goal 
states of other agents: 
 
The same subpersonal ontology then guides organisms when they are 
epistemic agents in a social world: Interpersonal relations become 
meaningful in virtue of a shared action ontology. An action ontology can 
only be shared and successfully used by two systems, if there is a 
sufficient degree of functional overlap between them, if they decompose 
target space in similar ways. We will posit that the cognitive 
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development of social competence capitalizes upon such a shared 
ontology to trigger the timely onset of behaviors such as gaze following, 
shared attention, and mind reading, which will eventually give rise to a 
full-blown capacity to entertain mental accounts of the behavior and 
goal states of other agents. We will also propose that what makes 
humans special is the fact that their functional ontology is much richer 
in socially individuated goal representations and that their model of 
reality is not only rich and flexible, but that they can actively expand 
their own functional ontology by mentally ascribing distal goals to 
conspecifics. (Metzinger & Gallese 2003: 550) 
 
While the PSM knows itself under-representation, as active self-model, it does 
this by applying the intentional stance to itself in a phenomenally intentional 
manner (Metzinger & Gallese 2003: 56). What this shows is that we cannot 
bypass the importance of an irreducible first person vantage point and its basis 
in an elementary self-model. As noted before, it is the non–cognitive PMIR that 
builds the bridge to a social dimension in establishing the basis for 
intersubjectivity in a rudimentary subjective perspective: 
 
An elementary self-model in terms of body image and visceral feelings 
plus the existence of a low-level attentional mechanism is quite enough 
to establish the basic representation of a dynamic subject-object 
relation. The non-cognitive PMIR is thus what builds the bridge into the 
social dimension. Once a rudimentary subjective perspective has been 
established with the help of the motor system, intersubjectivity can 
follow. (Metzinger & Gallese 2003: 567) 
 
In a bridge to a social dimension, initiated by an extended first person 
perspective, an intentional relationality integrates proto-conceptual and 
conceptual worlds, generating a conscious volition with subjective authority. 
Goal representations – through embodied self-simulations – are integrated into 
the phenomenal model of intentionality relation in a process of decision and 
selection: 
 
A parallel analysis is possible for the phenomenological properties of 
volitional subjectivity and agency. Conscious volition is generated by 
integrating abstract goal representations – constituted by self-
simulations – into the current model of the phenomenal intentionality 
relation as object components, in a process of decision or selection. 
(Gallese and Metzinger 2003: 375)  
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When the agent realises its behavioural relations, through a shared action 
ontology, then subject-subject relations become globally available to cognition. 
Considering emergence, when relations become available in this way, then 
concept formation develops to cognitively model social relations from a third 
person perspective: 
 
If the fact that you are constantly not only standing in perceptual and 
behavioural relations to your environment, but that you are frequently 
realizing subject-subject-relationships becomes globally available, it also 
becomes available for cognition. This, in turn, will allow those systems 
capable of concept formation to cognitively model social relations from 
a third person perspective. (Metzinger 2003: 568) 
 
What follows, in response to Lizardo, is a rejection of complicity between first 
and third person perspective. In complicity, we have a proto–conceptual – an 
elementary self–model – reducible to given tacit conceptual presuppositions 
encoded by action. For example, seeking to buttress Bourdieu’s model of 
regulating social necessities, Lizardo understands the proto-conceptual as 
already given in complicity to “the bodily with the mental, the psychological and 
the social, formal and efficient causality” (Lizardo 2007: 714). In contrast, 
Metzinger and Gallese’s agent based model, based on an embodied simulation of 
a non-cognitive PMIR (the basis of a first-person character of action), 
understands the functional as a mirroring mechanism dependent on the 
personal and situational history of the mirroring subject. Instead of complicity, 
an agent-based model returns to the mirroring subject, in the form of a 
differentiated nature of the subject that is distinguishable from the social. What 
is highlighted is the importance of personal history and the situated nature of 
the mirroring subject: 
 
The more we study mirroring mechanisms, the more we learn about 
their plasticity and dependence upon the personal history and situated 
nature of the “mirroring subject” (Gallese 2009: 494) 
 
If there is malfunctioning in a functional sub-personal mechanism – a 
rudimentary subjective perspective (Metzinger and Gallese 2003: 567) – then 
this affects the emergence of the semantic and with it the noted personal and 
situational histories of the mirroring subject. What results, to differing degrees, 
is a compromise in the ability to entertain the mental account and social 
experiences of others in bridging the propositional. Due to this we need to 
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consider the interaction between irreducible mechanisms – here the contextual 
aspects of social stimuli are filtered through the subjective perspective in regard 
to previous information. The functional dimension in the form of embodied 
simulation – grounding previous experiences – scaffolds the propositional and 
bears on the cognitive elaboration of contextual aspects. In this way, through 
ontological differentiation, we substantiate the irreducibility of the proto-
conceptual as more than a complicity to given regulating tacit conceptual 
presuppositions (what Bourdieu terms as a quasi-teleology): 
 
Our most sophisticated mentalizing abilities likely require the activation 
of large regions of our brain, certainly larger than a putative domain–
specific Theory of Mind Module. For example, the same actions 
performed by others in different contexts can lead the observer to 
radically different interpretations. Thus, social stimuli can also be 
understood on the basis of the explicit cognitive elaboration of their 
contextual aspects and of previous information. These two mechanisms 
are not mutually exclusive. Embodied simulation is experience–based, 
while the second mechanism is a cognitive description of an external 
state of affairs. I posit that embodied simulation scaffolds the 
propositional, more cognitively sophisticated mentalizing mechanism. 
When the former mechanism is not present or malfunctioning, as in 
autism, the latter can provide only a pale, detached account of the social 
experiences of others (Gallese 2004). (Gallese 2009: 495) 
 
A transcendental realist underlabourer, and its latent dimension in generative 
mechanisms, implicates an intransitive dimension in which there is no closure to 
a given pre-supposing objective logic. Similarly, against epistemic closure, as will 
be covered in the case of an irreducible sharedness, there is a rejection of the 
idea of a reduction to piecemeal interactions of individuated learners. Once 
viewed this way, we can acknowledge the personal and situational histories of 
agents and the irreducibility of the specific identity of the agentive/subjective 
parameter (Gallese and Metzinger 2003: 494). Furthermore, the non–
propositional dimension, as sub-personal mechanism, bears on the personal and 
situational histories of the mirroring subject. Turner is right to put forward a 
transmission problematic – a necessary question that needs to be considered - 
but arrives at a solution through an empiricist underlabourer in which a 
pragmatic sameness negates the possibility of irreducible collective objects. The 
next part of this section, acknowledging the importance of a pragmatic 
sameness, as an important irreducible property, given in a subjective authority 
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and interiority, still views sharedness to be irreducible to the practical 
engagement of a mirroring subject.  
 
6.2.2 Affirming irreducible sharedness 
 
The second part of the argument, resolving the transmission problematic, 
argues for a compatibility between an individuated reflexivity that mediates 
collective meaning (the mirroring subject that confronts the discursive order) 
and the relative autonomy of a discursive order. In affirming the relative 
autonomy of a realm of meanings we then move from the immediate observable 
– in this case accounting for meaning in its transmission through known 
epistemic channels – to irreducible generative mechanisms in the form of 
collective objects as emergent properties. The argument put forward, in this 
section, agrees and defends Archer’s (2003) view of a social ontology of the 
propositional – an approach that views a propositional realm existing 
independently of the activities it regulates and governs. Informed by social 
morphogenesis, it explains the emergence of a shared register in an interplay 
between the properties and powers of the human being and an environment 
that forms the relations of emergence in which these same properties and 
powers are exercised. What follows is an acknowledgement of the properties of 
relations underpinning the emergence of a personal identity and objective forms 
of sharedness – the latter with sui generis properties and powers. Thus, as 
Archer (2003) argues, we have a stratified view of humanity and the emergence 
of humanity from different irreducible stratum: 
 
The properties and powers of the human being are neither seen as pre-
given, nor as socially appropriated, but rather these are emergent from 
our relations with our environment. As such, they have relative 
autonomy from biology and society alike, and causal powers to modify 
both of them. In fact, the stratified view of humanity advocated here 
sees human beings as constituted by a variety of strata. Each stratum is 
emergent from, but irreducible to, lower levels because all strata 
possess their own sui generis properties and powers. Thus, 
schematically, mind is emergent from neurological matter, 
consciousness from mind, selfhood from consciousness, personal 
identity from selfhood, and social agency from personal identity. (Archer 
2003: 87) 
 
The noted interplay, explaining emergence, means a pragmatic sameness, in 
social relations, cannot be reduced to individuated activity. In the case of a 
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reduction to individuated activity, shared understanding would be derived from 
the properties and powers of skilled actors and individual/individual relations. 
The question is then to account for the means of transmission of socio–cultural 
relations as irreducible properties and powers, while affirming the existence of a 
pre–supposing autonomous discursive emergent stratum. 
 
To resolve this problematic, Archer starts from an emergent stratified view of 
both different orders (natural, practical and discursive) and humanity. This view 
emphasises the transability of ontologically distinct orders in the form of a 
relational interdependence between autonomous stratum. An ontology first 
approach, based on a referential detachment, understands the emergent 
properties of the discursive order to be referential to the natural and practical 
realms. As Archer argues, the relation between a ‘knowing how’ and ‘knowing 
that’, between the practical and propositional, is one that implicates, at first, the 
ontogenetic development of human capacities, in our embodied relations to our 
natural environment. Discursive knowledge (a ‘knowing that’) is grounded in a 
‘knowing how’ of doing: 
 
Embodied knowledge is a know-how about nature which has literally 
become ‘second nature’. It is a ‘knowing how’ when doing, rather than a 
‘knowing that’ in thought. Because it has to be realised by each 
individual in their natural relations, it is unsurprising that our 
ontogenetic development recapitulates phylogenetic developments. 
(Archer 2003: 162) 
 
Returning to the mirroring subject, we are able to identify, in a shared action 
ontology (the basis of doings), the developmental precursor for a semantic 
capacity (a point empirically substantiated in the previous discussion on mirror 
neurons and their role in collective transmission). It is first through an extended 
first person perspective, initiated by a proto-conceptual mechanism, that the 
emergence of a more sophisticated semantic mechanism is made possible. Thus, 
our shared action ontology, actualised in our embodied relations, establishes a 
vantage point and inter-dependence to a propositional ‘knowing how’. Being 
prepared for social becoming never disengages from the intransitive laws of 
nature and the linguistic medium is not merely a self-referential representation 
of ideas. The manner we utilise, sequentially, human powers and properties in 
reference to the ontological properties of distinct orders helps us arrive at a 
semantic ‘knowing that’ (meanings). This first person perspective, or a sense of 
self, is then conceived in doings – the previously noted extended motor action of 
a sub-personal functional mechanism – which then secures meanings. With the 
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transability of different orders the propositional is no longer internal to and 
regulating a logic of action. The emergence of a social identity is first predicated 
on a reflexive personal identity and the powers of a personal identity confront 
rather than acquiescence to a stated regulating sharedness (Archer 2003).  
 
As the noted ‘knowing how’ establishes referential detachment and grounds the 
development of our semantic capacities then we never disengage with our pre-
existing natural relations in our practical doings. Further, the initial intelligibility 
of the propositional is first acquired in these relations to our natural 
environment. Thus, human properties and powers, being ontologically and 
logically prior to social becoming, entails that language is causally efficacious in 
practical action. Embodied knowledge, based on sensory-motor interactions in 
nature, references our physical operations. The ontogenetic development of 
human properties and powers pertains to these noted phylogenetic 
developments that are characterized in direct contact with nature. 
 
Bodily extensibility is the ground of a semantic mechanism and the intelligibility 
of ideas in a propositional realm. Consequently, the properties and powers of 
ideas in an autonomous propositional realm – based on doctrines, theories and 
beliefs – necessarily reference an external world. Ideas are then emergent and 
develop from a capacity to utilise language; thus, the development of ideas 
should be explained in an interplay between different orders. Moreover, 
returning to the transmission problematic, if logical relations pertain to ideas 
and the relation between ideas, as Elder-Vass argues (Archer & Elder-Vass 2012), 
then it bypasses the important role embodied knowledge plays in the 
development of practical knowledge and thereafter the emergence of the 
propositional. In the notion of ideas and their self-referencing relations there is 
a closure to the propositional with no adequate account on its transmission; as a 
result, what we have is self-representing ideas. As noted earlier, first person 
authority, in the form of an initial sub-personal mechanism, bears on the 
personal and situational histories of the mirroring subject and the functional 
mechanism, as stated, is intrinsically referential and in direct contact with 
nature (referential detachment and existential intransitivity). In understanding 
ideas in terms of their referentiality we then affirm a transability between 
different orders. Ergo, what applies to the natural and practical orders applies to 
the discursive, due to a relational interdependence between these distinct 
ontological orders. The objective properties of a propositional realm, therefore, 
pertains to it being grounded in extra-discursive orders – the basis of semantic 
intelligibility – and whose non-self-referentiality extends to a propositional 
register that is open to transformation.   
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The shape this propositional register takes is contextualised in an interplay 
between the properties of a propositional order and socio-cultural interaction. 
The process of this interplay figures in morphogenetic cycles that account for 
the historical origins of a social order. In these cycles ‘groups’, in Socio–Cultural 
interaction, confront a propositional realm (Cultural System - C.S.); it is the 
subjective/objective interplay between ‘groups’ and ‘ideas’ (a set of doctrines, 
theories and beliefs) that accounts for both a diachronic and synchronic 
analysis. In the former case it is a study of interaction leading to a given social 
order and in the latter on what sustains cultural morphostasis:  
 
The interplay between ‘ideas’ (C.S.) and ‘groups’ (S-C) is dynamic and 
accounts for cultural elaboration – requires both diachronic analysis (of 
how certain ideas came to be in social currency at any time, of which 
groups sponsored them and why they did and may still do so, and 
against what past or ongoing opposition) as well as synchronic analysis 
of what maintains cultural morphostasis for as long as it lasts. (Archer & 
Elder-Vass 2012: 95)  
 
Moreover, an interplay between ‘ideas’ and ‘groups’ is informed by the 
properties of a propositional realm, that may remain dormant, and the 
enactment of its powers through a situated interplay between these properties 
and the actions of groups. Hence, when we distinguish between properties and 
powers – identified in an analytical dualism of ‘ideas’ and ‘groups’ – we avoid 
reification at the level of meaning (C.S.). Here, in S-C interaction and 
morphogenetic cycles, there is a response to objections that an irreducible 
propositional register implicates the existence of a realm independent of human 
behaviour altogether (Layder 1990: 61). Furthermore, the explanatory deficits of 
empiricism can be avoided when we consider the properties of an independent 
register that is more than S-C level interaction and the synchronic impact of 
given norms. Thus, analytical dualism resolves the transmission problematic 
when considering both the stratified depth of a subjective moment and in 
accounting for the origination of a situational logic at the level of meaning as an 
emergent property.  
 
What follows from an interplay between ‘ideas’ and ‘groups’ are irreducible 
objective meanings that are existentially distinct from the properties of people 
and their interactions. Social groups and their interactions, seeking to bring 
about a state of consensus, utilise their powers in an attempt to reproduce or 
transform the properties of a given sharedness (sharednes, as part of 
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morphogenetic cycles, always being varied). Two dimensions may be identified 
in this interplay - first, the properties of the world of ideas, in their relational 
transability to different orders, and through historic cycles of interaction, are 
formulations with their own logical consistency that define their objective 
properties. Second, causal consensus pertains to an attempt by groups to draw 
on this shared repository, in their own way, to establish shared ideas. Thus, in 
this distinction, as Archer argues, we have an independent realm that operates 
as both analytically and empirically distinct. In making this distinction between 
the properties of a propositional realm (theories, doctrines and beliefs with their 
own logical consistency) and exercised powers, we are then better positioned to 
trace the development of both the properties of groups and an independent 
world of ideas. Here certain ideas and their properties may be enacted in certain 
interactive episodes, while in other episodes a propositional realm’s properties 
may remain causally dormant:  
 
Logical consistency is a property of the world of ideas, which requires no 
knowing subject, whilst causal consensus is a property of people and 
their interaction. The proposition defended here is that the two are both 
analytically and empirically distinct and, therefore, can vary 
independently of one another. (Donati & Archer 2015: 160)  
 
Further, as will be discussed in the coming sections, this noted distinction 
pertains to the properties of different domains of a de-compacted social 
ontology. In a de-compacted social ontology interactions vary in accordance to 
the properties of systemic social domains and likewise the properties of people 
and their interactions. As a result, there is no analytical closure in the notion of a 
community of shared meaning, as these meanings are attempts by different 
corporate actors to establish hegemony at the systemic level of social domains.  
If the outcome of morphogenesis – based on an analytical dualism – entails 
cultural elaboration then attention turns to, in the coming sections, the nature 
an external objective world is mediated from an irreducible subjective interiority 
and authority. Specifically, it is an attempt to link a subjective and objective 
interplay at the point of interaction/mutual reinforcement and what this entails 
when explaining personal emergent properties (PEP) in the process of social 
morphogenesis. What follows, in the coming section, is an overview on the 
manner Archer links this subjective/objective interplay, in the context of the 
morphogenetic model, and to propose revisions to this model based on social 
domain theory. 
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6.3 The internal conversation & relational orders 
 
Importantly, as will be covered in the next chapter, an emphasis on the 
properties of the domain of pscyhobiography – in a stratified sense – pertains to 
the question of difference and the importance of educational practices being 
attentive to this difference as the axiomatic dimension of policy. Here difference 
is not merely in means adopted, e.g. diversity and social inclusion measures, but 
in a re-orientation of policy so that it is shaped by goods sought in reference to 
the human person. In this re-orientation, the domain of psychobiography is a 
dimension of social ontology that pertains to the properties of a subjective 
authority in its unique world-directed experiential trajectory; this word-
directed trajectory is understood in relation to concerns pertaining to natural, 
practical and discursive orders. Social reflexivity, therefore, is envisaged to 
cultivate a personal reflexivity in a relational context whose normativity is 
oriented to the ontological properties of relational orders from which personal 
identities are emergent. Furthermore, a revision of social morphogenesis, 
advocated below, re-thinks the properties of reflexive arrangements in their 
integrative efficacy in generating and sustaining relational effects that brings 
together personal and social reflexivity in ways that sustain relational goods.  
 
In the previous section an argument to resolve the transmission problematic 
was presented, affirming an external and objective system of meaning. Analytical 
dualism, central to the argument, seeks to investigate the interplay of subjective 
and objective moments – the basis of morphogenesis; from this interplay, there 
is a co-constituting emergence of personal and structural/cultural properties. 
In this section, there is an investigation into the link between the subjective and 
objective interplay, in a manner that maintains the properties and powers of 
‘internal deliberations’ pertaining to people and its efficacy as a personal 
emergent property (PEP).  
 
In the efficacy of a personal emergent property (PEP) the issue arises on how 
these properties relate what Archer terms as ‘context’ (socio-cultural structure 
(Archer 2003: 348)) with ‘concern’ (the contribution of active agents (Archer 
2003: 348)). Considering the interplay between both, what is being investigated 
is the subjective moment; this moment is understood by Archer – through the 
internal conversation – to be with deliberative efficacy and capacity to link 
context and concern. Three key facets are given to internal deliberations for it 
to be accorded with efficacy as a personal emergent property (PEP): 
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Because the properties and powers of ‘internal deliberations’ pertain to 
people, they cannot be expropriated from them and rendered as 
something impersonal. This would be to destroy their status as a 
personal emergent property (PEP). Thus the ‘interiority’ of the internal 
conversation cannot be exteriorised as ‘behaviour’, which could be 
impersonally understood by all. Similarly, the ‘subjectivity’ of inner 
dialogue cannot be transmuted into ‘objectivity’, as if first–person 
thoughts could be replaced by third–person ideas. Finally, the personal 
causal efficacy of our deliberation cannot be taken over the forces of 
‘socialisation’: this would be to replace the power of the person for the 
power of society (Archer 2003: 94) 
 
Following from the properties and powers of ‘internal deliberation’ – as a 
relational property between mind and world – is the emergence of inner 
deliberations as relational properties in reference, at first, to the natural and 
practical realms. The focus here is on inner conversations and its properties that 
manifest themselves between mind and world. What makes the inner 
conversation a personal emergent property is its relational properties: 
 
The internal conversation is a personal emergent property (a PEP) 
rather than a psychological ‘faculty’ of people, meaning some intrinsic 
human disposition. This is because inner conversations are relational 
properties, and the relations in question are those which obtain between 
mind and world. (Archer 2003: 94) 
 
As inner conversations are relational properties – inherent in a 
subjective/objective interplay – three residual problems figure in relations 
between mind and world:  
 
● The generic problem of “how can the self be both subject and object at the 
same time?” (Archer 2003: 94). 
● The analytical problem of who is speaking to whom i.e. the question of 
temporal emergence and the importance of considering dialogue between 
past, present and future selves qua the inner dialogue. 
● The explanatory problem pertains to how the societal gets into the 
internal conversation. The question is an implication of what is necessary 
for there to be efficacious powers for PEP and how the societal, as an 
order, is then mediated by these powers; from this the stratified 
conception of the self is held to provide a more adequate explanatory 
account of the role of the societal in the process of its mediation.   
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Accordingly, these two points – the properties of internal deliberations and the 
implicated three residual problems of the internal conversation – will be the 
basis of what follows in this chapter; based on this theoretical context, an 
argument will be presented on a relational understanding of personhood. The 
aim is to develop Archer’s argument regarding the efficacy of ‘inner 
deliberations’ and what it means to be capable of hermeneutics (maintaining the 
efficacy of inner deliberations as a personal emergent property). As we distance 
ourselves from our biological origins towards our social becoming, Archer 
argues, there is a middle ground of human properties and powers. In this middle 
ground is an irreducible “self–consciousness, reflexivity and a goodly knowledge 
of the world, which is indispensable to thriving in it” (Archer 2000: 189). The 
importance of this reflexive middle ground is to maintain a clear subjective-
objective distinction, that allows for the capability of hermeneutics from a first 
person perspective (an irreducible subjective authority and interiority). If we 
compromise this distinction, we then merely affirm nothing more than the 
human as a bundle of molecules plus society's conversation: 
 
Indeed, it has been argued here that a human being who is capable of 
hermeneutics has first to learn a good deal about himself or herself, 
about the world, and about the relations between them, all of which is 
accomplished through praxis. In short, the human being is both logically 
and ontologically prior to the social being, whose subsequent properties 
and powers need to build upon human ones. There is therefore no direct 
interface between molecules and meanings, for between them stretches 
this hugely important middle ground of practical life in which our 
emerging properties and powers distance us from our biological origins 
and prepare us for our social becoming. (Archer 2009: 90) 
 
While the basis of Archer’s realist argument will be acknowledged, there will be 
an attempt to supplement this approach. Supplementing the approach comes 
from a proposed revision if the proto-conceptual, preparing us for a social 
becoming, is necessarily reflexive for the properties and powers of the human 
being to be accorded with efficacy. The revision follows from a de-compacted 
understanding of social ontology that anchors the process of social 
morphogenesis in a domain of situated activity, rather than persons (Archer 
views the process of social morphogenesis to be anchored in persons and that 
this guards against a sociological imperialism). Finally, Crespi and Badcock’s 
(2008) cognitive continuum will be proposed to empirically substantiate the 
significance of considering the developmental dimension of how we become 
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reflexive, in our distancing from our biological origins, towards adopting roles as 
social actors. To be reflexive, it will be argued, is better framed in explicit 
developmental terms. Further, this re-thinking of reflexivity in developmental 
terms does not compromise the important question on the manner the indexical 
‘I’ is individually sensed to then become a socially indexed device (Archer 2003: 
91). 
6.3.1 Properties of internal deliberation 
 
First, there will be a review of Archer’s understanding of this middle ground and 
the reasons why it is held to be necessarily reflexive, while returning to the 
three key facets of internal deliberation that define an irreducible subjective 
ontology3. Following this overview, a revision will be proposed to the properties 
of internal deliberation. The revision supplements Archer’s argument on the 
irreducibility of reflexivity as a first person phenomenon but the approach taken 
understands the first person enactment of reflexivity considering its 
developmental trajectory. Further, when considering a developmental trajectory, 
we can then re-think the three residual problems of the internal conversation 
and the implications this may have when explaining the process of 
morphogenesis. 
 
In affirming the irreducibility of a subjective moment, we start from the 
subjective interiority of a fundamental sense of self. The fundamental sense of 
self establishes a first-person perspective; the first person perspective of 
reflexive deliberations, of an irreducible subjective ontology, cannot be 
eliminated as phenomenological. As the outcome of deliberation is dedication to 
certain actions – considering a constellation of concerns relating to the natural, 
practical and discursive orders – then it is the vantage point of subjective 
interiority that dedicates through prioritising what it understands to be its 
ultimate concerns. Thus, persons are first self-conscious and reflexive to then 
be capable of hermeneutics. Based on this stratified view, persons are emergent 
from selves and the social self is a subset of a broader personal identity. The 
developmental trajectory of a personal identity considers the important question 
on the manner the indexical ‘I’ is individually sensed to then become a socially 
indexed device (Archer 2003: 91).  
 
It is this indexical ‘I’, a fundamental sense of self, that then conceives itself 
independent of a name or any other third person referential device. With a 
                                               
3  Archer holds that while objectively a subjective ontology exists, subjectivity is its 
mode of existence. Thus, for there to be subjectivity there must be a reflective 
personhood as agentic capacity and that this is identical with self–consciousness. 
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subjective interiority, in the self-attribution of mental states, we can then affirm 
a subjective authority over the process of reflexive deliberation: 
 
I can conceive of myself quite independently of a name, a description or 
any other third person referential device; reflexivity is quintessentially a 
first person phenomenon. (Archer 2003: 40) 
 
Reflexivity is the first point of call and is cognitive rather than merely perceptual 
(Archer 2003). Second major causal powers, manifested in subjective behaviour, 
are presupposed by a first person integration of a constellation of concerns. 
When the person prioritises some concerns over others, a modus vivendi, they 
arrive at a behavioural outcome in a dedication to a certain path. Archer 
develops the DDD scheme4 to conceptualise this process from discernment, 
deliberation and then dedication to a certain modus vivendi.  
 
A view of the internal conversation, as link between a subjective/objective 
interplay, is thus understood to be a conceptual necessity if internal 
deliberations are efficacious in grounding a first person authority emergent 
from an irreducible interiority. In an irreducible interiority, it is an indexical ‘I’ 
that transcends its context to deliberate on its concerns to then adopt a set of 
preferences to be pursued. Unless there is a self–knowledge of beliefs, desires, 
intentions and memories, then there would be no way to explain how an agent 
dedicates itself to certain role requirements and the manner through which this 
decision was reached: 
 
Unless people accepted that obligations were incumbent upon them 
themselves, unless they accepted role requirements as their own, or 
unless they owned their preferences and consistently pursued a 
preferences schedule, then nothing would get done in society. (Archer 
2003: 30) 
                                               
4  The DDD scheme relates to the internal conversation and the manner it shapes 
life projects. The DDD dialogical scheme entails ‘discernment’, ‘deliberation’ and 
‘dedication’. In this process “we are trying to prioritise our ‘ultimate concerns’ and in 
designing a congruent modus vivendi” (Archer 2003: 102). Discernment is an initial 
subject–self review of possible initiatives in the three different orders that the subject–
self is drawn to. Deliberation is an initial sifting through process that leads to the stage 
where certain scenarios are deliberated on, considering concerns that inhere in 
different domains. Here, in this deliberative process, considering a constellation–of–
concerns, a particular path is considered worthwhile in the identification of ‘ultimate 
concerns’. Reaching the stage of dedication means the subject–self then taken certain 
paths. This process, open to revision, defines personal powers and properties in relation 
to its environment.   
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Subjective deliberation on preferences is grounded in the interiority of a 
fundamental sense of self and this establishes an authority in dedication. Before 
going public – ensuring an irreducibility to a discursive world – internal 
deliberations must be private and its first port of call is the noted first person 
point of a transcendent indexical ‘I’. The only candidate that makes possible the 
efficacy of the ‘I’, as subjective authority, is reflexivity itself. Reflexive 
deliberation, as a mental activity, in private, leads to behavioural outcomes on 
what to do. The irreducibility of this first person perspective is thus the 
“transcendentally necessary condition” (Archer 2003: 31) through which it is 
possible for the individual – a ‘sense of self’ – to then self-referentially deliberate 
and dedicate, regarding its externality: 
 
The only candidate, which necessarily fits the bill, is reflexivity itself, as a 
second–order activity in which the subject deliberates upon how some 
item, such as a belief, desire, idea or state of affairs pertains or relates to 
itself. By definition, reflexivity’s first port of call has to be the first–
person and the deliberation, however short, must be private before it 
can have the possibility of going public … Hence ‘reflexive deliberation’ 
is the mental activity which, in private, leads to self–knowledge: about 
what to do, what to think and what to say. (Archer 2003: 26) 
 
The properties of internal deliberation establish the centrality of reflexivity in 
our social becoming. As we shall see later, this also anchors the process of 
morphogenesis in persons (the link between a subjective/objective interplay is 
in an internal deliberation of an emergent personal identity in relation to its 
external context). In an emphasis on the trajectory of a personal identity, with an 
emphasis on embodied practical relations, the objective is to guard against 
sociological imperialism:  
 
This strictly concerns the sources of the sense of self and what factors 
and processes should be accorded priority, both at the start of life and 
throughout it. I will be arguing for the primacy of our embodiment, in 
practical relation with the natural world, and thus producing a 
naturalistic account. Harré advances the primacy of our speech–acts in 
a learning relation to the discursive world, and thus produces a social 
account. The former emphasises private practice; the latter public 
involvement. (Archer 2003: 106) 
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Between meanings and molecules primacy is ascribed to our practical relations 
and it is our reflexive capacity, in these practical relations, that prepares us for 
our social becoming. Hence, in according a primacy to our embodiment, in 
practical relation with the natural world, there is a pre-supposing view that 
holds this position necessary to avoid the appropriation of the subjective 
interiority, authority and efficacy to public involvement. 
 
6.3.2 Revising the properties of internal deliberation  
 
The revision proposed, as will be clarified, understands the domain of situated 
activity to be the anchor in the process of social morphogenesis (the point of 
mutual re-enforcement in the interaction of generative mechanisms). While 
Archer acknowledges the developmental dimensions of a personal identity, as 
noted, and the situational dynamics of interaction in the form of S-C interaction, 
the revision proposed aims to re-think reflexivity itself in developmental terms 
and as a mediatory force – identified in the domain of pyschobiography – rather 
than analytical link in a subjective/objective interplay. The revisions presented 
acknowledge the necessity of a subjective interiority – establishing a 
subjective/objective distinction – but grounds this subjective ontology in a 
unique experiential developmental trajectory.  
 
Thus, if the efficacy of internal deliberations is not viewed to link the 
subjective/objective interplay then the question is what may then be viewed as 
an anchor of the process of social morphogenesis. Problematically, Archer views 
persons as this anchor, in their individuated biographies and as specifically 
articulated in an irreducible reflexive capacity irreducible to public language. 
The developmental focus, this way, turns to how reflexivity enables our social 
becoming, as a subset of a personal identity. Reflexivity as the first port of call is 
what distances ourselves from our circumstances and establishes these 
circumstances as the object of deliberation (to be capable of trumping 
dispositions (Archer 2009: 9)). Viewing the first port of call this way entails the 
primacy of our self-regulated practical interactions in our natural world as it 
prepares us for our social becoming.  
 
To focus on reflexivity, as first point of call, compromises the developmental 
dimension on how we come to enact a reflexive capacity itself. The importance 
of an account of an individually sensed indexical ‘I’ is something that can be 
affirmed, while arguing that this reflexive capacity is developmentally a third 
person plural and part of a broader developmental experiential trajectory. This is 
substantiated in the case of the mirroring subject’s initial experiential presence 
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made available through the phenomenological salience of a mind/body ‘I’ and 
the means through which it establishes a vantage point to the world. In an initial 
self-regulated interaction – given through the first person presence of 
experience (Zahavi 2013) – there is the possibility to develop a semantic capacity.  
 
What follows is a re-consideration of what interiority means and its implications 
for subjective authority. Interiority, as noted, is understood by Archer in regard 
to internal deliberations. It is the fundamental aspect of selfhood that 
constitutes this deliberative process in self-referential terms; further, through 
this sense of self we are able to conceive selfhood as independent of any third 
person referential device (reflexivity as a first person phenomenon). In the 
proposed revision, the idea of an irreducible subjective authority, similarly 
applies to a self-referential first person phenomenon. However, subjective 
interiority is not what gives reflexivity its first person character. Instead, our 
sense of self, in practical engagement in the natural world, is a precursor and 
sustains a sense of self in its social becoming.  
 
Thus, developmentally, a sense of self is not the same as a reflexive capacity – it 
is an emergent property that contributes to a social becoming and to the 
capablity of hermeneutics. Here it is possible to acknowledge the efficacy of a 
self-regulated practical engagement – against an understanding of the self as a 
gift to society – without ascribing a necessary primacy to embodiment in our 
practical relations with the natural world. While our human capacities are 
ontologically and logically prior to our social being, it does not follow we are 
reflective regarding our environment through mere contact with the natural 
world. A first person perspective – the basis of a subjectivity of experience – is, 
in the words of Zahavi (2013), a for-me-ness or mineness. A mineness means it is 
the ‘I’ of subjectivity that is the subject of experience as a perspectival 
ownership: 
 
This for–me–ness or mineness, which seems inescapably required by 
the experiential presence of intentional objects and which is the feature 
that really makes it appropriate to speak of the subjectivity of 
experience, is not a quality like green sweet or hard. It doesn’t refer to 
the diachronic or synchronic sum of such content, or to some other 
relation that might obtain between the contents in question. Rather, it 
refers to the first-personal presence of experience. It refers to what has 
recently been called perspectival ownership (Albahari 2006). It refers to 
the fact that the experience I am living through are given differently (but 
not necessarily better) to me than to anybody else. (Zahavi 2013: 326) 
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What we have, in this case, is a primitive self-regulated understanding of the self 
– a pre-reflective self-consciousness – grounding the private interiority of a 
sense of self. The primitive dimension of a mineness does not disappear with the 
emergence of a semantic capacity. Rather, as an emergent property, it is 
efficacious in the manner a reflective capacity is made self-referential and 
enacted (this point will be substantiated in the case of a cognitive continuum). 
The emergence of a personal identity takes its first person character in a 
configuration between an initial mineness and the appropriation of the 
experiential presence of intentional objects, as part of a trajectory of internal 
deliberations. Thus, the first person dimension is affirmed in the manner it is 
first grounded in a mineness and, thereafter, in the emergence a differentiated 
reflective capacity. Consequently, we turn to the peculiarity of individuated 
psychobiographies in a trajectory of lived experiences.  
 
In a unique psychobiographical trajectory, the subject-self integrates their lived 
experiences between perception and apperception (pre-reflective mineness and 
reflective consciousness). In this process we have the first person character and 
irreducibility of internal deliberations to public discourse. Between self and 
world experience – with both intertwined – lived experience is in the world and 
whose intentional objects present themselves, in the multitude of changing 
experiences, as part of a subjective point of view:  
 
The minimal self was tentatively defined as the ubiquitous dimension of 
first-personal givenness in the multitude of changing experiences. On 
this reading, there is no pure experience–independent self. The minimal 
self is the very subjectivity of experience and not something that exists 
independently of the experiential flow. Moreover, the experiences in 
question are world-directed experiences. They present the world in a 
certain way, but at the same time they also involve self-presence and 
hence a subjective point of view. In short, they are of something other 
than the subject and they are like something for the subject. Thus, the 
phenomenology of conscious experience is one that emphasizes the 
unity of world-awareness and self-experience. (Zahavi 2009: 556) 
 
When a psychobiographical trajectory is affirmed, in its first person giveness, 
then analytical primacy is ascribed to the contingency of interaction between a 
minimal self, in an embodied mind/body interplay, and the first person 
perspective of living through a multitude of changing self-experiences in 
relation to the natural, practical and discursive orders (experience as world-
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directed). What prepares us for social becoming is not a reflexive world-
awareness but a pre-reflective functional mechanism that presents world-
directed self-experience for the subject to then integrate and make its own as a 
subjective point of view (perspectival ownership). The manner we become 
reflexive – develop a semantic capacity – is dependent on the ubiquitous nature 
of giveness of an indexical ‘I’. A subjective perceptual grip is part of an 
experiential flow and when this grip appropriates its objects as part of the noted 
process of integration, between self and word, differentiated mechanisms 
mediate the process. As mechanisms go beyond the discursive – with the private 
before and continually sustaining the public – we are with a process that is with 
first person interiority and thus authority. Therefore, subjective ontology should 
be viewed in the process of integration, between perception and apperception, 
in the emergence of a personal identity and its irreducibility to social identity.  
 
As stated, the background for an emergent subjective ontology is the domain of 
psychobiography. This domain, in a de-compacted social ontology, mediates the 
properties of a social ontology in the context of situated activity; it is here, in 
situated activity, that we have the generation of self-experiences in relation to 
concerns emergent from external orders. The open interaction of mechanisms 
in a process of mutual re-enforcement, in social morphogenesis, imputes the 
domain of situated activity with its own properties (Layder 2006: 268). 
Therefore, the manner we develop a reflexive capacity and thereafter a personal 
identity is contingently manifested in the lived context of interaction between 
the properties of the domain of psychobiography and other social domains.  
 
When we posit the anchor of social morphogenesis in a contingent interaction 
between mechanisms, then primacy is not ascribed to either public/collective 
discourse or an embodied practical engagement with the natural world. Instead, 
it is in a trajectory of an emergent personal identity, in its lived experiences and 
in the peculiarity of the domain of psychobiography in relation to the properties 
of other social domains. Thus, in the emergence of a personal identity – between 
molecules and meanings – there will be differentiation in which there may be a 
bias towards a self-regulated this-sided interaction with an external public 
realm, or, in other cases, across a cognitive continuum, there may be a bias 
towards public involvement in making self-referential deliberation. This 
individuated peculiarity is grounded in a differentiation in regard to 
singularities5 and the personality pre-dispositions that figure as part of a domain 
                                               
5  Singularities originate in the properties of the domain of psychobiography and 
the unique lived experiences that figure in this domain. These lived experiences are 
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of psychobiography. However, again, this is one mediatory force and the vantage 
point of emergence – of both social and personal emergent properties – points 
back to the properties of situated activity in which reflexive capacities are 
manifested.   
 
Informed by this revision of the properties of internal deliberation, a review of 
Archer’s approach to the three residual problems of the internal conversation 
follows. First, before setting out further revisions, there will be an explication of 
the theoretical context – including key concepts. Further on, in this chapter, 
empirical case points will be stated, in the case of a cognitive continuum, to 
substantiate the importance of supplementing Archer’s analytical dualism with a 
differentiated understanding of cognition and the role it plays in how we 
become reflexive.  
 
6.3.3 The three residual problems of the internal conversation 
 
The three residual problems of the internal conversation relate to the relational 
properties of a subjective/objective interplay. First, the three residual problems 
of the internal conversation, identified by Archer, will be covered. Second, 
following this, noted will be revisions that supplement Archer’s approach, 
informed by the previously stated revised properties of internal deliberation. In 
regard to the three residual problems they are the generic problem, the 
analytical problem and the explanatory problem. The generic problem pertains 
to the subjective/objective question on how the self can be subject and object at 
the same time. The analytical problem considers the temporal interplay in a 
dialogue between past, present and future selves. Finally, the explanatory 
problem is concerned with how the societal enters the internal conversation, as 
external circumstance, and how the self is efficacious in its mediation.  
 
The first residual problem – the generic problem – pertains to the question of 
subjective interiority as a property of internal deliberation; a property that 
‘bends back’ and is aware of itself as an ‘I’ that alternates between subject and 
object. What follows is an awareness that my experiences are objects of 
reflection emergent from an initial being-in-the-world, with its practical ‘know-
how’. Sedimented experiences, as a practical embodied engagement, are both an 
initial outward extensibility and a self-conscious manipulation between self and 
otherness of an externality. Thus, to self-consciously manipulate the 
                                                                                                                                                  
based on an interlocking relation between psychosocial development and an 
intersubjective environment in which this development is enacted (Layder 2006).   
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relationship between self and otherness is to reinforce the distinction between 
the two:  
 
I can self-consciously manipulate the dialectic relationship between self 
and otherness and, in this very process, I reinforce the distinction 
between the two (Archer 2000: 130) 
 
To affirm a subjective moment, in this dialectic relationship, a universal sense of 
self precedes the emergence of a social self and it is this sense of self that 
dedicates itself to its role as a social actor (the efficacy of a distinct subjective 
moment). The constellation of concerns that relate to the discursive, natural and 
practical orders, generate concerns, open to reflexive deliberation, that are both 
propositional and non-propositional – “these are concerns about our physical 
well-being in the natural order, about our performative achievement in the 
practical order and about our self-worth in the social order” (Archer 2003: 120).  
 
In our natural relations we establish the first point of a self/otherness 
distinction that grounds the ‘know-how’ of a practical order with both 
constraints and enablements. The practical order then provides a bridge that 
secures meaning from an embodied practical engagement in the natural order. 
This way, argues Archer, the irreducibility of a subjective response to the 
discursive comes from a deliberation on the properties of three ontologically 
distinct orders. As stated before, before taking on the social order, the human 
being is both logically and ontologically prior to the social being; social 
properties and powers need to build on these pre-supposing human ones 
(Archer 2000: 190). Between molecules and meaning is a pivotal role ascribed to 
the practical order as a middle ground that “distance us from our biological 
origins and prepare us for our social becoming” (Archer 2000: 190). Here, in 
between, emerges important human properties and powers, including a reflexive 
capacity and knowledge of the world:  
 
There is much more to the human being than a biological bundle of 
molecules plus society’s conversational meanings. In fact, between the 
two, and reducible to neither, emerge our most crucial human 
properties and powers – self-consciousness, reflexivity and a goodly 
knowledge of the world, which is indispensable to thriving in it. (Archer 
2000: 189) 
 
The practical order’s pivotal role does not merely disappear with the 
emergence of the propositional but continuously sustains –via human 
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properties and powers – society’s conversational meanings. A prior sense of 
self, constituted in embodied practical engagement, thus continues to be the 
basis of emergence of a self-concept and its sustainment. This is 
substantiated by the presence of both a procedural and eidetic memory that 
continues beyond the development of a self-concept and whose recall is non-
discursive. The non-linguistic recall relates directly to a sense of self that is 
engaged in its environment – it is through this engagement that there is a 
self/otherness distinction and a referential detachment inseparable from an 
understanding of space, time and causality, derived from sense data. In both 
eidetic and procedural memory, as continuity of consciousness, a 
sedimentation of accomplished practical acts form the basis of a habitual 
body and a self-identity. The habitual body operates as both a past tense 
practical accomplishment and enables us to contemplate a future. Declarative 
memory and self-knowledge is a later development and an emergent property 
of this prior constitution. Importantly, any declarative memory-activity never 
replaces the central role of this non-linguistic component: 
 
Here, memory, far from being some intellectualised representation, is 
the bodily sedimentation of accomplished acts: it is the ‘habitual body’ 
which gives our past tense and enables us to contemplate a future, even 
though our embodied expectations have continuously to be reconciled 
with the dynamic nature of our existence in the world. (Archer 2000: 
132) 
 
As noted in the properties of internal deliberation, the capability of 
hermeneutics is built on the capacities and powers of the human being. Hence, 
propositional knowledge does not filter and shape the direction of a semantic 
capability. Accordingly, the subjective/objective interplay considers the 
properties and powers of the object in relation to its embodied, practical and 
discursive knowledge. All three forms of knowledge shape the situations and 
circumstances that the subject then deliberates on: 
 
All knowledge entails an interplay between properties and powers of the 
subject and properties and powers of the object – be this what we can 
learn to do in nature (embodied knowledge), the skills we can acquire in 
practice (practical knowledge), or the propositional elaborations we can 
make in the Cultural System (discursive knowledge). Any form of 
knowledge thus results from a confluence between our human powers 
(PEPs) and the powers of reality – natural, practical and social. Thus 
what have been discussed sequentially are the physical powers of the 
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natural order, the material affordances and constraints of material 
culture, and, lastly, the logical constraining powers of the Cultural 
System. However, for the three orders equally, the way in which they 
affect the subject is by shaping the situations in which he or she find 
themselves, and their supplying constraints or enablements in relation 
to the subjects’ projects. (Archer 2000: 177) 
 
The second residual problem of the internal conversation refers to the efficacy 
of the noted subjective/objective interplay. The efficacy of this interplay is in its 
concrete manifestation in a subjective alignment, in the emergence of a personal 
identity. A subjective alignment, between personal and social identity, raises the 
question in what way an interplay works itself out logically and temporally. If the 
generic problem is concerned with the nature of relation between the subjective 
and objective – the basis of what Archer states as the self-conscious 
manipulation of the relation between self and otherness (Archer 2003: 130) – 
then the second residual problem is concerned with the enactment and 
manifestation of Personal Emergent Properties (PEP). PEP are manifested in an 
individuated manner and understood in how the sense of self reaches subjective 
alignment (personal identity) when adopting social positions. Here, in the 
efficacy of a subjective deliberation, the internal conversation is mapped, in 
which we unpack the different moments the subjective and objective interplay 
across the trajectory of the internal conversation. In this interplay, the ‘You’ (the 
positionalities and roles of social actors) is personified and acquired from a 
movement between Self (‘I’) to Primary Agency (the ‘Me’)6, to Corporate Agency 
(the ‘We’) and finally to the realisation of the singularity of each self in its role as 
social actor (‘You’).  
 
The necessity of a continuous sense of self in a movement from ‘I’ to ‘You’ – with 
the practical order as bridgehead between the natural and discursive order – 
affirms the ‘I’ as conscious of its embodied otherness in its practical 
engagement. Hence, as explained before, the movement is logically initiated 
from this ‘I’ and pre-discursive elements sustain the process, in commanding 
certain concerns to be navigated. Consequently, the emergence of social actors 
is a subset of personal identity and the ‘Me’ does not objectively set the 
                                               
6  The acquiring of a social identity (social actor) is emergent from a 
developmental account of how the self matures in its negotiation of this identity. The 
personal identity is defined by this process in the manner a social identity is acquired. 
Here primary agency (‘Me’) is the manner society impinges on the self and corporate 
agency (‘We’), in turn, is how the self responds to the ‘Me’ and seeks to collectively 
transform society. This whole process then reproduces or transforms the potential 
roles taken by social actors (Archer 2003: 271). 
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parameters of deliberation. The natal context (‘Me’) of the ‘I’ pre-dispositions 
certain concerns that relate to resources, life chances, influence and so on; 
however, the ‘Me’, in opposition to Mead’s view of the ‘Me’, cannot set the 
parameters of transmission in an objective unidimensional shaping of mediation. 
 
The collective ‘Me’ is part of the internal conversation and as it interplays with a 
subjective moment, rather than shaping the parameters of the internal 
conversation, its efficacy is then forward-looking, in the emergence of a 
personal identity that is, potentially, with transformative capacity as corporate 
agency (‘We’). Thus, Archer conceives the internal conversation, in regard to this 
interplay between context and concern, through the adaption of individuals to 
their roles as social actors. Consequently, as roles are made self-referential then 
this impacts the mediation of collectives. In mediating collectives, rather than 
these collectives setting the parameters of internal deliberation, there is 
direction to the internal conversation in relation to a subjective dedication to 
collectives as ‘Agents’ (the relationship between the ‘Me’ and ‘We’). Hence, the 
relation taken to either ‘Me’ and ‘We’, in the emergence of a personal identity, 
corresponds to Primary and Corporate Agents. In the former direction, agency 
seeks to reproduce its natal context (‘Me’), and in the latter, there is an attempt 
to transform this context in some way. This process, both indeterminate and co-
determinate, is termed by Archer as double morphogenesis. In the process of 
double morphogenesis, Agency, whether sustaining or transforming the social 
system, simultaneously sustains or transforms both Corporate and Primary 
Agents:  
 
This is ‘double morphogenesis’ during which Agency, in its attempt to 
sustain or transform the social system, is inexorably drawn into 
sustaining or transforming the categories of Corporate and Primary 
Agents themselves. (Archer 2000: 267) 
 
Furthermore, there is a co-determinacy in which the ‘Me’ becomes ‘We’ and 
develops into a corporate actor, in an attempt to enact social transformation; 
this transformative corporate activity, simultaneously, transforms the nature of 
social roles and Corporate Agency itself: 
 
The ‘Me’ is the self-as-object who, in the individual’s past, was 
involuntarily placed within society’s resource distribution as a Primary 
Agent. The ‘We’ represents the collective action in which the self-
engaged as part of Corporate Agency’s attempt to bring about social 
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transformation, which simultaneously transformed society’s extant role 
array as well as transforming Corporate Agency itself. (Archer 2000: 295) 
 
It should be stated that Archer’s model does consider collectives and the 
internal conversation engages these collectives, whether reproducing its 
positionality, as Primary Agency, or, on the other hand, seeking to transform it 
as part of a ‘We’ (Corporate Agency). Nevertheless, the internal conversation is 
the vantage point and anchor in linking Primary and Corporate Agency, in a 
mediation between context and concern. Consequently, this results in an 
analytical point that takes this dialectic as understood from its relation to 
singularities and the trajectory of personal identities with collectives. The 
question of double morphogenesis, therefore, becomes a subset of subjective 
solidarity between personal and social identity. To substantiate this, Archer 
introduces the idea of triple morphogenesis i.e. while double morphogenesis 
refers to relations between singularities and collectives – Social Agents (‘Me’ and 
‘We’) – it is personal choices that then lead to a subjective commitment to 
corporate roles, which affects the personification and simultaneously the 
transformation of these same social roles. Personal identity is then imbued with 
transformative capacities that affects the nature of positions then adopted – the 
transformation of Primary Agency. This way, the anchoring of triple 
morphogenesis in persons, in its relation to collectives, initiates the relation 
between Primary and Collective Agency. Following from this understanding, the 
role of the Social Actor is realised in singular terms, as a subset of personal 
identity, and with both Primary and Collective Agency defined as collectives in 
relation to these same roles. Therefore, singular persons then direct their 
reflexive capacities to these roles (the discursive order), in the process of double 
morphogenesis, which then enacts the process of triple morphogenesis. 
 
While persons cannot be understood without reference to a pre-existent natal 
context (Primary Agent), social identity is analytically anchored in the 
deliberative process of persons. Ultimately, it is the emergent personal identity, 
in analytical asymmetry to social identity (a sub-set of personal identity), that 
deliberates on whether positions and roles are commitments to be occupied or 
whether it is worth partaking in some kind of transformative corporate activity. 
Replicating or transforming our natal context thus has consequences for the 
type of social actor we become but also society’s own normativity that informs 
these very same positions: 
 
In living out the initial roles(s), which they have found good reason to 
occupy, they bring to it or them their singular manner of personifying it 
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or them and this, in turn, has consequences over time. What it does 
creatively, is to introduce a continuous stream of unscripted role 
performances, which also over time can cumulatively transform the role 
expectations. These creative acts are thus transformative of society’s 
very normativity, which is often most clearly spelt out in the norms 
attaching to specific roles. (Archer 2000: 296) 
 
In being the anchor, the transformative process of an involuntary ‘Me’ returns to 
the ‘I’, in how the ‘I’ deliberates on its circumstances. The collective ‘We’ is thus 
understood as an aspect of the ‘I’ and its dissatisfactions, as it reflects upon the 
involuntary ‘Me’:  
 
The implication, at this stage, is that the ‘I’ and the dissatisfactions it 
experiences as it discovers and reflects upon the involuntary ‘Me’, can 
only transform the socio–cultural conditions (SEPs and CEPs) which 
gave the ‘Me’ that particular object status by elaborating the ‘We’ of 
collective action. (Archer 2000: 267) 
 
The third residual problem of the internal conversation (the explanatory 
problem) pertains to the social, in the manner it figures in the internal 
conversation as an object of reflection. If the second residual problem is 
concerned with the manifestation of a subjective/objective interplay, then the 
third residual problem relates to the question on how this interplay then arrives 
at a solution. The solution is when the ‘I’ positions itself in relation to the ‘Me’ in 
the emergence of a later ‘You’ (personal identity). The ‘We’, when arriving at a 
subjective alignment, figures in the conversation at the stage of dissatisfaction 
and, therefore, a commitment of the ‘I’ to transform a social normativity that 
shapes the initial role occupied (‘Me’).  
 
6.3.4 Towards a revision of the three residual problems 
 
The re-thinking of the properties of internal deliberation also opens to revision 
the three residual problems of the internal conversation and the implications 
this may have for the process of social morphogenesis. The revision proposed is 
presupposed by the need to differentiate – in a stratified sense – the manner we 
become reflexive in the context of a domain of psychobiography and its relation 
to other social domains (the emergent properties of social domains is in their 
mutual reinforcement). A domain level analysis anchors social morphogenesis in 
the domain of situated activity and the properties of internal deliberation differ 
in accordance to the dynamics of interaction. When returning to the first 
residual problem (subjective/objective interplay) then the dynamics of situated 
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activity – at the point of mutual reinforcement – refers to the point in which a 
subjective moment responds to the circumstances of situated activity and the 
position it takes in regard to its interactive dynamics. At the same time, it will be 
maintained, the revision proposed does not compromise an irreducible 
subjective ontology. 
 
As stated, Archer emphasises the developmental trajectory of a personal identity 
as the anchor of social morphogenesis. Subjective interiority is understood, by 
Archer, as direct access to subjective experiences, in which the subject is able to 
turn back and deliberate on an external objective. In a revision to the properties 
of internal deliberation, the argument presented was that it is an initial self-
conscious givenness that sustains, self-referentially, the emergence of a 
thematic and reflective consciousness. The critical ‘I’ is anchored in its own 
unique experiential trajectory – the basis of a psychobiography – as first person 
perspective. An early sense of self is both logically and ontologically prior to 
social being and continues to sustain this sense of self. However, 
developmentally the capacity for mentation – the capacity to bend-back and 
deliberate – is a subsequent development. Hence, the possibility of an 
irreducible subjective ontology – against the idea of an objective regulation of 
self-experience – is maintained by affirming the following two points: 
 
(1) A minimal pre-reflective self-consciousness that establishes ownership of 
experience. This ownership of experience is already subsumed in the world and 
others (the world directed nature of experiences);  
 
(2) Any following objective moment returns to an outward extensibility of the 
original first person experience. Thus, there is always a return to this first 
person pre-reflective self-consciousness and the manner it appropriates the 
objective moment, with both gain and loss7. 
 
Considering the generic problem, a co-constituting subjective/objective 
interplay is possible in the peculiar mineness of lived experience. As Gallagher 
and Zahavi (2012) state, the ‘I’ returns to lived experience and filters this by 
appropriation:  
 
                                               
7  That is what is a pre-reflective experience is then elaborated in a reflective 
sense and this entails some form of loss in terms of the original experience lived 
through. At the same time, an initial pre-reflective experience acts as a constraint on a 
later objective moment (reflective elaboration as thematic self-experience). 
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But we need an account that can explain how I can return to an 
experience and remember it as my experience even though it might not 
have been given thematically as mine when it was originally lived 
through. Had the experience in fact been completely anonymous, had it 
lacked first-personal mineness altogether when originally lived 
through, such a subsequent appropriation would be rather inexplicable 
(Gallagher & Zahavi 2012: 76) 
 
The lived experience becomes “thematically mine” as an emergent property of 
an initial first person perspective. The initial first person perspective is a first 
person ontology that reinforces the distinction between a first person 
perspective to an object and one that is then made “thematically mine”: 
 
To emphasize the importance of the first-person perspective should 
consequently not be seen as an endorsement of a perceptual model of 
self-knowledge, as if our acquaintance with our own experiences literally 
came about by taking up a position in relation to ourselves, or through 
an explicit perspective taking. Rather, the point is simply that there is a 
distinctive way experiential episodes are present to the subject whose 
episodes they are. Experiential episodes have, to use Searle’s 
terminology, a first person ontology from the start, i.e. even before the 
subject acquires the conceptual and linguistic skills to classify them as 
his own (Gallagher & Zahavi 2012: 72) 
 
Thematic mineness is then presupposed by perspective ownership and directs 
experience that is self-referential (subjective interiority). To be reflexive – that is 
the ability to thematically classify an experience – is to first become acquainted 
with our own experiences. Here the presence of a first person ontology is what 
makes self-comprehension and the development of conceptual and linguistic 
skills possible. Once again we are returning to a differentiation between an 
initial functional mechanism – the manipulation of intentionally loaded objects – 
and a semantic mechanism that is then able to classify and make these objects 
part of a broader subjective integration. 
 
The temporal materialisation of mechanisms – the second residual problem – 
can be identified with the process of subjective integration (part of a subjective 
deliberation on its concerns). It is here – in the habitual body – that self-
experience, in a future thrust, simultaneously includes and is affected by the 
integration of past-experiences. In higher capacities of mentation we look back, 
considering present givenness, and then bring this past to bear on the present 
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and so giving the present a future direction. It is the process of integration, as 
argued earlier in the chapter, that defines subjective authority in a ceaseless 
interplay between subjective and objective dimensions of deliberation. In this 
temporal process of subjective integration, our world-directed experiences are 
integrated considering both non-linguistic and linguistic elements that sustain 
the enactment of reflexive powers. Gallagher & Zahavi (2012) denote this a 
process of ‘gain and loss’, in which there is a relation between an initial non-
linguistic element that then overlaps and feeds into its later higher order 
appropriation (Zippel 2011). A later propositional awareness means that while 
lived experience may be enriched in its integration, through a thematic 
mineness, there remains loss in its appropriation. Subjective integration takes 
past lived experiences (the manner they are configured) to then selectively filter 
a possible multiplicity of present objects. What we have is the existence of an 
outcome of a previous subjective/objective interplay that impinges on the 
present. The nature of this interaction is contingent on the nature of situated 
activity, including the existence of an institutional setting that may incentivise 
or de-incentivise certain modes of reflexivity in a relation between context and 
concern. Therefore, it is in this process, part of a broader de-compacted social 
ontology, that we can maintain both subjective and objective moments (the first 
residual problem), mapped as past, present and future tense (the second residual 
problem).  
 
This way, considering the process of subjective integration, social identity is 
understood as a sub-set of personal identity in an alignment between both (third 
residual problem). However, the relation between both identities is contingent 
on the nature of a world-directed domain of psychobiography and the 
enactment of its properties in situated activity. Furthermore, the noted revision 
of the properties of internal deliberation impacts the manner we understand 
this subjective alignment in reference to both double and triple morphogenesis. 
As emphasises is placed on the domain of situated activity then the movement 
from ‘I’ to ‘You’ (personal reflexivity) is a mediatory factor but whose outcome 
does not anchor the transformative process of triple morphogenesis, as link 
between structure and agency. Accordingly, triple morphogenesis is not 
analysed from the vantage of subjective alignment when linking structure with 
corporate agency. Instead, any configuration of a constellation of concerns, 
adopted by persons, may not align to the transformative actions of corporate 
agents that aim to transform the social settings of situated activity. 
 
Finally, a revision of the properties of internal deliberation leads to a re-think of 
the process of social morphogenesis. As stated, in anchoring the process of 
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social morphogenesis in a reflexive capacity, Archer sought to guard against a 
sociological imperialism and to maintain the possibility of a forward-looking 
subjective alignment (the social identity being a subset of an emergent personal 
identity). Thus, in continuity with Archer’s premises but, at the same time, re-
thinking the process of social morphogenesis, the important question is in how 
we can bring together the analytical problem (second residual problem) with the 
explanatory problem (third residual problem), in ways that acknowledge a 
subjective response to objective circumstances (rather than the parameters of 
this response being pre-defined). Here the process of subjective integration – 
identified in the domain of psychobiography – is what gives a future momentum 
to the emergence of a personal identity and its impact on the broader process of 
social morphogenesis. When we consider the previously noted domain of 
psychobiography, in its temporal trajectory, we are considering an autonomous 
domain, with its unique trajectory, and the manner its non-propositional and 
propositional mechanisms mediate the domain of situated activity. As will be 
demonstrated in the final section, pre-dispositions in the form of a cognitive 
continuum differ and affect the qualitative nature of a subjective integration; 
however, even in the case of an a-symmetry to the propositional, in this 
continuum, the nature of an internal deliberation remains analytically 
irreducible to the linguistic. Whatever the nature of mediation, there is an 
acknowledgement of Archer’s view that it is a necessity to disinter the genesis of 
practices from the logic of practices. 
 
Consequently, the emergence of a personal identity is analytically open and 
there is no methodological judgement towards the linguistic, or, on the other 
hand, our embodiment in world-directed practical relations. When we move 
beyond the need to ground the genesis of a collective logic of practices in 
persons and their reflexive capacities it is then possible to move beyond an 
inflated role ascribed to a reflexive capacity. Against the analytical primacy of a 
world-directed reflexive capacity there is a differentiated and emergent view of 
consciousness and the role it plays in the development of a capacity for 
mentation. An irreducible subjective response, in situated activity, is activated in 
an interaction between the peculiarity of a domain psychobiography and the 
properties of other social domain. Here a unique articulation of a pre-reflective 
giveness and thematic giveness – in persons – is mutually reinforced in 
interaction with patterned distributive resources found in the domain of 
contextual resources. The decision-making of a subjective response, including 
the retention and protention of an emergent personal identity (between the pre-
reflective and reflective), is influenced by mechanisms pertaining to different 
orders that facilitate interaction.  
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The movement from ‘I’ to ‘You’ – between the indexical ‘I’ and the emergence of 
a personal identity – is manifested through different dimensions of social 
ontology. Thus, for example, the noted process of retention and protention is 
affected by the distribution of contextual resources that figure in Primary 
Agency. What follows in mapping this movement is a primacy accorded to the 
situational – the point of interaction – in the enactment of personal properties 
in a subjective/objective interplay. As the process of social morphogenesis is 
anchored in situated activity then ‘I’, ‘Me’ and ‘We’ are ascribed to different 
aspects of social ontology. For example, by ascribing the analytical link to 
situated activity it is then possible to distinguish between collectives defining 
corporate actors (‘We’), including the direction of their activity, in contrast to 
the unique psychobiographies of individuals (‘I’). Therefore, corporate actors 
come with their own irreducible properties that define their duration, interests, 
decision making and actions (Layder 1990). Individual dedication may not 
correspond to group dedication and actions, even when individuals remain 
members of these corporate collectives. Biographical trajectories, shaped by the 
internal conversation, are, therefore, not viewed as a necessary link between 
primary and corporate agency. Corporate actors are actors in their own right, 
irreducible to persons and their internal conversations, and may take directions 
that define the trajectory of groups distinguished from individuals.  
 
Hence, in revising the anchor of morphogenesis from individual dedication to 
roles, we have a differentiated understanding of social actors that includes the 
collective reflexivity of corporate activity. If we return to a tripartite view of 
social ontology, noted in chapter four, indexical interactions are co-constituted 
by their settings. Dissatisfactions occur in indexical interactions and then affect 
the relation between the ‘I’ and the emergence of ‘We’ that is directed towards 
the broader settings of social activity (the collective reflexivity of corporate 
actors). Here we distinguish, in this co-constitution, between small scale and 
focused interactions to the large scale activities of collective actors, whose 
decisions and actions pertain to institutional constraints and enablements of the 
social settings of situated activity.  
 
In de-compacting social ontology, the different aspects of time (indexical and 
institutional time) define enduring from fleeting interactions. These different 
aspects are relational but the transformative nature of triple morphogenesis 
relates to the enduring aspects of social ontology. Hence, the dedication of 
individual actors to corporate roles relates to organisational time and its 
enduring structures in the form of power relations and distribution of resources 
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(see figure three). Macro scale phenomena may be associated with corporate 
actors that enact the transformative thrust of triple morphogenesis. At the same 
time, this triple morphogenesis is presupposed by how actors relate to the ‘Me’ 
and their everyday lived experiences. The point, as Layder (1990) states, is that 
there is a distinction between individual and collective agency, with the latter 
irreducible to individual activity:  
 
Although the distinction between individual and collective agency is not 
always capable of exact definition there is, nonetheless, a significant 
difference between small-scale focussed gathering (interaction in a 
coffee bar, private property or the like) any one individual involved is 
able to orient themselves towards the behaviour is thereby influenced, as 
well as influential. By contrast with larger-scale collective phenomena 
focal individuals are no longer simply influenced by the behaviour of 
other significant individuals, but by the collectivity as a whole. (Layder 
1990: 129) 
 
The pathways and dimensions of the internal conversation, as articulated by 
Archer, remain. However, the movement from ‘You’ to ‘We’ is re-defined, in 
regard to an emergent personal identity and its pivotal role. The dimensions of 
situated social activity take primacy and the internal conversation maintains its 
important mediatory role in dialectically tying personal and corporate forms of 
agency (see figure four).  
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Figure three: A stratified ontology of the social (source – Layder 1990: 130) 
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Figure four: Revision of triple morphogenesis  
 
6.4 Differentiating cognition in developmental selves 
 
This section aims to empirically substantiate the relevance of a differentiated 
and developmental understanding of a reflexive capacity in relation to other 
social domains. Chapter seven will develop this theme in an understanding that 
personal ends, in regard to higher education policy and practice, should be 
informed by the properties of the domain of pscyhobiography. Thus, when we 
differentiate cognition and emphasise the singularities in developmental selves, 
we are then in a better position to develop practices that enhance relational 
goods in which the material and non-material good of the citizen depends. 
 
Below is an attempt to empirically demonstrate the nature generative 
mechanisms interact and their developmental impact on the domain of 
psychobiography. As stated before, primacy is ascribed to an interaction 
between generative mechanisms – rather than public involvement or self-
regulated embodied interaction in the natural world. Thus, as will be shown, a 
differentiated view of cognition indicates reflexivity to be a later point of 
emergence, rather than the first point of call. Further, grounding the 
development of this reflexivity in psychobiography confirms the important role, 
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identified by Archer, of efficacious mechanisms between meanings and 
molecules that prepare us for our social becoming.   
The distinction between pre-reflective and reflective consciousness, 
developmentally, implicates the nature of mediation of a domain of 
psychobiography and the capacity to deliberate on external circumstances. The 
manner we psychologically manage our lives is with implications for the type of 
personal identity that develops. For an efficacious Theory of Mind (ToM) both 
self-affection and interpersonal attunement must function, together, for there 
to be subjective alignment in the emergence of ‘You’. To substantiate the above 
point three main issues are to be considered:  
 
(1) Establishing a distinction between the mineness of experience and reflexivity 
– it is their relation that sustains a functioning ToM;  
 
(2) Mapping the relevance of this distinction in a ToM dysfunction, in the case 
examples of autism and schizophrenia;  
 
(3) Tracing this distinction developmentally – here highlighted is the importance 
of an initial subjective interiority – the giveness of a mineness – that is then the 
basis of a later self-concept; dysfunctions of ToM demonstrate the emergence of 
the latter from the former. Hence, the mechanisms of self-regulation and higher 
order mentation are analytically irreducible. 
 
The exercise of a reflexive capacity, in facilitating subjective alignment to given 
objective roles, is presupposed by a mechanism that delivers the ‘I’ for a genuine 
concept of the self. Zahavi (2005), as noted, states this pre-supposing 
mechanism as the basis of a subjective interiority in a direct and non-inferential 
access to mental states. Developmentally pre-reflective self-consciousness – 
based on a bodily self-experience – is present during the first three to four years 
of life. The early experiential giveness of lived experience is not something 
additional to a mental act that reacts, reflects or introspects on its experience, 
but is an intrinsic aspect of experience (Zahavi 2005). The primitive aspect of 
self-consciousness initiates but also sustains the self/other distinction.  
 
Considering the development of a self-concept, we have five developmental 
selves (ecological, interpersonal, extended, private and conceptual self) that 
provide a basis for a model of an emergent and stratified self8 – the development 
                                               
8  These developmental selves are part of a continuum from which the emergence 
of a conceptual self is accounted. The ecological self, appearing in early infancy, is the 
sense of a self–regulated self as embedded and interacting in its environment. It is the 
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of a conceptual self is emergent from these developmental selves. The ecological 
self establishes the basis of a direct first person non-inferential access to self-
experience from which there is a possible propositional elaboration of bodily 
self-experiences. This returns to a bodily analogue as a means of transmission 
facilitating an embodied opening to the world. In the context of the mirroring 
subject it is a body schema “characterised by a transmodal openness that 
immediately allows it to understand and imitate others” (Zahavi 2005: 208). 
Developmentally, before there is a theoretical mediation (ToM), infants, through 
a transmodal openness, develop a non-objectifying self-experience. Self-
experience, from early life, is for itself and it is through access to it itself, as a 
bodily presence, then perceives and becomes attuned to its environment. It is 
before nine months that there is a primary intersubjectivity i.e. a goal directed 
interaction with the environment based on imitation. Imitation includes cross-
modal matching between external bodily acts and a primitive self-
representation of the body. From a bodily self-experience comes the first bridge 
between self and otherness. This initial stage continues to nine months, after 
which primary intersubjectivity moves to secondary intersubjectivity. The 
difference here is that the infant now moves beyond goal related interaction (the 
                                                                                                                                                  
interpersonal self, also appearing in early infancy, which extends the ecological self so 
that it responds to its conspecifics, though still unreflective, and is a direct reaction to 
intersubjective relationships from which the interpersonal self is then facilitated. 
Neisser states that both the ecological self and interpersonal self should be viewed in 
simultaneity as an “awareness of the interpersonal is almost invariably accompanied by 
a simultaneous awareness of the ecological self. A wealth of information specifies their 
co–existence: I can see that the person to whom you are addressing yourself (the 
interpersonal me) is the very person who is located here, at this point of observation in 
this environment (the ecological me)” (Neisser 1988: 395). The extended self is the 
trajectory of the self as past and what is to be expected in the future, based on memory; 
importantly this sense of self is based on an ownership of lived experiences and with it 
learnt repertoires and the recall of these repertoires. The private self is identified with 
an irreducible interiority of lived experiences and a sense of these experiences as 
demarcated from the world. On the other hand, the ecological and interpersonal selves 
are held to be a sense of being–in–the–world, representing a shift from extrospection 
to introspection. This sense of exclusivity of one’s experiences, an introspective 
reference, develops later (Neisser speculates this is to be around age four). An initial 
outward extensibility, with its perceiving and doing, thus becomes the basis of 
experiences that are then made objects of introspective reference.  Finally, the 
conceptual self develops from an ability to take subjective experiences as object of 
reference and reflection, for it to be elaborated in a broader discursive environment. 
This means conceptual elaboration is emergent from these different selves and because 
of this “our self–concepts typically include ideas about our physical bodies, about 
interpersonal communication, about what kinds of things we have done in the past and 
are likely to do in future, and especially about the meaning of our own thoughts and 
feelings. The result is that each of the other four kinds of self–knowledge is also 
represented in the conceptual self” (Neisser 1988: 401 – 402).   
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beginnings of intersubjective attunement) to an interaction that involves 
“triangulation”. This means the “infants’ interactions with other persons start to 
have reference to the world around them, to the objects and events that can be 
shared with others” (Zahavi 2005: 211). Here feedback and validation is sought, 
still proto-linguistic, and this is the early stages of referencing the world that is 
scaffolded by later propositional self–knowledge. Hence, developmentally an 
emergent first person givenness continually sustains and constitutes the type of 
experiences that then become an object of reflection. 
 
Further, the distinction between a primitive pre-reflective self-consciousness 
and reflexive self-consciousness, explains the nature of social cognition as a 
mentalizing spectrum (Crespi & Badcock 2008). Thus, in the case of autistic 
cognition there remains a first person direct access to mental states such as 
experiences, perceptions, desires, thoughts and emotions (Zahavi 2005). What 
distinguishes this condition is a diminished developmental bridging to secondary 
intersubjectivity and then reflexive awareness. Specifically, there are 
deficiencies in those aspects of cognition termed by Crespi & Badcock as 
mentalistic cognition, as opposed to mechanistic cognition: 
 
Mentalistic cognition (or simply mentalism, otherwise known as theory 
of mind, folk psychology, or mentalizing) evolved for interaction with 
other people in a psychological environment, whereas mechanistic 
cognition (folk physics) evolved in parallel for interaction with the 
physical environment (Crespi & Badcock 2008: 243) 
 
Here a point can be made regarding the notion of a ToM deficit in the case of 
autism and schizophrenia9 – in both cases (autistic and psychosis-related 
syndromes) there is a dysfunction in the nature of emergence of a functioning 
ToM. Exaggeration in mechanistic or mentalistic cognition represent, in their 
diametric opposition, problems in precursors of social cognition. In the case of 
hyper-reflexivity – an exaggerated reasoning of mental states with a diminished 
self-affection – what results is a dysfunctioning in the givenness of a bodily pre-
reflective awareness that regulates self-other relations. Thus lost is a sense of 
ownership and simultaneously a sense of immersion in the world (it is the 
mind/body interplay that is a vehicle to the world). The dysfunction noted 
demonstrates the inseparability of a sense of self from the immersion of an 
                                               
9  Accordingly, ToM is an emergent accomplishment of mechanistic and 
mentalizing mechanisms in co-constitution – the trajectory of this accomplishment 
varies considering the domain of psychobiography. This way autism and schizophrenia 
lead to problems in the development of social cognition though for different reasons in 
regard to the interplay of these noted mechanisms. 
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embodied practical engagement. Consequently, with a breakdown in a sense of 
self there is a reification of experiences as objects of reflection and so an 
exaggerated reflexivity. Compromising the balance between self and world is a 
dysfunction in what is sensed as a tacit awareness via the body schema. The 
body schema, as Sass and Parnas (2003) note, provides a tacit-focal structure in 
which any disturbance in its operation results in an imbalance in the foundations 
between self and world: 
 
We have tacit awareness of the perceptual background or context of 
awareness as well as of the structures and processes of the embodied, 
knowing self. One might exemplify these two ways of knowing—focal 
versus tacit—by distinguishing the body image from what might be 
called the body schema. Whereas the first refers to an objectified or 
objectifiable representation (conscious or unconscious) of one's own 
body, the second refers to an implicit or background awareness of one's 
body as a sensorimotor subject that encounters and actually constitutes 
the world of perceptual awareness as well as one's most basic sense of 
self (Merleau–Ponty 1962, pp. 99–104; Gallagher and Meltzoff 1996; 
Dillon 1997, pp. 121–123). A tacit or subsidiary awareness of kinesthetic 
and proprioceptive sensations serves as the medium of prereflective 
selfhood, ipseity, or self–awareness, which, in turn, is the medium 
through which all intentional activity is realized. Any disturbance of this 
tacit-focal structure, or of the ipseity it implies, is likely to have subtle 
but broadly reverberating effects that upset the balance and shake the 
foundations of both self and world. (Sass and Parnas 2003: 430) 
 
To compromise this balance consequently affects the tacit and pre-reflective 
givenness of bodily self-experience and with this the ability to engage with 
others is disturbed, as what is known of others is no longer given and permeated 
by this sense of self. The loss of perceptual grip and with it a phenomenological 
distance from objects of awareness – as part of an ongoing experiential stream – 
impairs social cognition from a pre-reflective self-regulation that constitutes 
self-experience.  
 
In contrast, in the case of autistic cognition, ToM impairments are accounted 
for, early on in developmental terms, in a bridge to intersubjective self-
knowledge. Difference in a bridge to inter-subjective self-knowledge, as socio-
affective differences, appears from early infancy and are developmental 
precursors of a developed ToM. Consequently, there is a dysfunction in the 
bridge between the pre-reflective givenness of experience and the elaboration 
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of this givenness into propositional self-knowledge. The symmetry of subjective 
mediation is biased to mechanistic cognition (see below) and thus a bias towards 
direct access to mental states as this-sided cognition. In the case of higher 
functioning autistic cognition, deficits in an interpersonal mediated access to 
mental states, may be compensated and bridged by an intellectual and theory 
driven approach that is less interpersonal and more egocentric in its approach 
(Zahavi 2005). The implications of this is that to reason regarding mental states, 
utilising mental representations (folk psychology) is – developmentally – an 
interpersonal emergent property. Thus, mentalizing, in the case of autistic 
cognition, is biased toward a mechanistic cognition and shows a lesser 
dependence on others. This also coheres with Crespi & Badcock’s (2008) work 
on the development of a cognitive system, in autistic cognition, that is less 
dependent on inference from socio-affective attention and more on direct 
inference – what follows is an enhanced self-regulated interaction with external 
circumstances. In psychotic spectrum conditions, there is an over-
interpretation of an other-sided intentionality due to a diminished this-sided 
self-regulation – what follows, in this case, is an exaggerated proneness to 
indirect access to mental states.  
 
These case points demonstrate that a reflexive capacity is exercised in different 
ways and in accordance to mechanisms existing in a domain of psychobiography 
and its relation to other domains. Developmentally it is our social becoming that 
prepares us to exercise a reflexive capacity.  However, our social becoming does 
not shape the direction of reflexive deliberation, as the properties of the domain 
of psychobiography, as covered, extend beyond a public involvement and the 
extra-discursive impacts the nature a reflexive capacity is enacted (as 
demonstrated in a cognitive continuum). Accordingly, in diametric opposing 
ends of a continuum, conceptual self-understanding, in regard to external 
circumstances, may be hindered for different reasons. It is more adequate to 
explain these reasons from a differentiated and developmental understanding of 
consciousness and the mapping of this differentiation in the interplay of 
generative mechanisms that are integrated – made thematically mine – via 
subjective authority.  
 
Thus, at both ends of the continuum and across this continuum we establish the 
importance of generative mechanisms that continue to figure and mediate the 
self-other relation to external circumstances. Both autistic bias to mechanistic 
cognition and the noted hyper-reflexivity (other sided cognition) in psychotic-
spectrum conditions, lead to deficits in ToM for different reasons: 
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Both autistic literal mindedness and mechanistic cognition, and 
psychotic-spectrum overinterpretation can lead, though by different 
mechanisms, to deficits in theory of mind tasks and understanding of 
pragmatic language such as metaphor and humor (C. D. Frith 2004; Frith 
& Allen 1988; Mitchell & Crow 2005). Taken together, this evidence 
suggests that reaction to gaze, as well as tendency to attribute mental 
states and intentions to others, exhibit contrasting patterns of hyper 
development and underdevelopment in psychosis and autism (Crespi & 
Badcock 2008: 253) 
 
The manifestation of reflexive powers is consequently relatively open and 
contingent, bearing on the internal conversation and the residual problems 
discussed i.e. in the trajectory of subjective alignment between ‘I’ and ‘You’ and 
with it the continued accomplishment of a personal identity.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter sought to present an explicit theoretical argument for a homo 
relatus conception of the person. The structure of the chapter was based on a 
series of necessary questions that all models of personhood must engage with. 
Thus, the realist understanding of personhood presented, based on Archer’s 
work, adopted the following path: 
 
 It is necessary, before setting out a critical realist understanding of the 
person, to first provide an argument for a pre-supposing transcendental 
argument. The necessity of this argument was set-out as a reasoned 
necessity that all theories must engage with in some way. The basis of a 
transcendental realist argument is viewed in a detachment of the act of 
reference from that which it refers to. Central to this referential 
detachment is an acknowledgement of both the possibility of reference 
and an existential distinction between the transitive/intransitive. The 
fallibism that follows from this distinction affirms the possibility of 
referencing personal ends and the renewal of fallibist educational 
practices for this purpose.  
 Sharedness and differentiation pertain to different domains of a 
differentiated social ontology – the domains of psychobiography and 
contextual resources. First, it is necessary to resolve the transmission 
problematic, in which an account needs to be made on how ‘collective 
objects’ – an external perspective – are transmitted to then become a 
subjective perspective. The working of mirror neurons establishes an 
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empirical reference on what enables this transmission. Here we 
distinguish, developmentally, between a functional control mechanism 
and its role in the emergence of a semantic mechanism. This 
developmental distinction between a functional and semantic capacity 
establishes a case for an ontological distinction – rather than complicity – 
in which a social becoming is not pre-supposed by transmitted 
collectives. Second, accounting for the means of transmission and 
differentiated nature of subjective inculcation does not negate an 
objective and irreducible propositional realm. ‘Ideas’ are grounded in our 
practical engagement in the natural order and are more than self-
referential doings. Due to the transability of knowledge between different 
orders, the Cultural System (CS) consists of a sedimentation of human 
learning; the properties of this learning may remain dormant or enacted 
as causal powers (the interplay between ‘ideas’ and ‘groups’). In 
acknowledging differentiated transmission in an individuated social 
becoming and an independent collective realm there is a case for 
educational practices that understands student development in terms of 
both the properties of the domain of psychobiography and an extrinsic 
referential standard, independent of the learner, to measure learning 
against. Furthermore, we have a shared context in which the material and 
non-material good of individuals depend and whose properties are 
revised in reference to these same goods. 
 If we affirm irreducible subjective and objective properties, then the 
question extends to the manner we investigate their interplay. The 
properties of internal deliberation, returning to the transmission 
problematic, pertains to the way an indexical ‘I’ becomes a socially 
indexed device. An irreducible subjective interiority and authority means 
the subjective moment is a first person phenomenon that is never filtered 
through a given objective moment. Following from the properties of 
internal deliberation are the three residual problems of the internal 
conversation – the manner the self can be both subject and object in 
deliberation, a temporal dimension to emergence (past, present and 
future) and how the societal enters the internal conversation. A revision 
was proposed regarding the properties of internal deliberation (the 
subjective interiority and authority of an irreducible subjective moment), 
in which a developmental understanding is adopted in regard to the 
emergence of a reflexive capacity. Instead of a reflexive capacity being the 
basis of a subjective interiority and authority, preparing us for our social 
becoming, the focus is developmental in reference to the emergence of a 
reflexive capacity. In a posited developmental turn, subjective authority is 
<157> 
understood in terms of a developmental trajectory of a domain of 
psychobiography. Further, identifying the domain of psyhcobiography as 
the basis of subjective authority re-thinks the process of social 
morphogenesis. The properties of the domain of psychobiography are 
considered a point of mediation in a differentiated social ontology; thus, 
the process of social morphogenesis is anchored in a mutual re-
enforcement between properties pertaining to relational social domains. 
The revisions proposed are adopted in chapter seven in the notion of a 
morphogenetic social order and deep citizenship that brings together 
personal, social and systemic reflexivity to advance the common good.  
 Finally, to empirically substantiate the developmental focus of a reflexive 
capacity, in differentiated terms, the idea of a cognitive continuum was 
put forward. Here the idea of a cognitive continuum means there is a 
further elaboration of the transmission problematic in the nature 
individuals enact their reflexive capacity. In regard to this continuum, we 
have, at one end, a bias to a this-sided cognition (self-regulated); at the 
other end of the continuum, there is a bias towards an other-sided 
cognition. The continuum, further, substantiates the developmental 
emergence of a reflexive capacity in which there is first an initial 
interaction with our physical environment; this initial practical 
engagement with our natural environment then establishes a bridge to 
more sophisticated forms of intersubjective interaction. Thus, a 
developmental trajectory – qua the domain of psychobiography – provides 
an explanatory account on the qualitative enactment of a reflexive 
capacity and how this impacts the emergence of a personal identity. 
Chapter seven takes this view as the basis of a development model of the 
curriculum and the different ways this curriculum may be responsive to 
personal ends.  
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 7 
Student Development &  
Personalist Ends 
 
 
 
Previous chapters highlighted the existence of an understanding of the social as 
an integrative and consensual site of intervention to further system integration 
goals. Consequently, for example, a stated fairness agenda focused on the manner 
citizens may be cut-off from consensual spaces and what may be done to further 
an integrationist policy of social inclusion. Further, as covered, while differences 
exist in explaining this cut-off, it is a self-dependent responsibilisation of the 
citizen – informed by an egalitarian individualism1 (Gilbert 2013: 10) - that is the 
basis for individuals to claim their stake. These proposed consensual spaces, with 
its responsibilities and duties, are concomitant with abstract representations, as 
they frame social processes from given policy representations. Thus, there is a 
closing of the integrative role of a relational reason to given closed system 
imperatives (the concept of relational reason will be covered later). Social 
reflexivity is then regulated from without — through externalist policy agendas — 
rather than a logic of transcendence attentive to ontological difference.  
 
Moral governance, consequently, follows in an attempt to re-make the citizen and 
public service subjectivities. The noted responsibilisation turn in policy may be 
observed in the making of networks, including actors, into a site of reflexive self-
organisation (Jessop 2002: 460) that sustains policy outcomes. In the case of the 
‘Big Society’ approach, welfare co-production is an attempt to generate an 
integrative function in sustainable ways and governance techniques (e.g. nudging, 
life cycle interventions and auditing), noted before, were attempts to preserve the 
regeneration of consensual spaces. What follows is the organisation of actors in 
mutually advantageous exchanges (Münch 2012), with adequate forms of 
integration sought to sustain this exchange. 
 
                                               
1  A commitment to an egalitarianism is in instituting the conditions through which 
individualistic subjectivities are facilitated and sustained. Both New Labour and the ‘Big 
Society’ agenda differ in what constitutes favourable conditions, including a diagnosis of 
problems of welfare dependency. However, there remains a consensus that what is to be 
done, in terms of governance, is to socialise problematic aspects of markets and through 
these initiatives to be responsive to the needs of citizens. 
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Thus, supply side interventions, in public welfare, represent a shift to ‘moral 
governance’ that regulates both outwards and inwards — outwards in generating 
the right social relations and inwards in the making of an idealised citizen to 
function in the context of these normalised relations. With both an outward and 
inward regulation there is an economisation of morality as market morality that 
inheres in an instrumental rationality, established in social relations and across 
policy fields, with responsibilisation translating into a discourse of rights defined 
by responsibilities (Shamir 2008). Rights are represented in terms of an exchange 
(something for something) and individuals integrated into consensual spaces as 
enterprising subjects. This approach can be seen in the re-generation of networks 
between universities and businesses, so that they promote growth, innovation 
and enable students to take-up opportunities in the workplace. The onus, in this 
configuration, is on universities to look for ways to work with businesses to match 
required skills through better pedagogic practices (promoting better teaching), 
innovation and enterprise. The idea of innovation ensures a form of autonomous 
creativity in these synergies but the nature of partnerships remain strongly 
articulated centrally and in ways that promote a model of education that 
represents students as a human capital investment and education, for students, 
as means to an income and work-related skills enhancement (Dilts 2011). As 
presented in previous chapters, there is an underlying model of the student in 
higher education that finds continuity in a broader policy ethos that can be traced 
from New Labour policies to the ‘Big Society’ agenda. If we take Jessop’s typology 
of ideal-typical strategies (neocorporatism, neostatism, and 
neocommunitarianism)2, there may be differences in the configuration of ideal-
type strategies complementing the neoliberalisation of higher education but it is 
                                               
2  Three ideal typical strategies are noted and each of these may exist within a 
broader neoliberal regime – neocorporatism, neostatism and neocommunitarianism. 
What these represent are policy models that complement a market-led restructuring of 
social policy and are adjustments to a globalised neoliberal travelling policy. 
Neocorporasitsm focuses on a socially embedded market economy and the use of 
negotiated networks and partnerships that are both state regulated and self-regulating 
(private, public and third-sector) to balance competition and cooperation. Neostatism 
represents a focus on state interventions to secure the right conditions for a broader 
national economic strategy – to achieve this objective the state seeks to guide market 
forces through coordinating economic resources, activities and the use of statist capital 
to achieve a competitive edge through investing in the right infrastructure to secure a 
competitive advantage. Finally, neocommunitarianism focuses on the ‘third sector’ and 
the ‘social economy’ between markets and state for the goal of both economic 
development (achieving economic strategies) and social cohesion. The point is that these 
three different ideal types may exist together and feature in different aspects of policy. 
Whatever configuration is sought, regarding different strategies, they are specific 
mediations of a global neoliberal order (Jessop 2002: 460 – 464). 
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a neoliberalisation that is a prism through which an egalitarian individualism is 
proposed.  
 
Due to the existence of a view of the person, with defined social roles to meet this 
view, then the issue is to articulate an alternative direction informed by an 
ontology of personhood discussed in the previous chapter. Further – whether 
implicit or explicit – normative directions, as demonstrated in chapter five, follow 
from a given ontology of the person. Consequently, before moving to the 
implications of an ontology of personhood it is necessary to engage with some 
precursors i.e. if it is possible to derive ‘ought’ from ‘is’ or the fact/value 
distinction.  
 
7.1 Evaluative presuppositions of social policy:  
Deriving ‘ought’ from ‘is’ and the fact/value distinction 
 
Governance interventions – salient in the logic of neoliberal policy triangulation 
– affirm a fairer society as something sought in the regulation of market 
economies to work for individuals. An initiative to provide opportunity and annul 
negativities of collectivist welfare, for example, comes with thick notions of what 
makes for flourishing and by implication a conception of the social as an ordered 
space in a functionalist and circular reading of system imperatives (see chapter 
two). As noted in previous chapters there are several assumptions that exist 
regarding social exclusion, the promotion of social integration and behavioural 
forms of egalitarian individualism. Consequently, a view of the person is present 
and derived from a given ‘is’ is an ‘ought’ – initiatives to enable individuals to 
maximise on their preferences and a know-how to sustain an understanding of 
what constitutes individual flourishing. The objective of this introductory section 
is to argue that a view of the person, stated in the previous chapter, comes with 
evaluative policy implications. Thus, before an evaluative policy direction is 
presented, it is necessary to consider the fact/value distinction and if normative 
evaluations can be drawn from ontological questions. An argument will be put 
forward that, in a qualified sense, ‘ought’ can be derived from ‘is’ and an ontology 
of personhood implicates policy directions.  
 
The argument put forward responds to a view that understands external and 
internal value judgement to be two different areas of investigation. Before 
presenting a view on the possibility of deriving normative directions from 
ontological reasoning – a transcendental logic defined by an intransitive realm – 
it is important to briefly state the position of those maintaining a strict fact/value 
distinction, pre-supposed by an empiricist underlabourer, and to then respond to 
their objections. First, are the views of Campbell (2014) and Black (2013) who adopt 
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the importance of value-free sociology. Second, is Turner’s argument against 
external value judgements due to the nature of these arguments leading to 
unidirectional explanations (Turner 2013). 
 
Campbell and Black both argue for a strict distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ in 
social science. In Campbell’s understanding, social science is potentially able to 
“answer all questions within its domain – that is, perfectly describe and explain all 
observable reality – but it cannot answer even a single moral question” (Campbell 
2014: 446). Here a difference is made between external and internal value 
judgements – the former being a judgement regarding the social world that is 
external to the social sciences (the question of desirability of, for example, certain 
social reforms). The latter, on the other hand, refers to the world of social science 
that includes internal value judgements pertaining to what “what we should study, 
what methods we should use, what concepts or theories we should employ, or 
what ideas we should praise or criticize” (Black 2013: 767). In making this 
distinction there is a view of sociology that orders facts and predicts unknown 
facts but otherwise remains evaluatively agnostic. The point made is that the 
selection of subjects, methods, concepts or theories are necessary (the internal 
value-judgement) but actual practice itself should not hold any view regarding the 
desirability of the phenomenon studied: 
 
If a sociologist chooses to study capital punishment in America, for 
example, the choice is not a value judgement about the desirability of 
capital punishment as a way to handle crime. (Black 2013: 767) 
 
Thus, per this view, the question of ‘objectivity’ is a misnomer, as value-free social 
science means an absence of external value judgement and this is possible in the 
choice of a research strategy and the manner conclusions are presented. 
Accordingly, biased social science can be value-free if it restricts its tools – 
regardless of the factual conclusions reached – to the research question posed 
rather than infusing an investigation with an external judgement (what ought to 
be). 
 
This way social science lays its claim to be ‘scientific’ if a distinction is maintained 
between internal value and external value judgement when conducting research. 
Nevertheless, this does not preclude the existence of external value judgement in 
actual social scientific practice. The distinction provides a criterion, or an ethos, 
through which research strategies and conclusions reached may be measured. 
Importantly, the debate about value-free sociology is an epistemic one i.e. if it is 
possible to achieve referential distance to the object of study and if the object is 
open to the type of investigation that excludes external value judgement: 
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The debate about value-free social science is not merely a matter of 
misunderstandings - mistaken meanings, muddled thinking, or bad logic. 
Nor is it merely a difference of opinion. It is part of larger conflict about 
whether the human is a proper subject of science. It is a cultural war - 
over what counts as knowledge of the human and over the standards that 
should apply to knowledge of the human. (Black 2013: 774) 
 
In response, there are two main issues that may be put forward that bears on the 
question of a value-free sociology – first, an attempt to posit a strict distinction 
between internal and external value judgements is pre-supposed by an existing 
external epistemological model. Thus, instead of freeing social science from the 
problems of normative bias, it offers, theory-laden, an explanatory closure in the 
manner it sets out what ought to be the domain of social science. Thus, this 
theory-laden position dismisses a priori an evaluative external judgement that 
may be implicated from internal social scientific. For example, in the case of this 
chapter, knowledge of the human person – including the relationality of the 
person to his external environment – would not provide normative implications.  
 
Consequently, there is an epistemic starting point in the approach adopted by 
Cambell and Black – a philosophical ontology – and this bears on the argument 
posited on the nature of what constitutes value-free social science i.e. we have an 
existing external value judgement, even if this is seemingly rejected. Black (2013) 
adopts a form of covering law model of explanation based on an empirical 
falsifiability). In this starting point, the explanandum is viewed as derivative from 
an explanans and with this a pre-supposing definition of the object that is then 
espoused as ‘scientific’ i.e. there exists an understanding that views the explanans 
as a question of empirical falsifiability. Due to an existing external value 
judgement, there is an understanding that statements are sociologically 
intelligible if open to the criterion of testability, generality and simplicity (Black 
2013). Distance and referentiality count as knowledge of humans, as a standard 
for social science. To describe and explain is to be concerned with ‘facts’ - 
observable reality – and this provides no preferences concerning questions of 
value preference. The question of observation, qua referentiality, is grounded in 
substantive theory testing, in a deductive sense, and this gives us an internally 
valid value judgement open to empirical study. The approach then rejects general 
theory or what was stated in chapter six as a philosophical ontology - this despite 
what is advocated being an epistemic model dictating the nature of investigation 
and hence a general theory that guides.    
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Second, following from the first point, due to a rejection of general theory, 
identified in an implicit refusal to consider an external value model that informs 
social science, there is a closure in the explanatory potential of social science and 
its broader critical role. The nature of what counts as knowledge is guided by a 
general theory, even if the focus is substantive, and this informs broader questions 
on the constitution of humans and their emergence as persons in relation to the 
natural, practical and discursive orders. The nature of this emergence – as argued 
in chapter six – means we have a broader relational human telos but also 
specificity in terms of differentiated singularities (Smith 2010). Further, there is 
an assumption that general theory closes, guides or even dictates the direction of 
investigation but this is a misconstrual of what may be intended by general theory. 
As argued previously, a transcendental reasoning is a necessity and being 
grounded in the intransitive dimension it is both emergent from but also 
irreducible to epistemic conceptions. Instead of closing research to external value 
judgements, asserted is the complexity and openness of the phenomenon studied. 
An external value judgement, while irreducible to the object of reference, is still 
grounded in the object – as referential detachment – and thus questions of 
desirability follow rather than dictate further strategies of investigation. While 
research on the nature of the object may implicate an external value judgement, 
what is posited here is a relational fallibilism in the methods chosen in which 
external value preference informs research preferences and questions asked. A 
cut-off between external and internal judgements closes possible directions when 
exploring the relation between personal well-being and social relations.  
 
A relational understanding between external and internal judgement is derived 
from a layered and depth ontology, with two dimensions that follow – the nature 
of explanation and the centrality of relational emergence that underpins the 
nature of this explanation. Critical theory, as adopted here, sets itself the task of 
exploring the well-being of the person in the context of personal emergence (here 
the context refers to an amalgam of personal, situational and objective generative 
mechanisms). To acknowledge a dialogue between explanation and a realist 
underlabourer – the notion that generative mechanisms are pre-dispositioned to 
generate certain effects – means the more we know of the environment of 
emergence the better policy may be in remedying social problems (external value 
judgement). As generative mechanisms are the intransitive dimension of 
referential detachment then the dialogue between internal and external value 
judgement is a fallibilist one.3 There is no closure in what may be justified in 
                                               
3  This approach is different to the fallibilist model advocated by Black (2013), in that 
it does not set explanatory possibilities through given epistemic presuppositions. Instead, 
it is a fallibism that takes the object as standard and with it a referentiality to the object 
is both open and adaptive. 
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relation to an explanandum. Further, the emergence of an object of reference is 
in a relational ontology and this ontologically grounds the question of what 
constitutes personal flourishing. Once again, to view external and internal value 
judgements as unrelatable is to hold, de facto, an ontological stance that 
epistemically defines what counts as ‘scientific’ and the direction social science 
should take. Consequently, what follows is a pre-supposing external value 
judgement on the very nature of what constitutes social science.  
 
Acknowledging a dialogue between internal and external value judgement affirms 
the social preconditions of human flourishing in a pluralist sense. Grounding 
flourishing in the objective properties of mechanisms results in an argument 
against reducing value judgement to personal preference. At the same time, the 
complexity of interplay between generative mechanisms – pertaining to personal, 
situational and objective dimensions – means capacities and their manifestation 
are differentiated. Thus, as Gorski (2013) argues, the good itself is plural and there 
is an adaptive relation between external and internal value judgement (a 
bidirectional relation) to account for the complexity of emergence: 
 
While human beings do share a number of distinctive capacities, these 
capacities are variably distributed across human individuals. If the art of 
living well consists in identifying and realizing these capacities, then there 
will not be any one-size-fits-all model of the good life. The good itself is 
plural. Ethical naturalism can also evade the trap of cultural relativism by 
focusing on the social preconditions of human flourishing. Specifically, it 
will adjudge some social orders to be better than others insofar as they 
allow individuals enough freedom to discover enough freedom to discover 
their capacities and enough resources to realize them. (Gorski 2013: 550)  
 
Turner (2013), on the other hand, argues an external value judgements lead to 
unidirectional explanations (Turner 2013). The problem with external value 
judgement – informing sociological practice – is a starting point that dictates the 
nature of explanation (the issue raised is consistent with the argument put 
forward by Turner (2007) regarding the transmission problematic – see chapter 
six). The problem is a conflation between ‘moral error’, as error in a point of view 
(for example, contravening happiness as a subjective state), with ‘moral error’ as 
objective concept; empirical work may be carried out on the former but not the 
latter. In making this conflation ‘moral facts’ – as an objective concept – are then 
assumed to motivate actions e.g. fulfilling an obligation. What we have are forms 
of unidirectional explanations that assume collective phenomena to be grounded 
in objective facts (moral goods). Consequently, these facts provide reason for 
actions without an account on how these reasons are then felt as subjective state. 
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The key is how we explain social action and if empirical facts that explain are 
simultaneously normative ones then there needs to be some explanatory 
connection between these facts and empirical reality. Further, this connection 
also applies to a view of normativity as discursive motivation – without empirical 
grounding – as it similarly assumes collectives that subjectively motivate but 
without explanation on how these same collectives are transmitted and 
inculcated. 
 
In response to Turner’s objection, it should be stated that ‘moral error’, in an 
ontologically grounded ethical naturalism, does not assume a ‘moral reality’ is 
transmitted due to an unaccounted existence in the nature of things. The ethical 
naturalism advocated – affirming a relational dialogue between internal and 
external value judgement – is not something explained in pre-existing notions of 
moral facts. Instead, it both follows and is in immanent dialogue in an explanation 
of generative mechanisms and the consequences of these mechanisms in their 
impact on personal flourishing. Accordingly, the type of social arrangements that 
enable this flourishing, or not, requires explanation. In an explanatory sense an 
external value judgement is not transcendentally affirmed and so opposes 
unidirectional explanations. Thus, the position that external value judgements are 
ontologically grounded and may be utilised as an explanatory critique of social 
arrangements, does not entail an explanatory account of motivations and reasons.  
 
What we have is an argument against ‘flourishing’ as personal preference i.e. a 
personal preference transmitted through broader cultural and ideological 
expressions (again, we return to the circular problem of an assumed existence of 
collective phenomena, without explanation, on the nature of its transmission)4. If 
we consider the multi-dimensionality of emergence, then it does not follow that 
irreducible meanings of flourishing transcend subjective experience and explain 
action. An irreducible dimension to normative facts, qua well-being, is something 
empirically grounded in an ontological sense. Regardless of reasons and 
motivations, that err, shared meanings of flourishing – grounded in an interplay 
of mechanisms – may be contingently manifested but in other settings subdued 
all together. Thus, a ‘moral reality’ does not transcend and explain, one way, but 
is grounded in a relational sense and whose subsequent uptake needs to be 
explained. It is possible to posit a view of ‘normative facts’, ontologically grounded, 
                                               
4  Turner denies ‘objective’ in any sense, whether as collective objects or normative 
facts (‘moral reality’). However, broader cultural and ideological expressions are not the 
same as a ‘normativism’ that understand ‘facts’ to be internalised in unidirectional 
explanations. Instead, as covered in chapter six, expressions should be connected to 
empirical reality to avoid circular arguments.  
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providing there is also a complementary account in how these beliefs come to 
incentivise actors to take on certain social roles.  
 
When we relate reason and value there is an explicit realist underlabourer that 
posits, as covered in chapter six, the propositional order to be in referential 
relation to the non-propositional. It is the extra-discursive that is the basis of 
intelligibility of the propositional (our practical relations in the natural world) 
grounding the relation between our emergent capacities to reason and value 
judgements that may follow from these emergent capacities (Sayer 2011). Practical 
reason is thus value-laden and social arrangements may be better attuned or close 
possible directions in a dialogue between value and reason. Thus, social 
arrangements in evaluative sense – based on a referential detachment – may be 
identified as more conducive to the objective outcomes of ‘well-being’ or 
‘suffering’.  
 
Furthermore, the emergence of a personal identity is first facilitated by a self-
regulated openness to the world. In response to circumstance – in the emergence 
of a personal identity – there is a process of subjective integration of lived 
experience. Being in relation, with concerns emergent from context, means 
reasoned value judgements pertain to the “complex interplay of normativity and 
ontology” (Calder 2008: 432). Here the derivation of a normative discourse is 
evaluative, as it is prior grounded in the types of concerns that an ontology is 
dispositioned to generate in subjective states (Jacobs 2013).     
 
We can thus argue that evaluative statements are contextualised in the conditions 
that continually sustain us as sentient beings. Instead of abstraction, evaluative 
reasoning then implicates a relationality between several dualisms and their 
seepage as emergent relational properties5. This seepage is manifested in 
everyday reasoning and informs evaluative considerations. Consequently, a strict 
separation of fact and value leads to an explanatory deficiency when considering 
the complex interplay between normativity and ontology, as everyday evaluations 
(deliberation on everyday concerns). The tendential properties that follow are too 
open for a strict fact/value split, as both are relationally intertwined, and with 
this normativity becomes enmeshed in the type of motivations and justifications 
that pertain to how persons are embodied and interact in given orders. To survive 
                                               
5  Sayer (2011: 29 – 32) argues that a strict separation between fact and value 
implicates a whole family of dualisms that are then viewed to be mutually exclusive and 
opposed (fact-value, is-ought, reason-emotion, science-ideology, science-ethics, 
positive-normative, objectivity-subjectivity and mind-body). Negating the seepage and 
mutual reinforcement of these dualisms has implications for how value and reason is then 
conceptualised.   
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and thrive is to be necessarily part of this process from which a personal identity 
is emergent. The issue to consider is the nature of flourishing and ends that are 
sought – between personal specificity and the plurality of its expression – and the 
implications this may have for policy directions and specifically higher education 
policy.  
 
7.2 The interdependence between personal ends and sharedness for the 
common good 
 
The previous section advocated a relational dialogue between reason and value. 
This section extends the argument to an alternative policy direction beyond homo 
sociologicus and homo economicus conceptions of the person or a synthesis 
between both views. Opposed to the two models of personhood and their 
synthesis – both approaches necessitate impersonal ends – the goal is to 
articulate an alternative direction that takes personal ends as the point of 
reference. Personal ends are compatible with a relational understanding of the 
citizen (homo relatus) as they are grounded – qua referential detachment – in an 
interplay between normativity and ontology. To focus on the interplay between 
both means shared arrangements are important in nurturing proactive tendential 
capacities of persons. At the same time, nurturing personal capacities (the basis 
of solidarity) implicates a context of mutual interdependence that is more 
conducive to the purposes of reciprocity. Instead of an integration of individuals 
into impersonal system ends, personal ends necessitate interventions closer to 
the point of interaction between generative mechanisms. Accordingly, the 
interplay between singularities and sharedness – between normativity and 
ontology – is viewed from the place of the domain of situated activity. It is in 
situated activity that normativity is emergent from and responsive to persons and 
their emergence in objective relational orders. Social relations, therefore, are 
open to renewal at the point of interaction (a subsidiarity in the form of reflexive 
arrangements) and it is in these arrangements that solidarity and subsidiarity are 
understood to be in mutual reinforcement6.  
 
                                               
6  The common good is promoted by goods generated relationally, in which both 
solidarity and subsidiarity are in a relationship of reciprocity. Solidarity – a reciprocal 
sharing of responsibility – establishes the necessity of settings in which a shared 
relationality guides and orients the actions of social actors towards each other in 
reference to personal ends. Subsidiarity, on the other hand, is defined by contingent 
arrangements that advance the common good through which the material and non-
material good of the individual depend. As solidarity and subsidiarity are mutually 
reinforced in advancing the common good then the reciprocity between both is defined 
in terms of a transcendental logic that sustains their relation (Donati 2009b).      
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Thus, it is the point of mutual reinforcement between interacting mechanisms 
that alternative policy paths and a vision for the common good is articulated. The 
common good informs the nature of an interplay between normativity and 
ontology – or between solidarity and subsidiarity. Further, the emergence of a 
personal identity and a social order (personal and social morphogenesis) – as 
discussed in chapter six – are interconnected and the relation between both 
returns to the common good, in the manner this common good links solidarity 
and subsidiarity. Proactive in potentia capacities of persons, therefore, are 
emergent and manifested in a relational ontology. The policy direction envisaged 
is one that emphasises a mutual context that links the interconnection between 
singularity and sharedness for personal ends. Personal ends, as will be argued in 
the case of student development, refers to an orientation of social relations 
between actors to be responsive to the point of differentiation. As personal ends 
and a shared context are co-constituted and interconnected the following 
implications follow:  
 
Practical interaction as the starting point of all epistemology – The practical order 
is a bridgehead between the natural and discursive orders. Thus, being in the 
world, in our practical engagements, we are in relation to the world and others. 
In practical manipulation of objects, in relation to other conspecifics, as covered 
in chapter six, there is the development of a semantic capacity and this means it 
is a practical interaction with our environment that is the starting point of all 
epistemology (Collier 1999). Moreover, the differentiated nature of personal 
development – the domain of psychobiography – entails both a specificity and a 
shared environment. Thus, flourishing is non-self-referential in our difference 
and a sharedness that facilitates, simultaneously, this difference. Orders generate 
shared forms of concerns – physical well-being (natural order), performative 
achievement (practical order) that are then synthesised in an emergent social 
order. Similarly, as noted, the manner we navigate emergent concerns – as part 
of a personal modus vivendi – pertains to the specificities of a psychobiography. 
 
The normative basis of policy in specificity – Specificity entails difference and the 
objective of being responsive to difference (solidarity) is the normative problem 
of policy. Consequently, in being attentive and responsive to the particular there 
is an analytical re-focus away from moralising policy directions that impose 
foregrounded assumptions to then dictate rather than be responsive to the 
particular. The mutual reinforcement of difference and sharedness entails, as 
Collier argues (1999), to view the flourishing of everyone as part of a pursuit of the 
common good and that this is integral to one’s own being and flourishing: 
 
<169> 
An account of the unity of a human individual as a composite unity 
constituted by the relatively stable causal interaction of their parts. On 
the basis of these points, I have arrived at the extensibility of human 
individuals as they become more rational/interactive to include more of 
the world in the open structure that makes them the individual that they 
are. The consequent tendency, as one becomes more 
rational/interactive, to care more for more of the universe, as it becomes 
more integral to one’s own being. (Collier 1999: 42)  
 
Being attentive to difference is to be more rational/interactive and the goal of 
policy is to establish adequate institutions to sustain conditions for reflexive 
arrangements grounded in solidarity and its renewal in relational goods.  
 
Complementing solidarity and subsidiarity for the common good – As stated, being 
attentive to difference is the normative problem of policy. To maintain conditions 
that advance solidarity entails a continuous reflexive generation and re-
generation of arrangements for the common good. As solidarity – pre-supposed 
by a referential detachment – is contextualised in arrangements closer to the 
point of subjective/objective interaction then the interplay between personal and 
social histories favours lived solidarity. This means relational goods are generated 
internal to lived practice, rather than policies and practices that universalize and 
abstract from interactive dynamics. Universalizing is opposed to allowing 
particulars – in a non- self-referential sense – to manifest themselves, including 
their potential gifts, in ways that potentially contribute to the common good. The 
fullest expression of the common good, as stated, is in our common obligations to 
the particular and these obligations are inherent in the non-self-referential 
dimensions of personal social becoming – the manner we interact with each other 
and the ways these interactive dynamics allow tendential capacities to flourish. If 
we consider triple morphogenesis then the trajectory of personal and social 
emergence lies in the interplay of these interactions and the manner social 
institutions and structures incentivise a ‘letting be’ of an emergent personal 
identity, so that individual flourishing is nested within a broader pursuit of the 
common good. 
 
7.3 Policy directions beyond individualism and holism 
 
As policy focuses on personal ends, in a relational sense, then the approach taken 
focuses neither on abstracted individual goals nor a macro regulated holism. 
Instead, the policy model envisaged is based on a homo relatus conception of the 
citizen and focuses on the social link that connects people together. The social 
link acknowledges the totality of social relations – rather than an aggregated 
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utilitarian good for the greatest number of individuals – and the interplay between 
the powers and capacities of persons and their settings. Two main points are 
highlighted considering this policy re-direction:  
 
Affirming primacy to positive freedoms – To be more rational/interactive is due to 
an in-gear understanding of our relational engagement in the world. The 
constraints and enablements of external interactions are not an afterthought as 
is the tendency with negative freedom approaches that emphasise freedom-from 
in negative rights based discourses. Instead, following from a positive view of 
freedoms there is a supply side view of rights. Supply side policy interventions aim 
to generate conditions in which solidarity is generated and sustained; as positive 
freedoms aim to enhance tendential capacities – in our embodied interactions - 
then a supply side view of relational rights is implicated in an interpersonal 
obligation to contribute to arrangements that enhance relational goods.  
 
Supply side interventions in shared arrangements implicate a depth view of 
citizenship in which the role of the citizen is defined in relations that connect 
individuals (the ‘body-actual’) to their broader material settings (the ‘body 
cosmic’). The interconnection between the body-actual and body cosmic relates 
to a societal constitutionalism in which the extensibility of the body-actual is 
understood in terms of “material, cognitive and emotional interactions of 
particular people with specific needs and wants, capacities and vulnerabilities in 
particular material settings” (Sayer 2011: 176). Here a relational universalism – in a 
shared relational extensibility of the body actual – entails a logic of action that 
sustains a relational setting (a proactive, in-gear conception of the body-actual) 
in ways that are conducive to a flourishing of the person.7  
 
As an alternative to a dispersed freedom and its implicated discourse of negative 
freedoms there is a transformative pursuit of the body-cosmic but in mutual 
consent and responsibility to the world. Intersubjective consent – in a voluntary 
sense – is sought in arrangements that incentivise a reflexive reasoning on the 
nature of relational goods that advance the common good8. The foundation of 
                                               
7  In being in the world, in relation to external orders and others, the body actual is 
in relation to the body cosmic – the body cosmic establishes the extensibility of the body 
actual to its externality and is thus the ‘world as body’. In interacting with relational 
environments, the body-actual, in potentia, is emergent from the body cosmic. 
Consequently, there is a proactive view of causal interaction between the body-actual 
and the world (Collier 2007).  
8  Dispersed freedom here is taken from Collier (2007) and is contrasted to gathered 
freedom - “Here I come to the ambiguity of freedom referred to in the title; many political 
issues concern the area of conflict between two sets of freedoms: in political terms, we 
may distinguish market freedom, which is the power money gives its possessor to 
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shared consensual concerns towards relational contexts, based on gathered 
deliberation, refer to relations from which personal identities emerge. As personal 
ends are emergent from the body-cosmic then an orientation to these relations – 
the basis of material and non-material goods – entails a relational reflexivity that 
is contributive to cooperative human activity9.  
 
Gathered deliberation, pre-supposed by a gathered freedom, takes the form of a 
civil democracy that is shaped by supply side conditions for the generation of 
relational goods that shape relational rights. Here the indexical – the site of lived 
solidarity – is organically tied to the actions of corporate actors. The 
interconnection between lived solidarity and the actions of corporate actors 
(actions directed at enduring practices and power relations) interconnects both 
primary and secondary goods10 (institutional and indexical time). As will be 
covered in the next section, the complementarity between the meta-reflexive 
mode of personal reflexivity and a broader societarian reflexivity are important 
facets that mutually reinforce and sustain reflexive arrangements. Reflexive 
arrangements – based in a gathered deliberation – are then shaped by a relational 
reason11 that is open to renewal in referential detachment to personal ends. Thus, 
                                               
transform the common world without common consent (this I call dispersed freedom); 
and civic freedom, i.e. the freedom to co-determine with one’s fellow-citizens a common 
project for the common world – whether a project of conservation or of transformation. 
This I call gathered freedom”. (Collier 2007: 17) 
9  Co-operative behaviour entails gathered deliberation on the nature of our causal 
interactions with our environment and how this bears on both material and non-material 
goods that human flourishing depends on.  
10  Primary relational goods are those goods with a deep intersubjective character, 
while secondary relational goods are ones with a collective character. Thus, Donati 
defines this distinction in the following manner – “An interesting question is whether 
relational goods necessarily imply interpersonal relations or not. In response, I suggest 
distinguishing between primary relational goods (such as friendship, family, small 
informal groups, which have a deep intersubjective character) and collective or 
secondary relational goods (which have an associative character and could be generated 
through more impersonal relations, for instance the relational goods produced by a 
voluntary association)” (Donati 2015: 199) 
11  Relation reason is borrowed from Donati’s re-working of Parsons’s AGIL scheme 
– in this re-working the scheme is a compass for the orientation of action rather than a 
fixed structure. The Adaptive dimension pertains to instrumental means; Goal oriented 
rationality pertains to political power and the achievement of definite targets; the 
Integrative dimension links the other three dimensions. In linking the other three 
dimensions the Integrative dimension’s focus is on relations to the natural, practical and 
discursive orders. The integrative process is termed, by Donati, as the rationality of 
relationality itself (relational rationality). In other words, it is directed to the environment 
of action in the manner relations link both the Adaptive and Goal dimensions to the 
axiomatic dimension (L). The axiomatic dimension is the value end of the noted relational 
rationality (I) and is represented in the human person; if an orientation to a shared 
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the value dimension of a relational reason is cyclically renewed in terms of an 
epistemic fallibilism associated with this referential detachment.  
 
Pre-supposing a supply side understanding of relational rights by obligation – 
Following from a primacy ascribed to positive freedoms is a re-conception of 
rights in a relational sense. Relational rights are manifested in relational goods 
that are generated in the re-orientation of social relations towards personal ends 
and the common good. Furthermore, the contingent cultivation of personal 
capacities – in the context of these relational goods – implicates institutional 
settings that go beyond single principle models. Single principle models advocate 
– abstracting from the relational context of individuals – the total good of 
individual utility (homo economicus view of the citizen being an example of this 
approach). Thus, an approach that emphasises increasing access to pre-given 
sanctioned goods – for example, in interventions that aim to enhance social 
mobility – is foregrounded in assumptions in respect to a utilitarian conception 
of the good that is distributed to the greatest number of individuals. 
 
The approach advocated, in this chapter, moves beyond individualised and 
holistic policy directions (homo economicus and homo sociologicus). The common 
good, therefore, pertains not to the sum aggregate of goods that are divided and 
distributed. Instead, the common good, as Donati (2009b) argues, is the gel that 
brings together individuals and is the social link on which the material and non-
material goods of individuals depend: 
 
The common good is the social link joining people together, on which 
both the material and nonmaterial goods of individuals depend. The 
human person cannot find fulfilment in himself, that is, apart from the 
fact that he exists "with" others and "for" others. This truth does not 
simply require that he live with others at various levels of social life, but 
that he seek unceasingly--in actual practice and not merely at the level 
of ideas--the good, that is, the meaning and truth, found in existing forms 
of social life. No expression of social life--from the family to intermediate 
social groups, associations, enterprises of an economic nature, cities, 
regions, states, and the community of peoples and nations--can escape 
the issue of its own common good, in that this is a constitutive element 
of its significance and the authentic reason for its very existence. (Donati 
2009b: 220)  
 
                                               
environment, both situational and associational, is in the (I) dimension, then the reflexive 
process should have (L) as its end. (Donati 2014) 
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Second, going beyond single principle models – based on the distribution of 
impersonal social goods – is the importance of returning to relations and the 
manner individuals relate to each other and their environment (the basis of 
material and non-material relations). Relational universalism posits the universal 
nature of these relations and the manner their ontological properties are pre-
dispositioned, in given circumstances, to generate concerns that need to be 
navigated. Hence, a necessary relationality – in being in the world - needs to be 
managed in some way and this implicates normative questions on personal 
flourishing and suffering.  Again, a homo relatus view of the citizen requires 
reflexive arrangements that integrate material and non-material goods for 
personal ends12.  
 
7.4 Deep citizenship and a meta-reflexive mode of reflexivity 
 
A deep citizenship precedes from supply side policy interventions seeking to 
preserve causative arrangements that affect the generation of relational goods. 
Here highlighted is the citizen’s contributory role to these relational goods that 
link actors to each other and sustains their relations in complementary conditions 
of reciprocity. The role of the citizen, in this process, is shaped by a deep 
citizenship and a concomitant meta-reflexive reflexivity that is critically attuned 
to relational goods as concerns deliberated upon13. Thus, as relational goods are 
                                               
12  I follow Archer (2013: 21) that a logic of action requires three irreducible facets - 
“firstly, people who are deemed capable of acting in the way specified; secondly, social 
structures that foster this kind of action; and, thirdly, results for the social order 
congruent with these types of action.”  
13  Archer identifies four modes of reflexivity – communicative, autonomous, meta-
reflexive and fractured reflexivity. In the communicative mode of reflexivity “internal 
conversations need to be confirmed and completed by others before they lead to action” 
(Archer 2012: 13). In contrast, in the autonomous mode of reflexivity “internal 
conversations are self-contained, leading directly to action” (Archer 2012: 13). The meta-
reflexive mode of reflexivity is one in which “internal conversations critically evaluate 
previous inner dialogues and are critical about effective action in society”. Finally, in a 
fractured reflexivity internal conversations “cannot lead to purposeful courses of action, 
but intensify personal distress and disorientation resulting in expressive action.” (Archer 
2012: 13) Further, reflexivity is viewed, by Archer, as not a “homogeneous phenomenon but 
is exercised through distinctive modes, and that one such modality is dominant for almost 
every person at any given time” (Archer 2012: 12). In the case of this chapter both the 
autonomous and meta-reflexive modes of reflexivity are relevant. The salience of a homo 
economicus view of the person, in policy models, covered in previous chapters, exhibits a 
congruence with an autonomous mode of reflexivity in which the citizen is provided with 
relevant guidance and information to then strategically judge and dedicate to certain 
outward behavioural preferences. In contrast, the meta-reflexive is a mode of reflexivity 
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emergent from a multi-dimensional social universe, the connection between a 
meta-reflexive mode of reflexivity and a deep citizenship is pre-supposed by a 
depth understanding of social ontology.  
 
It is a societal constitutionalism14 that provides the background for this deep 
citizenship, in which the good of each person, and thus human dignity, is only 
possible in a relational social order. As stated, the realisation of human dignity in 
the common good is tied to a relational reason – in gathered deliberation – on the 
relation between solidarity and subsidiarity. Here a deep citizenship extends the 
role of the citizen beyond mere access and distribution of scarce individualised 
utilitarian goods to that of primary goods that figure in the totality of social 
relations – thus, in this context, we have a co-production of complementary 
relations and practices that sustain the conditions of solidarity as secondary 
relational goods. What follows from these conditions is a mutual reinforcing 
relation between primary and secondary relational goods that are explained in an 
interconnection between social domains (the secondary relational goods defined 
in social practices and power relations are manifested in interpersonal situated 
activity). In a deep citizenship, there is an interconnection and co-production 
between indexical interactions and institutional arrangements that provides 
context and value meaning to interactive dynamics. 
 
It is in this broader societal context that the meta-reflexive citizen is critically 
attuned to the efficacy of primary relational goods in its enhancement of personal 
ends. Thus, citizen’s actions extend, at a system level, to institutional 
arrangements that provide context to primary relational goods.  Consequently, 
for example, in the context of higher education, teachers may question if current 
practices meet the needs of student development and thus as corporate actors 
aim to transform these practices. A depth citizenship, therefore, aims to make this 
link between different strata of a differentiated social ontology so that the social 
link in social relations – the common good – is cyclically sustained.   
 
Conceptually, based on a mutual reinforcing relation between different social 
domains, three forms of reflexivity are posited in the context of a morphogenetic 
                                               
that continuously and critically evaluates social practices that exist in their given 
contexts. Thus, the meta-reflexive mode of reflexivity complements a homo relatus view 
of the citizen in the manner social actors deploy their reflexive capacities in monitoring 
the efficacy of existing arrangements in their sensitivity to the relational interplay 
between normativity and ontology.   
14  Societal constitutionalism being the recognition that one’s identity is constituted 
through a relation to the ‘Other’ (Donati 2014: 160) 
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social order – subjective, social and system reflexivity15 (see figure five). In a deep 
citizenship, the meta-reflexive is tied to transformative practices at the level of 
social reflexivity that then impacts power relations and contextual resources at 
the system level. Further, a system reflexivity is understood in responsive 
arrangements shaped by personal ends, rather than an epistemic closure that 
follows from impersonal policy objectives. In terms of a triple morphogenetic 
framework, it is the domain of situated activity – as covered in chapter six – that 
defines the emergent properties of interactive dynamics. Thus, indexical time is 
conceived to be organically tied to institutional time in this relation between 
different forms of reflexivity in a morphogenetic social order. Here the critical 
deliberation of a meta-reflexive subjective reflexivity – in the context of indexical 
interactions – potentially transforms into the ‘We’ of corporate activity in the 
context of power relations and the distribution of resources (institutional time).  
 
Finally, a morphogenetic social order that seeks to cultivate a meta-reflexive 
mode of reflexivity implicates a civil democracy. A civil democracy refers to the 
noted totality of social relations that enables the citizen, in the form of a societal 
governance, to seek the common good. The common good here being a social link 
for individuals to develop capacities for flourishing and to contribute to relations 
that sustain and govern relations from which the good of the individual is 
maintained. A societal governance, in reflexive arrangements, relates to a 
morphogenetic social order in which a deep citizenship is cultivated. In this deep 
citizenship, emergent interactive dynamics become the site of a lived solidarity, 
in which transformative practices reference personal ends. Thus, as Donati (2014) 
                                               
15  A differentiation between systemic and social reflexivity is in continuity with a 
social domain analysis. It understands the nature of reflexivity considering the irreducible 
properties of different social domains. Here space and time are important properties in 
the relation between different domains (indexical and institutional time). Thus, increased 
systemic reflexivity is understood, dialectically, in reference to increased personal and 
social reflexivity, as the manner personal and social reflexivity intersect bears on 
systemic properties and its differentiation. If we take indexical and institutional 
properties of social ontology, then the reflexivity of corporate actors (‘We’) is 
distinguished from that of the individual actors (personal reflexivity). While both personal 
and collective reflexivity are relational (at the personal level, the meta-reflexive being 
complementary to the collective reflexivity of the corporate actor), the corporate actor’s 
activity is directed at the common good and the generation of relational goods from 
which both individuals and social groups depend (social reflexivity). This way personal 
reflexivity, as an aspect of personal identity, through adopting the role of a corporate 
actor, is oriented towards the arrangements from which a system reflexivity dialectically 
emerges. 
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argues, a civil democracy sets out a distinct direction different to economic, 
political and social democracy: 
 
Civil democracy (as distinct from economic, political, and social 
democracy) is the form of societal governance that pursues the common 
good not as a state of things, nor as a sum or aggregation of single goods, 
nor as a super-ordinated reality, but as the totality of those conditions of 
social life that allow groups, as well as their individual members, to 
achieve their own perfection more fully and quickly through the creation 
of relational goods. (Donati 2014: 108) 
 
 
Figure five: Morphogenetic social order 
 
7.5 Contextual applications: Higher Education & the curriculum 
 
In this section the aim is to propose contextual applications for an alternative 
relational policy direction. First, the question raised is if a relational view of the 
citizen is compatible with policy models that aim to triangulate between a homo 
economicus and homo sociologicus conception of the citizen. Second, in contrast 
to existing approaches, how does a societarian reflexivity, in the context of a 
morphogenetic social order, affect specific higher education policies and 
practices. In answering the second question, both the curriculum and assessment 
will be areas explored as concrete examples.  
 
In reference to the first question, a relational understanding of personhood is 
incompatible with existing policy models of the person. There is a qualitative 
difference in the mode of reflexivity envisaged in a homo relatus view of the person 
and those incentivised in hegemonic policy and practice. A relational 
understanding is grounded in a reflexive re-orientation to personal ends and this 
necessitates a meta-reflexive reflexivity responsive to difference and its emergent 
conditions of possibility. In contrast, as noted, both homo economicus and homo 
sociologicus – or a syncretism of both – necessitate impersonal ends. As 
demonstrated in previous chapters, a triangulation of these views of personhood 
implicate an aspirational ethos towards impersonal sanctioned goods (homo 
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economicus) and the conditions in which regulated actors access these goods 
(homo sociologicus). Instead of a reasoned deliberation on the nature of relational 
goods, the citizen is in a defined relation to goods that they may benefit from. 
Thus, the good in both conceptions, including a triangulation between these 
views, is directed towards impersonal ends that bypass central questions relating 
to fallibist practices shaped by a realist logic of transcendence.  
 
In contrast, in the context of a broader common good – consistent with a homo 
relatus conception of citizenship – the generation of relational goods are directed 
towards personal ends. Thus, goods generated in solidarity to others – as will be 
demonstrated in the case of assessment practice – takes the common good as 
emergent from lived relations and their practices, in which goods are then 
available for all to derive advantage from (Donati 2012). Furthermore, policy 
missions and challenges are open to relational deliberation on relations and 
practices that seek to generate and regenerate relational goods. Thus, policy 
objectives do not aim to regulate and extrinsically represent the relational 
properties of personal and social morphogenesis. Instead, the more we know of 
our interactions in common material settings the better equipped we are to 
respond and facilitate better conditions for reciprocity. 
 
The second question pertains to concrete practices, a societarian reflexivity and 
a gathered deliberation on responsive arrangements, in the context of a 
morphogenetic social order. Here the question relates to practices that are 
responsive to an interplay between personal and social histories. A 
morphogenetic social order considers relational differentiation – between Ego 
and Alter – as a point of adaptive integration (the integrative dimension of 
relational reason). A case application of a relational turn in educational practice is 
in a curriculum model and related assessment practices. In regard to curriculum 
planning, the evaluative aim focuses on the development of in potentia capacities 
(personal histories). Considering the goal of talent development (a developmental 
model of the curriculum), two goals are identified in the context of a 
morphogenetic social order—an end for which the process of educational renewal 
is revised (what education is for) and reflexive arrangements that deepen this 
value judgement in educational relations (what education is)16. Accordingly, what 
education is for would be inseparable from adopted practices and the logic of 
transcendence that inheres in these practices (the axiomatic dimension of a 
relational reason).  
                                               
16  This approach is a re-working of Kelly’s (2005) developmental model, in which 
growth (the development of capacities and powers over content) as end-state is 
reworked so that relational reason takes its full scope and the end of human dignity (what 
education is for) provides an orientation for what education is.  
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What education is – manifested in educational practices – integrates value 
judgements with conducive reflexive arrangements to enhance the learning 
process. The envisaged learning process is more than a mere credentialing to 
access scarce utilitarian goods e.g. entrance into a selective institution or 
certification to enter a profession. The hegemony of this route – observed in 
accountability measures in policy – is counter-productive to the development of 
student capacities and restricts learning outcomes to better choices in the 
context of ‘labour market demands’. Thus, we have an externalism as a curriculum 
model and one that uses state power to regulate education to meet government 
goals (Young 2008: 29). For example, as seen in chapter five, proposed government 
reforms in educational practices are shaped by objectives that figure outside the 
educational domain (what education is for). A fairness agenda is an example of an 
intervention at the level of education provision – interventions that are remedial 
measures to correct past policy failures (as seen in the case of life cycle 
interventions).  
 
The learning process in a student developmental model, in contrast, views the 
learner as more than a recipient of sanctioned learning opportunities in a 
‘something for something’ exchange. The ‘ought’ of education – what education is 
for – takes the student perspective in regard to the development of talents. Social 
arrangements (social reflexivity) is then revised to take the student perspective – 
a logic of transcendence – as the basis of what and how learning is assessed 
(Shepard 2013). The adaptive dimension of relational reason is in developing 
means to further the end of student development and learning in reference to 
what the student is doing.  
 
However, while a referential detachment (the irreducible properties of the 
domain of psychobiography) defines the relation to the student it does not equate 
with an epistemic authority in regard to content or the types of skills necessary 
to engage with subject content. As Collier argues (1999), an important difference 
lies between metaphysical worth (the axiomatic dimension of relational reason) 
and the mistaken idea that equality in terms of this metaphysical worth entails an 
equal judgement on goods generated from work produced. Work produced is not 
of equal value and being rational means a capacity to draw conclusions 
considering the properties of an objective world: 
 
The non-travelling of equality or inequality from person to work or from 
work to person is easy to defend because the work, once produced, is 
independent of its producer …. But there is something similar in the idea 
of some sociologists of knowledge that since all people are equally 
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rational beings, all opinions are equally rational. This rests on 
equivocation about the word ‘rational’. ‘Rational beings’ can be an all-or-
nothing metaphysical characterisation of human beings, as in Kant. In 
that sense we are all equally rational beings. But we are not all equally 
good at evaluating evidence or deducing conclusions, nor do we all have 
equal access to evidence. Hence some people’s opinions about factual 
matters are worth more than others, and this in no way ‘travels’ to any 
judgement about the worth of the knower. (Collier 1999: 97-98) 
 
Returning to the curriculum, it would be a mistake to view the developmental 
process as an end, rather than a broader goal to which this development should 
be reviewed. Thus, for example, the developmental model adopted by Kelly (2004) 
takes the processual development of the learner as an end-goal (the enhancement 
of capabilities, including all stages of human development). In attributing primacy 
to the developmental process, precedence is ascribed to developing the 
autonomy of the learner’s cognitive processes over content. However, subject 
content, as a product of rational beings, cannot be separated from an 
enhancement of subjective capabilities. Instead, there is a relationality between 
the intrinsic and extrinsic – the development of personal capabilities is 
manifested extrinsically. Here the learning environment (the domain of situated 
activity) anchors the learning process so that intrinsic development references an 
externality and acknowledges the multidimensional and differentiated nature of 
learning/learners. Propositional knowledge, as stated in chapter six, references 
the natural world and is bridged through the practical order. The qualitative 
nature of this bridging is affected by personal predispositions that mediate the 
nature an externality is navigated in the emergence of a personal identity (a 
differentiated cognitive continuum). Thus, higher education and practice should 
aim, as value judgement, to bring together an extrinsic reference (referential 
detachment) and the differentiated nature of intrinsic mediation. 
 
Considering this developmental approach to the curriculum the ‘is’ of educational 
practice is re-thought to bring together differentiation (personal histories) with a 
shared subject criterion. As stated above, a relational educational environment 
aims to focus on the interplay between personal histories and shared content as 
the basis of reflexive arrangements that are responsive to student development. 
What follows are possible proposals that are better suited to achieve this 
developmental approach – the case example provided is assessment practice. The 
choice of assessment is in its evaluative role in the process of learning 
development. Therefore, educational practice is significantly informed by the 
planning of assessment and the role of assessment in the broader purposes of an 
educational process and an evaluation of the learning process itself. In regard to 
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assessment practice two main issues are raised – first, is the central question on 
the evaluative purpose of assessment and the manner a relational turn informs 
this purpose. Second, following from the evaluative purpose of assessment, the 
question turns to assessment practices that may complement a developmental 
approach to the curriculum: 
 
(1) The ‘ought’ of assessment: The first issue is an extension of the ‘is/ought’ 
problematic noted earlier in the chapter. Here the question is what assessment 
seeks to evaluate – it points to the purpose of educational programs and what 
they seek to achieve. If the aim is to develop the tendential capacities of students, 
then this implicates assessment strategies in higher education. For example, 
should assessment practice be used as a selective measure to select the ‘best’ 
students for admittance into institutions? Post-admission is the objective to grade 
and credential students to meet the demands of employers and the labour 
market? Thus, what assessment ‘is’ cannot be abstracted from its evaluative 
purpose i.e. ‘ought’. As stated, higher education policy devises a view of the person 
and consistent objectives for education. Consequently, assessment is an 
important dimension in what higher education aims to achieve in regard to 
learning and behavioural outcomes.   
 
In the case of a developmental model, assessment aims to develop the capacities 
of students, considering differentiated personal histories (including personal pre-
dispositions discussed in chapter six). Assessment practice takes a relational turn 
in which provision – referencing the axiomatic dimension of relational reason – 
seeks to integrate instrumental means and the institutionalised dimensions of 
situated activity in ways that advance the educational mission of higher 
education. The mission here is informed by the common good – shared reflexive 
arrangements that allows all social actors to fulfil their potential capacities. Thus, 
the mission of higher education is to assist all students to fulfil their potential and 
for educators and administrators to revise their practices in accordance to this 
mission. Student development, in this context, defines the nature of academic 
‘excellence’ and the validity of assessment strategies (Astin & Antonio 2012). 
Learning outcomes, therefore, do not refer to extrinsic policy agendas or 
institutional goals. Extrinsic objectives, abstracted from student development, 
entail a neglect of personal learnings ends for extrinsically defined outcomes (an 
existing impersonal ‘ought’ that defines the objectives of assessment).  
 
(2) What learning outcomes should be cultivated and how? If assessment methods 
– the instrumental means of a relational reason – necessarily advance an 
evaluative purpose, whether implicitly or explicitly, then the question is what 
learning outcomes should be evaluated and how. Specifically, in what way does a 
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homo relatus conception of personhood implicate alternative assessment 
methods and practices? Further, as will be clarified, the methods adopted to 
evaluate the work of students is organically tied to broader issues in higher 
education such as research, teaching performance and funding. In terms of an 
evaluative purpose, learning outcomes should be viewed, as stated, in terms of 
personal development. This means a re-orientation of assessment practice to the 
specificity of the learner, in which the validity of assessment is viewed considering 
the efficacy of assessment for student learning.  
 
Here we distinguish – considering learning outcomes – between conceptual 
outcomes and outcome measures. The former is the perspective of the student 
and their progress that provides a reference point for outcome measures (Astin & 
Antonio 2012). Thus, we may have similar assessment measures but the goals in 
setting these outcomes measures and their application differs when we consider 
conceptual outcomes. Outcome measures, on the other hand, are directed 
towards the best means to measure personal development – the how of 
assessment. Different students are at different stages of development and whose 
singularity may be better suited to certain forms of assessment. When the 
question of how we assess is posed this way, we then make salient the unique 
backgrounds of learners and their subjective trajectory (the properties of the 
domain of psychobiography). Thus, two issues follow when we consider the best 
means to document learning – the conceptual outcome that references student 
development and an outcome measure that aims to synergise differentiated 
developmental trajectories with shared subject content.  
 
The argument proposed here is against norm-referenced assessment – in the case 
of norm referenced assessment we have de-differentiation in assessment under 
the pretext of equanimity. In universalised norm referenced assessment, in which 
grading is relativised, considering the performance of other students, the student 
is graded against pre-defined impersonal outcomes. What follows are forms of 
assessment – whether summative or formative – that neglect personalised 
learning trajectory, including the efficacy of assessment in reference to this 
personalised trajectory. Instead, criterion referenced assessment is better suited 
to personalist ends and advancing student learning. The advantage of criterion 
referenced assessment is that it sets standards for content mastery and 
acknowledges an epistemic authority to the subject matter without compromising 
the agentic authority of the learner. Both better prepared and less prepared 
students are assessed to the same standards but the time scale and means of 
assessment may differ.   
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In terms of assessment practice, outcome measures, in how they are designed, 
may be used to either enhance or neglect personalised conceptual outcomes. 
Consequently, examples of assessment strategies provided below should be 
understood in the context of alternative relational educational practices that are 
responsive to a student’s developmental trajectory (the axiomatic dimension of 
relational reason). Thus, these same assessment strategies – the Adaptive 
dimension of relational reason – may be utilised for different conceptual 
outcomes (the ought of assessment practice). Here the difference is in an objective 
to re-think the conceptual outcomes of assessment (the ought of assessment) so 
that the axiomatic dimension – recognized in the specificity of student 
development – shapes the application of assessment strategies. Again, we return 
to the nature of the social link – the common good – that defines the nature of 
practices and the manner they are applied in referential detachment to student 
development.   
 
Re-thinking the value dimension of higher education practice in terms of the 
common good, as stated, means practices are not reduced either to individual 
preference or societal regulation (homo economicus and homo sociologicus). 
Instead, it resides in arrangements organised to advance a civil democracy and 
the conditions of solidarity. The development of the student is part of these 
arrangements; hence, higher education provides relational goods that are 
available to all. In this context, institutions adopt a logic of transcendence in 
which educational provision is not distributed as a scarce good designed for 
better prepared students. Whatever stage of development, higher education 
provision should aim to adapt to the student’s personal pre-dispositions and stage 
of development. The notion of higher education with personal ends is not only 
incompatible with previously covered hegemonic policy models but also 
traditional views of ‘excellence’ in a ‘reputation and resources’ view of provision 
(Astin & Antonio 2012; Astin 2016). In a ‘reputation and resources’ approach to 
assessment, selective institutions compete for better prepared students and 
funding, with excellence defined in terms of what institutions do and the 
resources they attract to further research. Cyclically this approach is intended to 
enhance institutional reputation to attract ‘better’ students and further funding.  
 
The focus in a ‘reputation and resources’ approach is, therefore, re-oriented to 
the institution, rather than the good of student development. An orientation 
towards instrumental goals – whether in meeting a work-skills gap or a logic of 
institutional acquisitiveness – leads to a view of assessment as primarily intended 
to judge learning. This is the case as learning is set-up for given impersonal ends, 
before or post-entry into higher education and outcomes are intended to further 
institutional or governance policies and practices. What follows is an imposed 
<183> 
scarcity in which education is an opportunity to enhance employability in a 
competitive workplace or a norm-referenced credentialing in which some are 
set-up to 'succeed'. In contrast, education for all – a relational good – is tied to 
relationships in which the good of the learner is set-out in reciprocal relations. 
Relations – in this alternative higher education context – ties personal and social 
histories to advance a morphogenetic social order that is oriented to reciprocal 
relations in which all students are set-up to develop, in reference to their personal 
learning histories. Further, there is no necessary compromise in learning 
standards in a re-orientation to student development as this does not 
compromise ‘excellence’ in regard to standards but re-articulates ‘excellence’ so 
that it is responsive to what students do to meet subject standards. Instead of a 
pre-supposing definition of what is a culture of ‘success’ (as noted in chapter five), 
resources and funding are not artificially sanctioned and distributed but pertain 
to reflexive arrangements and interactive dynamics in which institutions co-
operate on pedagogical practices, subject content, types of courses and 
assessment. Considering this alternative view of higher education policy and 
practice, below are examples of assessment practices and the manner these 
practices – a relational rationality – advance the Latent dimension of relational 
reason: 
 
(a) Greater reliance on narrative evaluation: Narrative evaluation is part of an 
iterative mentoring process in which teachers and peers provide detailed 
feedback to meet the specific stage of development of a learner. Narrative 
evaluation – whether supplementing or replacing grading – is developed 
specifically to identify strengths and possible improvements for specific learners, 
including what students need to do to develop (Astin & Antonio 2012). Greater 
reliance on narrative evaluation is a complementary means in the context of a 
sustainable assessment that monitors the developmental trajectory of a student. 
Specifically, it is based on a differentiation between an assessment of learning and 
an assessment for learning (Boud & Solder 2016). Assessment for learning aims to 
generate the independence of the learner to then be capable – in the long term – 
to judge their own work and identify areas to develop. Reflexive learners are then 
in a better position to identify what may need further development and for 
teachers to then assist the learner with subject skills to make the required 
transition. Gradually, through mentoring, the goal is to equip the learner to self-
assess their learning in what needs to be done to further their development.  
 
Narrative based assessment strategies, therefore, are part of an iterative process 
to enhance the learning process and may be incorporated into a variety of 
pedagogical and assessment practices and strategies. Examples include peer 
assessment, learning portfolios and essay questions specifically designed to 
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develop meta-cognitive skills that promote learner independence. Further, in 
student/teacher partnerships, in curriculum design, assessment strategies are 
part of a feedback loop – a virtuous cycle – that informs possible changes to 
pedagogical practices and areas of development for learning. The goal is to 
integrate teaching into the assessment process so that it is responsive to the 
student and their learning. Thus, as Boud & Solder (2016) state, the process of 
assessment is part of a feedback loop and an active part of the curriculum to 
enable students to achieve learning outcomes in the context of student 
development: 
 
For assessment tasks to be positioned as sustainable, the whole process 
of assessment must be conceived of as an active part of the curriculum to 
enable students to achieve particular outcomes, not just a means of 
ascertaining whether outcome have been achieved or not. This means 
that assessment needs to be consciously and holistically designed to 
scaffold processes of learning, including students’ management of their 
learning, and lead over the timescale of a course to activities that enable 
the demonstration of what has been learned. At early and mid-stages, 
there would be an emphasis on feedback processes and the building of 
capacity for students to make judgements of their own work. Later, the 
emphasis would shift to emphasise the assurance and portrayal of 
learning. A focus on sustainable assessment involves attention being paid 
to the integration of these elements and the building of capacity through 
all assessment acts for students to make increasingly better judgements. 
(Boud & Solder 2016: 407) 
 
The aim in guiding the learner through a sustainable learning process is to enable 
an independent learner that is then capable of identifying their learning goals and 
to reference subject skills and content to realise these goals. Criterion referenced 
assessment is better suited for this purpose, as its makes salient content 
standards and contextualises learning outcomes in the context of the student’s 
development, aiming to build their capacity as reflexive learners.  
 
(b) Documenting student trajectories: The objective in documenting a learning 
trajectory is to support the above noted assessment for learning. Through 
documenting a learning trajectory, there are possibilities to monitor student 
development over time. This may be contrasted with an assessment designed to 
judge the learner against universalized outcomes and in reference to other 
students at a particular period in time. For example, a longitudinal database of 
student development may be instituted from early schooling to university 
entrance, to document personalised development (Astin & Antonio 2012). As 
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higher education should aim to educate all students – regardless of point of 
development – then the importance of documenting student learning is part of a 
revision of institutional and pedagogical practices to be responsive to different 
personal histories.  
 
Further, the validity of assessment methods, as an outcome measure, pertains to 
the manner it documents and sustains learning and thus adopted strategies for 
assessment should be capable of measuring assessment over time for the sake of 
student development. With norm referenced assessment – designed to measure 
learning at set periods – there is a tendency to measure outcomes but without 
recourse to personalised development and its iterative effect, as a causal input, in 
the learning process. Here the objective is to move from what is being assessed to 
how it is being assessed and the impact this may have on the individual learner. 
Outcome measures, this way, are viewed in an integrative relation to conceptual 
outcomes and as a means to document learning trajectories that leads to 
responsive assessment strategies.  
 
(c) Differentiating outcomes measures and learning outcomes: If the goal is to 
assist student development in reference to subject content then this goal may be 
reached in different ways. As noted above, the outcome measures we select 
implicates how we then adopt assessment measures (Astin & Antonio 2012). The 
process of selection of suitable measures is pre-supposed by the conceptual 
question on why we choose to identify certain outcomes as important areas for 
assessment. Adopting personalist terms of assessment, in identifying these areas, 
means a return to the student in the context of an iterative assessment cycle; 
thus, this means both assessment means and outcomes may differ between 
students i.e. both outcome measures and learning outcomes are in relation of 
referential detachment to the student.   
 
In terms of practical application, there are different paths in which students may 
reach intended cognitive and affective outcomes and curriculum design and 
pedagogical practice should reflect this. Hence, as each student aims to enhance 
their learning then outcomes pertain to where a student may be at a certain stage 
in their development. Further, this puts into question time scaled courses that are 
independent of learners and their stage of development. Subject standards may 
be reached through different assessment strategies and standards may be 
reached to different times scales. To answer which measures should be selected 
or developmental time scales adopted is to return to personal ends.    
  
(d) The curriculum and student involvement: Student involvement is an 
important dimension in the design and implementation of the curriculum (Astin 
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1999). Here advocated is a co-curricular partnership in which subject content is 
tailored for student learning. The perspective of the student informs curricular 
design so that the learner is set in an active position. Student involvement in 
curricular design should be viewed in an inclusive sense – envisaged is the 
development of mentoring partnerships to enable the development of a self-
reflexive learner about their personal development. Again, the focus is on what 
the student does and their own personal stage of development. Incorporated here 
are curricular developments to include activities designed to generate initiative 
and active learning. Examples of interventions that may be included in course 
design – to encourage behavioural changes – extends to self-reflexive learning 
diaries, peer networking between learners at different stages of development and 
joint teacher-student activities. These different initiatives also aim to develop 
cognitive and affective outcomes. Cognitive outcomes refer to the development 
of specific subject skills. Affective outcome, on the other hand, are more 
encompassing and includes the development of behavioural outcomes such as, 
for example, the manner learning leads to the development of an ecumenical 
world-view, leadership, social responsibility and motivation for further learning 
(Astin & Antonio 2012: 61). Both cognitive and affective outcomes are inter-related 
– for example, the development of student involvement, in regard to subject 
learning, aims to further student motivation to reflexively monitor their own 
learning and what needs to be done to further this learning17.   
 
Importantly student involvement may be utilised to diagnosis multi-dimensional 
outcome measures, in collaboration with the learner. The goal, in a student 
involvement in the selection of appropriate assessment strategies, is to develop a 
self-reflexive capacity in which the student understands their stage of learning 
and what to do next in meeting learning standards, to advance their learning. As 
teaching, in this approach, is focused on what students do then teaching is re-
defined, as stated above, in the form of a responsive mentoring that relies on an 
iterative narrative evaluation that is criterion referenced.     
 
Further, as the mission of higher education is the education of all students then 
the development of pedagogical practices for learning, including the development 
of student motivation, are intended to encourage the under-prepared and passive 
student. Consequently, student involvement in co-curricular partnerships is an 
example of higher education provision that aims to be responsive to the student 
                                               
17  Furthermore, assessment practice designed to develop both cognitive and 
affective outcomes plays a part in the development of a meta-reflexive subjectivity. Here 
the inclusion of behavioural outcomes re-orients learning towards the generation of 
relational goods and subjectivities that sustain these goods. 
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in reference to the differentiated properties of the domain of psychobiography. 
Reflexive arrangements, therefore, would reference the properties of the domain 
of psychobiography and it is this domain that informs transformative educational 
practice (the axiomatic dimension of relational reason). 
 
Finally, a relational direction for higher education aims to place the student at the 
heart of the system. However, affirming a referential detachment to the person 
(the realisation of human dignity) re-directs the centrality of the student from a 
rhetorical acknowledgement, pre-supposed by impersonal ends of given policy 
agendas, to one that aims to articulate fallibist practices responsive to student 
development. If we return to Donati’s model of relational reason, two distinct 
approaches may be contrasted – first, in higher education policy, as seen in 
chapter five, there is an appropriation of the integrative dimension of an AGIL 
scheme through governance goals (power and achievement of goals i.e. goal 
oriented rationality). Second, the relational turn takes the integrative dimension 
– reflexive arrangements – to be grounded in the axiomatic dimension. Reflexive 
arrangements (subsidiarity), therefore, informed by a transcendental realism, 
acknowledges the personal properties of student development as the basis of a 
relational rationality. Therefore, two central points may be posited in regard to a 
broader approach to higher education provision: 
 
(1) The primacy of the singular: Primacy is ascribed to the singular – the basis 
of a homo relatus conception of the citizen. The singular – in a relational 
context – is the basis of higher education relations and relational concerns 
emergent from the context of provision is transformed in solidarity to this 
singular (the properties of the domain of psychobiography). It is the 
interactive dimensions of the domain of situated activity that anchors the 
process of social morphogenesis in which a mission of education for all – 
in referential detachment to student development – establishes the 
normative expectations and resources of an adaptive higher education. As 
noted earlier in the chapter, specificity is the normative problem of policy.  
(2) A co-operative ‘system’ approach: A co-operative ‘system’ approach is 
opposed to both an artificially imposed scarcity in regard to educational 
goods and an acquisitive institutional logic. This co-operative ‘system’ 
approach, as Astin (2016) argues, seeks to develop an institutional 
infrastructure that shares promising approaches to develop student 
learning at different levels of preparation. The totality of higher education 
relations – in a mission to educate all students – are designed to enhance 
the common good through this exchange of relational goods. Further, in a 
relational reflexivity, there is an a-symmetry in the development of 
practices to advance the learning of under-prepared students. Here the 
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common good of higher education belongs to all participants and is not 
something sanctioned or regulated through impersonal ends.   
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter sought to propose an alternative policy direction and the possible 
applications of this direction in higher education practice. First, a justification was 
offered on a relational understanding between an external value judgement and 
internal social scientific practice. Here an argument was made on the necessity of 
an external value judgement – in continuity with a necessity of a transcendental 
reasoning – but one that is an immanent relation to internal practice. Thus, this 
transcendental realism implicates an ontological grounding for an external value 
judgement in the types of concerns different orders are dispositioned to generate. 
What follows is a relational dialogue between reason and value in which there is 
an immanent interplay between normativity and ontology and this entails 
educational practices that are defined in referential detachment to relations that 
define the material and non-material good of persons. 
 
The common good is the glue that binds this interplay between normativity and 
ontology. If solidarity is understood as a re-orientation of relations and practices 
so they are sensitive to the ontological properties of the objective Other, then 
reflexive arrangements (subsidiarity) aims to sustain these relations and the glue 
that brings persons together. It is the common good that links solidarity with 
subsidiarity and provides meaning and purpose to their relation; it is in this 
relation that there is a deep citizenship understood in the context of a Civil 
Democracy. In this Civil Democracy the focus is on sustaining relational goods, in 
a mutually reinforcing relation between primary and secondary relational goods. 
Relational goods, in contrast to utilitarian goods that are sanctioned and 
distributed, are defined by personalist objectives. In this environment, provision 
aims to educate all, in reference to the development of each learner.  
 
Examples of relational goods were provided in a student development model of 
the curriculum. In a developmental model of the curriculum, relational goods 
inhere, in the examples provided, in assessment practices (what and how learning 
is assessed) that reference the learner’s development. Thus, validity of assessment 
is defined in reference to the value dimension of conceptual outcomes (the ought 
of educational provision). In terms of a relational reason, assessment strategies 
are instrumental means that are interconnected and shaped by the Latent (L) 
dimension of a relational reason. Consequently, the aim is to adopt appropriate 
outcome measures – the Adaptive (A) dimension of relational reason – in ways 
that reference student development in complementary reflexive arrangements. 
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Further, certain strategies, in their design and application, are more compatible 
and complement personal learning trajectories (assessment for learning). 
Narrative based assessment, documenting student developmental trajectories 
and student participation in curriculum design are all examples of strategies and 
paths – a relational rationality – that, in their design, focus on what students do 
to meet subject criteria; again, it is what students do that defines the validity of 
assessment strategies.   
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Concluding Remarks 
 
 
The thesis started with an overview of attempts at articulating a policy vision that 
focused on the social as a corrective measure, in achieving pre-given policy objectives. 
Setting a precedent, New Labour, attempted to transcend what was viewed as the 
policies of the old Left and New Right through advocating a third way that reconciles 
what were viewed as antagonistic policy approaches. In this third way, New Labour 
viewed an investment in consensual social spaces as a way of managing contingencies 
to meet policy outcomes. An investment in the social meant generating the right supply 
side condition for a provision of opportunity – integrationist policies – that would then 
lead to behavioural changes e.g. responsibilities that come with rights. Together the 
provision of opportunity and the making of subjectivities brought with it the two goal 
of a fairness agenda and enhanced economic performance in adapting to a changing 
globalised world. Workfare policies were central to New Labour’s goal of generating 
behavioural changes in that it assumed these changes meant individuals were 
connected to the right social networks and claimed their stake in an economy that 
worked for those marginalized. The regulation of social pressures through managerial 
means, to meet given objectives, was an important facet of policy reforms and part of a 
social investment state. 
 
The Conservative ‘Big Society’ agenda continued with New Labour’s third way rhetoric 
but placed greater emphasis on a moral underclass discourse. In this moral underclass 
discourse, there exists a greater emphasis on a supposed dependency culture and 
broader normative breakdown. However, with this focus on behavioural pathologies 
there is also a stated commitment to a welfare beyond the state. The state, in this 
approach, is seen to regulate the social – similar to New Labour – to generate possible 
avenues that bring about required behavioural changes. Here the social – between the 
state and the individual – provides the right environment for individuals and 
communities to help themselves. In terms of welfare provision what is advocated is an 
enabling state that assists and provides the required know-how and tools to sustain a 
process view of welfare co-production. The integrationist turn, therefore, appears in 
an attempt to utilise this re-thinking of welfare provisions so that it brings about 
holistic changes in communities and individuals. A posited holistic change is seen in 
advocating an ownership of provision so that there is a bottom-up accountability, 
individual choice and competition. Devolved power also comes with a re-structuring of 
choice context, so that individuals value the right choices and are self-dependent in 
their ownership of these devolved powers.  The idea of nudges is an example of an 
intervention in the citizen’s decision context in which there is an effort to incentivise 
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certain behavioural paths in both individual choices but also in incentivising an 
ownership of provision (a Libertarian Welfarism). 
 
The noted policy overview of governance models demonstrated the existence of a view 
of the citizen as person. Consistent with third way thinking there is an attempted 
reconciliation between the strategic subjectivity of homo economicus and the socially 
regulated subjectivity of homo sociologicus. In homo economicus there is an attempt to 
generate the self-dependent citizen that when provided with the right know-how and 
tools for advancement – or social mobility – is then able to claim their stake and make 
the right choices. Thus, for example, student choice in the context of competition 
between institutions is highlighted in higher education provision. Homo sociologicus, on 
the other hand, represents the socially regulated citizen. In regulating social roles there 
is an attempt to engineer the infrastructure of provision so that the terms of exchange 
of individual choices are pre-defined. In different ways, both New Labour and the ‘Big 
Society’ agenda attempted to synthesise both views of the person in ways that were 
consistent with their broader policy vision. 
 
A textual analysis of ‘Higher Education: Students at the Heart of the System’ 
demonstrated continuity with policy themes discussed in chapter three. Higher 
education provision was viewed as part of a fairness agenda in which it offered access 
to labour markets and enables social mobility. This emphasis on providing work-based 
skills was seen in the regulation of higher education provision in a shaping of relations 
between universities, businesses and student needs. The regulation of provision, 
including its relations and practices, put the needs of businesses and economic 
performance first and it was for universities to provide a service responsive to the 
needs of the wider economy. Further, the needs of the students, rhetorically activated, 
were viewed in terms of gaining the right work related skills. The acquisition of right 
skills was part of a fairness agenda – returning to the theme of policy triangulation – 
and aimed to enhance social mobility and the access of strategic resources in relevant 
social networks. This higher education infrastructure sets the terms of exchange (homo 
sociologicus) in which strategic styles of subjectivity are then enacted (homo 
economicus). 
 
The final two chapters of the thesis are organically tied and attempted to articulate an 
alternative policy vision based on a homo relatus conception of personhood. First, 
chapter six sought to propose and justify a realist view of personhood. The argument 
presented set-out to tackle necessary questions that all theoretical accounts of 
personhood consider, whether implicitly or explicitly. The account of personhood 
starts with a justification of a transcendental reasoning and specifically the use of a 
transcendental realist underlabourer to articulate an ontology of personhood and the 
conditions of its possibility. The basis of this transcendental realism was identified in a 
referential detachment that affirms the latent model of an object. The latent model of 
an object establishes the possibility of reference but whose terms are fallibist and open 
to revision. Thus, the argument follows that personhood is a possible point of reference. 
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In accounting for the conditions of possibility of an emergent personhood personal 
identity the question then moves to the nature of transmission of collective discursive 
objects and the mechanisms that facilitate this transmission. Empirically the working 
of mirror neurons substantiates a realist distinction between the irreducible powers of 
subjectivity and those of collective objects. Both of these dimensions, in an analytical 
dualism, are acknowledged. 
 
The interplay between the irreducible powers of the subjective and objective then 
implicates questions on the properties of an internal deliberation – in how we 
understand personal emergent properties – and the manner the societal enters these 
deliberations and the manner a personal identity responds and then adopts to a certain 
personal identity. In investigating these questions revisions were proposed, in which 
the properties of the domain of psychobiography were viewed as a mediatory factor, in 
differentiated multiverse social universe, rather than the link in the 
subjective/objective interplay. Here the goal is to distinguish between the internal 
deliberations of individuals, including their psychobiography, from the institutional 
features of the social and the collective reflexivity of corporate actors. Further, the 
necessity of a reflexive consciousness, preparing us for our social becoming, is 
questioned. Instead, the enactment of a reflexive capacity is understood in 
developmental terms and in reference to the properties of the domain of 
psychobiography. The idea of a cognitive continuum empirically substantiates this 
revision and views the interaction between different mechanisms – developmentally – 
as the basis of differentiated singularities. Importantly, the properties of the domain of 
psychobiography establishes the latent model of personal ends; it is the latent model of 
personal ends that will then be acknowledged as the basis of transformative and fallibist 
educational practices. 
 
Chapter seven takes the themes discussed in the previous chapter to then present a 
realist turn in policy. First, it is argued that an ‘ought’ may be derived from an ‘is’ and 
that distinct ontological orders (natural, practical and discursive) are dispositioned to 
generate certain concerns that need to be subjectively navigated. Thus, an interplay 
between normativity and ontology implicates an inherent relationality between 
external and internal value judgements. It was argued that the relationality of 
emergence of a personal identity, in reference to distinct ontological orders, implicates 
personal ends that are responsive to this interplay and in reference to the domain of 
psychobiography (the basis of singularities). Accordingly, solidarity to difference 
requires complementary reflexive social arrangements that are not extrinsically 
regulated through pre-given impersonal governance agendas. 
 
The link between solidarity and subsidiarity is defined by the common good. The 
common good, different to utilitarian goods, is the social link that connects people 
together. It is the totality of social relations that are structured to advance the end of 
human dignity and figures in fallibist arrangements that seeks to integrate difference 
that defines human dignity. Here relational rights mean a recognition of the rights of 
<193> 
 
ontological difference in the integration of the Adaptive dimension (A) and Goal 
oriented rationality of relational reason. In this integration supply side interventions 
are highlighted in ways that are responsive to this difference (the Latent (L) dimension 
of relational reason). The notion of a deep citizenship is part of supply side 
interventions, in which a meta-reflexive mode of reflexivity is incentivised. The meta-
reflexive mode of reflexivity directs their personal deliberations to the efficacy of social 
arrangements in deepening the Latent (L) dimension of relational reason. 
 
Finally, contextual examples were provided in the form of a developmental model of the 
curriculum and the validity of assessment practices were defined in what students do 
and how student learning relates to their development. The ‘ought’ of assessment 
practice then shapes assessment strategies and how they are applied (the ‘is’ of 
assessment). The personal history of the student – in a referential detachment to the 
properties of the domain of pscyhobiography – shapes how we assess learning. Further, 
being responsive to personal histories does not mean a neglect of learning standards. 
Rather, the objective is to educate all students and to develop learning standards in 
reference to the stage of personal student development. Thus, education provision is 
not viewed as an impersonal scarce good that is distributed to the largest possible 
number of individuals. Instead, it is a relational good that is intrinsically responsive to 
personal difference.    
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Glossary of Key Terms 
 
 
Policy Triangulation: Policy triangulation is a policy approach that attempts to 
reconcile two positions that may be viewed in antagonistic terms. In attempting 
to reconcile different positions the positive features of each position are 
highlighted and brought together in ways that create a new synthesis and third 
way (Alderwick 2012). 
Modality & Evaluation: Fairclough defines modality in terms of what authors of 
a text commit themselves to when making statements, asking questions or 
making demands (Fairclough 2003: 165). Markers of modality in a text point to 
levels commitments. Evaluation is tied to modality in that it refers to the ways 
authors, whether explicitly or implicitly, commit themselves to values i.e. 
statements of desirability and undesirability (Fairclough 2003: 171)  
Interdiscursivity: Interdiscursivity refers to the ways a mixture of genres, 
discourses and styles – order of discourse – are articulated in a text. Fairclough 
views interdiscursive analysis to mediate between the linguistic analysis of text 
and the level of social events and practices that articulation of orders of 
discourse refer to (Fairclough 2003). 
Intertextuality: Intertextuality points to the manner a text refers to other texts 
and the manner these texts are referred to e.g. are they dialogued with or 
rejected (Fairclough 2003). 
Genre Chains: Genre chains refers to the ways genres are linked together and 
the ways this linking figure as part of the semiotic aspects of social practice. 
Thus, the way different genres are linked and articulated together point to ways 
meanings are generated in a re-contextualisation of genres from one context to 
another. If a genre, for example, pertaining to business practice – e.g. consumer 
feedback – is selectively appropriated in public service provision then this 
implicates questions on the meanings that are filtered in this linking of different 
genres (Fairclough 2003: 31-33).   
Philosophical/Substantive ontology: Philosophical ontology, or an account of 
being, asks ontological questions on the nature of the world that makes 
scientific practice possible. It derives its premises from scientific conditions of 
practice to then postulate transcendental arguments that answer philosophical 
questions on the nature of the world that makes an object a possible point of 
investigation (Bhaskar 2008: 26). While a philosophical ontology acts as a 
philosophical underlabourer on what the world must be like for scientific 
practice to be intelligible, substantive ontology refers to tools developed to 
investigate the structures of the object studied.  
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Double/Triple Morphogenesis: Double morphogenesis relates to the process of 
interplay between the properties and powers of the subject and object. In this 
interplay, Personal Emergent Properties (PEP) deliberate on the powers of 
objective positions, with the goal of reaching a subjective alignment (the 
emergence of a personal identity) to then adopt a social identity. In the first 
instance, the ‘I’ deliberates on its natal context (‘Me’); here the response may 
lead to reproducing this content or seeking to change its properties in some way 
in the emergence of a personal identity (‘You’). An attempt to change the 
properties of the natal context (Primary Agent) may be identified in the 
dissatisfaction of an ‘I’ in regard to its natal context; what follows is an 
identification with the role of the Corporate Agent (‘We’). If the subject adopts 
corporate action then, in this instance, “agency leads to structural and cultural 
elaboration, but is itself elaborated in the process” (Archer 2000: 258). Triple 
morphogenesis refers to an extension of double morphogenesis in which 
persons adopt the role of Corporate Agents and with this transform the 
objective properties of social roles that actors occupy.   
Analytical Dualism: Analytical dualism acknowledges the distinction between 
subjective and objective dimensions of social life and analyses their interplay as 
irreducible emergent properties. Here the goal is to investigate this interplay 
without conflating the irreducible properties of the subjective and objective. The 
process of morphogensis is an explanatory model in which the noted interplay is 
investigated as cycles in which personal emergent properties interplay with 
structural and cultural emergent ones and thus lead to the elaboration of both.    
Transitive/Intransitive: The transitive dimension refers to fallibist knowledge, 
at a given time, in regard to the nature of the world. The aim of transitive 
knowledge is to arrive at better approximations of the object investigated. The 
object investigated, being the basis of fallibist theories, exists independently of 
current theories. The intransitive dimension, therefore, is the nature of an object 
investigated that exists independently of current theories. Progressive transitive 
theories aim to deepen its understanding of the intransitive dimension (Collier 
1994).    
Meta-reflexive: Archer (2012) identifies four modes of reflexivity – 
communicative, autonomous, meta-reflexive and fractured reflexivity. In the 
communicative mode of reflexivity “internal conversations need to be confirmed 
and completed by others before they lead to action” (Archer 2012: 13). In 
contrast, in the autonomous mode of reflexivity “internal conversations are self-
contained, leading directly to action” (Archer 2012: 13). The meta-reflexive mode 
of reflexivity is one in which “internal conversations critically evaluate previous 
inner dialogues and are critical about effective action in society”. Finally, in a 
fractured reflexivity internal conversations “cannot lead to purposeful courses 
of action, but intensify personal distress and disorientation resulting in 
expressive action.” (Archer 2012: 13). The meta-reflexive mode of reflexivity is 
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viewed to be harmonious with a relational view of the citizen in a critical 
dispositionality towards primary relational goods and if the context of these 
goods (secondary relational goods) deepen the Latent dimension of relation 
reason.  
Referential Detachment: The notion of referential detachment, adopted from 
Bhaskar, is the procedure in which when we refer to our external environment; 
when we refer to this externality it is necessary to referentially detach from the 
object to then understand it. The detachment of the act of reference from that 
which it refers to, argues Bhaskar, establishes an existential separation between 
the referential act and referent, if the referent is to be intelligible and open to 
discursive articulation (Bhaskar 2000). 
Domain of Psychobiography: The domain of psychobiography is the basis of 
what makes us singularities. It consists of a unique subjective trajectory of lived 
experiences; the basis of this unique trajectory is an interaction between 
irreducible personal emergent properties and external circumstances. What 
results from this interaction is an individuated subjective configuration of 
experiences – emergent from our relations with our environment – and 
grounded in the vantage point of the self and the characteristics defined by this 
trajectory. Thus, we confront the social with unique backgrounds that are 
irreducible to the objective dimensions of the social world (Layder 2006).  
Generative Mechanism: In critical realism generative mechanisms are identified 
as the latent model of the object; according to Bhaskar it is the way of acting of a 
thing (Bhaskar 2008). This way of acting is understood as the powers of an object 
that are independent of perceived events that it may generate. Thus, generative 
mechanisms, as causal powers, are existentially separate from events and 
patterns of events (Collier 1994).  
Relational Reason: Relation reason is based on Donati’s (2014) adaptation of 
Parson’s AGIL model. Donati adapts this model as an orientation of action, rather 
than a fixed theory. First, there is the Adaptive dimension that relates to 
instrumental means. Second, is Goal oriented rationality that relates to political 
power and the achievement of definite targets. Third, is the Integrative 
dimension (I) that relates to a process in which both the Adaptive dimension and 
Goal oriented rationality are linked to advance the Latent dimension (L) of 
relation reason. The Latent dimension is the value end of a relational rationality 
i.e. the Integrative dimension of relational reason. Specifically, the Latent 
dimension references the end of human dignity (the end of human dignity is 
defined in a solidarity to the ontological properties of difference).  
Norm & Criterion referenced assessment: Criterion referenced assessment 
aims to measure learning outcomes based on the place of a learner in reference 
to given subject standards. Norm referenced assessment, on the other hand, 
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aims to measure student learning in reference to a larger cohort of students 
(Petty 2009). 
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